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SUMMARY
In the last half century, the aerospace industry has seen a dramatic paradigm shift
from a focus on performance-at-any-cost to product economics and value. The steady
increase in product requirements, complexity and global competition has driven aircraft
manufacturers to seek broad portfolios of advanced technologies. The development costs
and cycle times of these technologies vary widely, and the resulting design environment is one
where decisions must be made under substantial uncertainty. Major sources of frustration,
capital loss, and schedule slippage in aerospace development projects can be traced back to
the understanding or handling of uncertainty and the consequences of the decisions made
under that uncertainty.
Modeling and simulation have recently become the standard practice for addressing these
issues; detailed simulations and explorations of candidate future states of these systems help
reduce a complex design problem into a comprehensible, manageable form where decision
factors are prioritized. There have been several important advancements in system design
methods that have leveraged modeling and simulation to carry out structured analyses.
Nevertheless, the field is still growing quickly–especially in the domain of probabilistic
methods that treat uncertainty quantification and mitigation. These analyses attempt to
reduce overall uncertainty in cost, performance and schedule by delivering holistic analyses
with the ability to examine the key engineering and programmatic trades: Should I risk
making the product in-house or outsource the manufacturing? What is the best technology
portfolio and how do I optimize and adapt it to my risk tolerance constraints? While there
are still fundamental criticisms about using modeling and simulation approaches (pertaining
to fidelity, model form, applicability of assumptions and scalability, etc.), the emerging
challenge becomes How do you best configure uncertainty analyses and the information they
produce to address real world problems?
One such analysis methodology was developed in this thesis by structuring the input,
xxi
models, and output to answer questions about the risk and economic impact of technology
decisions in future aircraft programs. Unlike other methods, this method placed emphasis
on the uncertainty in the cumulative cashflow space as the integrator of economic viability.
From this perspective, it then focused on exploration of the design and technology space to
tailor the business case and its associated risk in the cash flow dimension. The methodology
is called CASSANDRA and is intended to be executed by a program manager (or executive)
of a manufacturer working of the development of future concepts. The program manager
has the ability to control design elements as well as the new technology allocation on that
aircraft. She is also responsible for the elicitation of the uncertainty in those dimensions
within control as well as the external scenarios (that are out of program control).
The methodology was applied on a future single-aisle 150-passenger aircraft design so
as to evaluate the cost and schedule implications of a composite materials technology. The
problem was scoped away from searching for highly improbable or unforeseeable failure
modes and focused on a broader impact of design, technology and scenario uncertainty.
The research contributions resulting from the proposed methodology may be considered
at two levels. The overall methodology is compared to existing approaches and is shown to
identify more economically robust design decisions under a set of at-risk program scenarios.
Additionally, a set of metrics in the uncertain cumulative cashflow space were developed
to assist the methodology user in the identification, evaluation, and selection of design and
technology. These metrics are compared to alternate approaches and are shown to better
identify risk efficient design and technology selections.
At the modeling level, an approach is given to estimate the production quantity based on
an enhanced Overall Evaluation Criterion method that captures the competitive advantage
of the aircraft design. This model was needed as the assumption of production quantity is
highly influential to the business case risk.
Finally, the research explored the capacity to generate risk mitigation strategies into
two analysis configurations: when available data and simulation capacity are abundant, and
when they are sparse or incomplete. The first configuration leverages structured filtration
of Monte Carlo simulation results. The allocation of design and technology risk is then
xxii
identified on the Pareto Frontier. The second configuration identifies the direction of robust
risk mitigation based on the available data and limited simulation ability. It leverages a
linearized approximation of the cashflow metrics and identifies the direction of allocation
using the Jacobian matrix and its inversion.
The result of the dissertation was a methodology that enabled early design and technol-





Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being rash.
General George S. Patton
As modern aircraft systems continuously grow in complexity and development cost,
the burden on product development managers to develop successful aircraft programs is
increased. Consequently, there is a clear and present need for the continuous development
of formalized methods to augment the decision information available during the design
of aerospace vehicles [107]. Unfortunately, with the rise in system complexity comes a
rise in net uncertainty of the system itself, particularly when the implementation of new
technologies, materials and processes are critical to the expected product success. In new
aircraft development programs, the decisions regarding the investment of billions of dollars
in research, development, manufacturing and assembly infrastructure must be made very
early on and in the presence of sparse data and abundant uncertainty. In the lack of
competition, this may not pose a significant challenge, but modern commercial and military
aircraft industries experience aggressive competition between a small number of key players.
Failure in this context is unacceptable, and as the adage goes for aircraft developers, ‘every
new aircraft bets the company ’ [35].
The ultimate decision to launch the project will depend on a judgment about the quality
of the assumptions and the treatment of the uncertainty in the analysis presented. Share-
holders in the project are likely to ask How sure are you about the results presented?
As the decision to include technologies is often made before they are fully mature, the
resulting uncertainty and risk must therefore be managed. From the technical perspective,
this typically translates into managing the cost and time line of the technology develop-
ment, its application on the aircraft, and the manufacturing setup. From the programmatic
perspective, the investment and profitability aspects must also exhibit favorable qualities
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of risk and reward. The fundamental need for its management stems from this simple per-
spective: If I do nothing, there are consequences; but if I do something, the consequences
may be improved. The risk management problem can then be reduced to the four questions:
1. What happens if I do nothing? - answered through risk analysis and other technical
studies
2. What happens if I do something? - answered through assessment of alternatives and
their integration in the system
3. What is the penalty/payoff for trying to reduce/confirm a given risk level? - answered
through exploration of the risk mitigation power and the costs of the identified miti-
gation strategies
4. What should I do? - answered through alignment of the decision to core program or
enterprise strategy and selection
Forecasting the effects of uncertainty on complex systems follows a similar logical se-
quence: uncertainty elicitation (or identification and description of uncertain parameters),
propagation of that uncertainty through a system to achieve distributed responses (via mod-
eling and simulation), and uncertainty mitigation (alternative selection and execution). The
end result of risk management is an explorative measurement of the implications of uncer-
tainty entry and their combined effect on the decisions and trade-offs between alternatives.
Many authors believe that risk is an integral part of successful product development
management [50]. The challenge lies in how uncertainty information is developed and
treated in complex system design environments such that the quality of the risky decision
is maximized by the specific, in-depth information about the risk. Decision-making in this
context is often considered as much an art as it is a science: a blend of the objective and
physical with the subjective and psychological. In its most basic form, design activities and
the body of decision making processes can be viewed as the ongoing balance between risk
and reward.
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1.1 Forecasting and Risk
An appreciation of the feasible scope of research is pertinent here–before delving deeper into
the topic. A technical decision has the following attributes: an uncertainty about the result,
the consequential effects of such result and a lead time before those effects are realized. As
methods and processes improve the ability to deal with the uncertainty and risk, Twiss
states that with forecasting technology there are:
...too many unknowns surrounding the future for us to ever hope to forecast it
with certainty. These forecasts will inevitably contain errors, but this cannot be
avoided. Our decisions must be made in the present using the best information
available at the time, but it behooves us to use it in the most effective way...
although [forecasting] cannot eliminate uncertainty, it can assist in reducing it;
thereby a better view of the future and its evolution can be obtained, leading
to better decisions. More than this cannot be expected [132].
Risk is manifested in many forms, most often described in the performance, schedule,
and cost risk of the proposed product. At the enterprise level, a new product risks are
correlated with the market, the competitive position, and the short term to long term
investment balance of the company strategy.
C.W. Miller produced a cartoon illustration showing the differences in disciplinary per-
spectives of aircraft design. In the drawing shown in Figure 1, it depicts each of the candi-
date aircraft concepts if that discipline were not required to compromise and could design
the rest of the aircraft in isolation. While exaggerated and amusing, it begs the question
to the author as to what that aircraft might look like to the Risk discipline. Following
the earlier quotation by Twiss, it is estimated that risk-in-isolation aircraft design might
look like what already exists, as the uncertainty in that configuration is essentially zero.
However, when additional dimensions of risk are introduced in the problem, such as the risk
of more stringent requirements, new competitors, and continuously developing technology,
the risk in isolation design now begins to evolve.
3
Risk
Figure 1: Cartoons illustrating the design in isolation effect of contributing disciplinary
perspectives of the airplane by C.W. Miller [93]. Note that the likely risk averse design
would be as little deviation from the existing paradigm as possible.
1.2 Changing Times
The civil air transportation industry is arguably one of the largest and most economically
sensitive industries today. In recent events, a volcanic crisis over Europe hampered air
traffic for weeks, causing billions of dollars of damages and loss to both airlines and the
businesses that rely on commercial air travel and transport.
The emergence of a fierce duopoly in major commercial aircraft developers between
Airbus and Boeing has changed the face the market and the way the game is played [128]. In
the presence of competition, new social and political pressures have tightened requirements
and the manufacturers are driven to seek higher risk technologies to gain market share
and competitive edge. In this modern business, the voice of the customer is tied to sales
performance, and recently that voice has shifted to an acute awareness of the total life-cycle
cost. Simply put, airlines demand new aircraft that can achieve the same performance at a
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lower operational, maintenance and disposal cost.
In response to this customer demand, Boeing, Airbus and others continuously seek
new technology to improve performance and decrease operating cost while maintaining a
profitable business for their shareholders. An important contributing technology is the
use of new materials such as carbon-epoxy composites for aircraft structure; however, this
has not come without difficulties, as several major programs have gone over cost, under
performance and past schedule as the the inherent risks to the industry have been realized.
1.3 Why is Risk on the Rise?
The information revolution has enabled widespread dissemination of knowledge across the
world, and the aerospace industry is no different. The continual globalization of the design
and production of commercial aircraft has slowly transformed what was once a privately
guarded industry into an economy of learning. This learning poses long term competitive
risk. A lucid report on commercial aircraft cycle time by NASA in 2001 describes the
implications to aircraft developers of incremental business risk due to learning economies:
The new economics literature on learning economies suggests that the risk in-
herent in new aircraft development may be even larger than originally posited.
While commercial aircraft production is subject to significant learning economies,
companies can benefit from these economies to a much greater extent if they are
able to maintain or increase their annual production rates. When there are wide
variations in production rates, there will be a significant depreciation in learning
benefits, and the realized economics of the program may be disappointing.[118]
The major driving reasons for increased risk to aircraft developers are summarized in
the following:
1. Rise in development or acquisition costs driven by technology and process investment
needed
2. Rise in development cycle time (program launch to first delivery) - interrelated disci-
plines must converge on synthesized solutions taking time as the underlying technology
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development network is mixed mode (serial and parallel development)
3. Rise in aircraft systems and subsystems complexity - supply network, disciplinarian
interactions, produce and service expansion
4. Rise in stakeholder expectations and societal usage - development of a duopoly raises
customer (airline) leverage
Aircraft development cost and cycle times have steadily increased in the last 40 years.
Table 1 displays a selection of the major commercial aircraft, showing a steady increase in
the development time and inflation-adjusted development costs of the program. This rise
in costs places increasingly heavy reliance on program success.
1.4 Industries of Risk
There has been substantial research risk management methods that try to bring results
about risk analyses of various systems and subsystems development analyses to the decision-
maker’s attention. However, a comprehensive review of program risk management by the
Rand Corporation report in 2004 [40] describes:
”a striking lack of literature on the use of the (risk management) techniques”
(and ) “that virtually all of the evidence for its utility was anecdotal.”
In addition, there is a lack of consensus on how those risk analyses are combined,
weighed, evaluated, and translated into a holistic view of the net risk-reward of competing
alternatives.
This is a challenging task because the different disciplines involved with aircraft de-
sign view uncertainty (and thus risk) in different ways. Some of the uncertainty is purely
subjective (qualitative), others are data-driven and bear quantitative uncertainty that is
not always explicitly expressed in the design environment. Another part of the net un-
certainty lies in the unidentified possible system states not considered (or ”unknown un-
knowns”). For these reasons and others, a defensible, traceable, rigorous approach to com-
bining the information sources into traceable knowledge structure is difficult and therefore
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challenging (not to mention stressful) to the decision maker. The decision process begins
as technically-driven (where the decision maker examines a large partially disconnected set
of data and analyses from the contributing areas) and these results feed an internal, human
and judgment-based process. It is for this reason high-level decision making is traditionally
left to experienced people within the field; they draw on a large wealth of human knowl-
edge and experienced-based perception to crystallize the ultimate decision. The growing
complexity of aircraft systems, in addition to the increasing societal implications of making
design mistakes, threaten this classical decision model. It is clear that given the stakes
involved in today’s projects, such intuitive measures, based solely on experience, are no
longer sufficient [47].
Of all aerospace-related organizations, NASA is one of the most risk-aware and prolific
on the subject of technical risk management. Their missions continually present new and
unique technical and safety risks; much of their research has been to minimize risk. Stud-
ies conducted on low-volume, high cost missions have laid the ground work for aerospace
systems risk research. Their focus has covered areas such as risk and uncertainty analysis,
reliability, decision-based design, and robust design [130].
There is a conspicuous need for more advanced risk-informed methods to char-
acterize, balance and minimize risk in the uncertain and ambiguous stages of
conceptual design. Such methods will treat risk as a trade-able resource that
can be used to make robust and reliable design decisions [130].
NASA has also used the term risk-informed design instead of risk-based design, empha-
sizing that risk analysis tools and methods cannot be the sole basis for decision making in
design processes [28]. This thesis adopts a similarly balanced view of incorporating risk into
existing design paradigms.
1.4.1 Rise in Aircraft System Complexity
Browning gives a detailed description of the ramifications of schedule risk as a function of
complexity rise, stating that complex system product development inevitably involves risk
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Table 1: Duration of major commercial transport aircraft development programs.
Launch Year Aircraft Development Time Development Cost ($B 2010 )
1965 Boeing 747 9 years 11.8
1986 Airbus A330/340 11 years 11
1990 Boeing 777 11 years 7.3
1994 Airbus A380 13 years 15
2003 Boeing 787 14+ years 17
[17]. As systems grow in complexity, the possible risk entry points grow in kind, given that
the integration risk is also a function of system interactions.
Masten provides a detailed description of the business-economic effects arising from the
increase in overall aircraft complexity, stating:
The greater the complexity of the transaction and the level of uncertainty as-
sociated with it, the greater the likelihood of being bound to an inappropriate
action, and hence the greater the implicit costs of contractual organization [83].
The long-term risks associated with an extended supply chain, design out-sourcing, and
particularly outsourcing the design of key components (such as the wing) is described in
great detail in Pritchard’s critique of Boeing and Airbus’s risk-sharing enterprise strategy
[104]. These risks are complex to quantify and are considered outside the scope of this
thesis.
The rising stakeholder and airline operator impact is described in the 2011 Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) air traffic forecast, projecting a steady increase in commercial
airline traffic for the next 30 years [36], shown in Figure 2 and in Boeing’s 2012 forecast
shown in Figure 3.
These elements contribute to a increased culture of awareness and detailed, knowledge-
driven risk management techniques among managers at many levels of the new aircraft
development process. The next section will focus on the influence advanced materials on
1In billions of USD, corrected to Fiscal Year 2010. Amounts are approximates, as development aid and
subsidies shroud actual development cost.
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Figure 2: The FAA’s projected increase in U.S. Commercial Traffic for 2010-2031 [36].
the risk temperature of development programs.
Research Observation I
New aircraft development programs are increasingly challenged by the rise in advanced
technology, multidisciplinary complexity growth and implications of program failure. These
changes open new, never before seen opportunities for risk entry and therefore, the risk
assessment methods used by program managers must advance in kind which incorporate
the increased merging of these aspects.
1.5 Aerospace Perspectives of Risk
The aerospace industry has long been claimed as a technology development leader. This
is partly due to the fact that it takes a substantial degree of technology working together
in harmony to fly (the combination of the gravity of Earth and the viscosity of air have
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Figure 3: Boeing’s 2012 30-year market outlook, broken down by aircraft type, growth
factor, and region [13].
contributed to the technical challenge). The safety of hundreds of passengers per flight de-
pends on the continual performance of these technologies. It therefore demands considerable
investment, time, attention to detail and effort to design and build a safe airplane.
Fifty years ago, the technical know-how and immediate market was held within small,
distributed business groups, often clustered in the United States and Western Europe.
Today, most developed nations manufacture aircraft elements and the list of countries pro-
ducing their own aircraft has grown to include Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Canada, and
many more.
Aerospace risks have fluctuated amidst the Industrial Revolution and Modern Era. In
early human aviation history, the physics of flight were poorly understood, leading to a
high probability of failure and this risk. For example, before the Wright Brothers’ success
at Kitty Hawk, countless extreme-risk level and often catastrophic attempts at flight are
fully documented in the history books. However as knowledge and technology about flight
developed, the aggregate risk of manned flight was reduced.
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Over time though, the net risk began to be transform into programmatic challenges.
New prototype designs in the early part of the 20th century were characterized by dra-
matic entrepreneurial exuberance, success and disaster. As war became an accelerator
for technology development, or rather, as the impact associated with failing at war grew
wildly, the concept of balancing risk, whether programmatically or of human life, was barely
a consideration. Gradually, as the Cold War subsided and economic belts tightened, both
commercial and military aviation corporations were forced to evaluate and carefully balance
the impact decision quality. Eventually enough competition was created and programmatic
considerations and product alignment to enterprise strategic vision took hold.
In the military maritime sector, high development costs and low production quantities
caused program managers to develop some of the first product risk management methods.
Among them was PERT, a schedule risk management tool which arranged anticipated
project tasks into a linked network and assigned probabilities: most optimistic, most likely
(often interpreted as the average) and most pessimistic duration for each of the activities.
According to Lionel Galway’s review in 2004,
PERT was a great success from a public relations point of view, although only a
relatively small portion of the [Navy’s] Polaris program was ever managed using
the technique. And this success led to adaptations of PERT such as PERT/cost
that attempted to address cost issues as well. While PERT was widely ac-
claimed by the business and defense communities in the 1960’s, later studies
raised doubts about whether PERT contributed much to the management suc-
cess of the Polaris project [40].
As life becomes driven by increasingly intelligent systems, the uncertainty about even the
nearest moment in the future still remains constant. It is a simple fact: we cannot predict
the future with perfect certainty. Risk versus reward is a boiled-down decision device that
combines the utility of a reward (for example, we really want to go to the moon), with
the associated risk in life (astronauts might die), money (costs too much), time (takes too
long). This is a core metric in any investor’s mind: what is my exposure to bad events, and
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is it worth the perceived benefit I will receive?
1.5.1 The Rise of Composites in Aircraft Structures
Composite materials have become crucial to the development of new aircraft designs for
their increasingly important role in aircraft design, cost estimation, and manufacturing.
Including more composite materials in an aircraft design generally reduces the weight and
occasionally maintenance costs. There is an uncertainty caused by the rapid technological
development of the use of the material, as well as the continuously changing design and
manufacturing processes. Therefore, much of the cost data either does not exist, or it is
difficult to obtain accurately. There is also a continuing improvement in the manufacturing
process that will be challenging to include within the scope of this project.
Figure 4: Use of composite structures in aircraft components and regressed forecasts [51].
Structural design and loads analyses, among other disciplines, are continuously bur-
dened with uncertainty quantification and mitigation during design. Engineers face this
challenge at every point of the design process, especially during the conceptual and pre-
liminary phases where the trade studies between the performance of alternative designs
rely on heavy assumptions. However, uncertainty quantification of the data substantiating
the analyses for design alternatives is often simply estimated after the fact by subjective
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experience-based expert input. Automating these qualitative processes so as to develop
rigorous and evaluative studies of the existing uncertainty is clearly valuable to a decision
maker, specifically the uncertainty in the requirements, inputs and potential interactions
within the system model. This is true for new technology insertion across disciplines within
the aircraft architecture.
1.5.2 Examples of Realized Risks with Composite Aircraft
Recent major aircraft development programs such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the
Airbus A380 have experienced a variety of delays and technical setbacks in the development
process. It is not the aim of this thesis to criticize these programs, or their management
of the difficulties presented. Rather, it is to illustrate that the risks associated with new,
high technology complex systems are indeed real, and to present a candidate approach to
exploring the exposure specific to each new product. Looking at the schedule risks realized
by the 787 Dreamliner program, there have been an assortment of manifestations. Most are
associated with the risk-sharing approach Boeing has taken in the the use of a global supply
network, as shown in Figure 2. Several authors have criticized the approach of exchanging
unit cost risk for program schedule risk, and a complete view of this risk trade space will
be discussed later through the use of Risk Interrelationship Matrices in Section 2.3.2. The
result of these delays is the potential for cancellation of pre-orders from airlines as well as
several billion dollars in customer contract penalties.
One example of recent schedule risk was related to a new materials technology applied in
the 787 Dreamliner, and contributed to the motivation for this thesis. The unprecedented
proliferation of the use of composites in this all-new aircraft experienced growing pains,
particularly in the joint between the wing and the fuselage. During a ground test late in the
development cycle, it was found that the upper skin and stringers had slight delamination
from locally exceeding limit load (operating limit) in upward bending.
The damage occurred below the required load level needed for certification. It was
expected that this type of failure would occur at ultimate load, and not limit load, thus
causing the need for a repair or re-design. The resulting re-design called for installing
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Table 2: History of change in the Estimated dates for the First Flight and First Delivery
of the Boeing 787 program. Data collected from [46]
.
Date First Flight First Delivery Reason Given at Announcement
Launch 8/1/2007 5/1/2008
10/1/2007 3/1/2008 12/1/2008 Gap where the left side of the nose-and-
cockpit section is out of alignment with
the fuselage, shortage of fasteners
1/1/2008 6/1/2008 Program Manager replaced, supply chain
problems
4/1/2008 12/1/2008 9/1/2009 Labor dispute, machinist strike. Union
members maintain that if more of the key
production had been in-house instead of
by subcontractors, the 787 would have
been completed on time.
12/1/2008 6/1/2009 3/1/2010 The design and installation of reinforce-
ments along the upper part of the place
where the wings join the fuselage
12/1/2009 (completed) First flight completed
7/1/2010 (completed) 2/1/2011 Explosion of engine during testbed
11/1/2010 (completed) 9/1/2011 Electrical fire in cockpit
additional fasteners and a re-shaping of the stringers at the wing box. Figure 5 illustrates
the cross section of the wing box and location of stress point.
Another example of the complexities of realizing returns with plastic-composite materials
in aircraft is explained by McLellan [90], describing the loss of performance margin by
adapting the new material extensively in their design of the new Adams A500 aircraft:
Adam Aircraft is another worrisome example of composites gone wrong. The
center-line thrust piston twin A500 also came out heavier than expected and was
more costly to build. It was eventually certified but its payload and performance
restrictions dried up what had been a promising market [90].
The next section will address the core perspective of business case risk measurement by
assessment of the cumulative cashflow.
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Figure 5: Location of the stress point arising from joining advanced composites on the
Boeing 787 [46].
1.5.3 Break Even Analysis of Aircraft Programs
Cost models have been applied to generate forecasting models for cash flows as a treatment
and abatement of cashflow risk concerns [100]. From a high-level business perspective, these
risks can be transformed directly into measures of uncertainty on a manufacturer’s Cash
Flow chart given in Figure 6.
Products with a positive expected return on investment (or positive Net Present Value)
are green-lighted, but the assumptions substantiating the product performance, cost, market
availability and future presence of competition are subject to sizable uncertainty. This
uncertainty ultimately translates to a possible shift in the expected cash flow chart, shown
with the dashed lines above and below the mean expected return in Figure 79. Note that















































Figure 6: New product development profits and their key product life cycle milestones [110].
.
of stochastic diffusion processes.
Figure 7 shows the estimated annual cash flows for a modern commercial transport
aircraft program. Note the sharp ramp up in magnitude of both costs and revenues as
production begins, as well as the exponential decrease in production costs over time. Also
note that there are typically some payments early in the development phase. These inflows
are typically a result of purchase agreements with customers, as many sales incorporate a
down-payment of approximately 10-50 percent of the aircraft. This down-payment varies
between customers as a function of the other purchase agreement details. In this example
a discount rate (similar to inflation rate adjustment) of 10 percent was used. The effect
of this is that as the value of money now is greater than money in the future, the large













Figure 7: Cash flow diagram, showing the annual and cumulative cash flows for a typical
commercial transport aircraft. Also note the discount factor and its effect on the present
value of future payments (in the darker shading) [91]. .
1.6 The Uncertain Cumulative Cashflow Concept
Literature review of the uncertainty described in the cumulative cashflow of aerospace ve-
hicle programs has separated two fundamental contributing areas: Technical Uncertainty
(related to costs and schedule in research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E),
and Market Uncertainty (related to the manufacturing rate/costs, sales price and market
capacity). Provided that the product, vehicle, or technology is valuable, these two uncer-
tainty projections combine to form the programmatic uncertainty, or uncertain cumulative
cash flow (as referred to in this thesis). This is shown in Figure 8. This dissertation research
views this projection of uncertainty as a potential approach for forecasting business case
dimensions, and ultimately, success and profitability.
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Figure 8: Cumulative cash flow for complex engineered systems is highly dependent on
technical and market uncertainty [110]. .
1.7 Envisioning the strategic mitigation effect on the business case
The uncertain cash flow diagrams give insight into the business case in terms of both risk
and reward (or more specifically: break even year, sunk cost, ROI and their associated
risk dimensions) in an aggregated way. Understanding the impact of a strategic mitigation
plan on a perturbed scenario then becomes clear: design and strategy alternatives can be
compared simultaneously.
Figure 9 shows a notional example of two alternatives possible. The first example has
a much steeper capital expenditure curve, but also has a larger expected overall return on
investment. The potential for upside is also lower, however it comes at the expense of the
possibility that the program may never break even (note the lower dashed line bound). The
lower diagram has less total sunk cost, a longer expected break-even date, and a low return
on investment, yet the uncertainty around those dimensions is much lower. Note that both
of these aircraft design alternatives have the approximately same risk-to-reward ratio, so it
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BREAK EVEN 14YR, +/- ? YR
SUNK COST: 9.2B, +/- 3B
Target ROI
Alternative A
• High possible return
• High cost and schedule 
risk
• Potentially never reach 
break even
Alternative B
• Balanced cost, schedule 
and performance risk
• Potentially too 
conservative on upside 
returns, target ROI may never 
be reached
Figure 9: Alternatives compared by uncertainty and risk propagated to the cash flow chart,
allowing balance between cost schedule and performance trades to be evaluated holistically.
The program manager’s attitude towards risk (as well as the higher level manufacturer’s
economic situation and product placement) then come into play to the already crowded
decision space. By being able to reduce these decisions to the single business perspective
gives an increasingly transparent feedback to the program manager, and ultimately enable
better, more informed decisions. This is the CASSANDRA methodologies core deliverable.
The methodology also enables studies to be made in evaluating the robustness of the
business case. By introducing scenario perturbations to the uncertain cash flow curve and
then examining the program manager’s control power to return the program back to the
desired state, an assessment of the business robustness can be made.
This aspect is the risk mitigation and strategy development section which is the final
step of the methodology. Not only is the program manager able to evaluate the total busi-
ness case of design and technology decisions, but she is also able to examine what control
power is available at that specific design point. Ideally the program manager should be able
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to find a design that meets the cash flow and risk perspectives desired, and also meet the
robustness requirement of that business case. When the modeling and simulation environ-
ments are setup, the business case can be torture-tested by various scenario, economic, and
technological perturbations. In this thesis, three case studies are evaluated and carried out,
and are found in the Results chapter.
1.8 Research Objective
The end goal for fusing the paradigms of financial risk management, psychological percep-
tion of risk, and modern preliminary aircraft design is summarized in the following research
objective:
Research Objective
In order to contribute to the present techniques for integrating risk management practices
into the design process, the objective of this research is to deliver three things:
1. A methodology that a program manager can use to measure and allocate the risk
arising from technology and manufacturing uncertainty onto the business case of a
new aircraft development project.
2. Development of metrics in the uncertain cumulative cashflow space which better ex-
press the extent and usefulness of the risk being assumed.
3. A process for identifying robust risk mitigation strategies in the presence of either
large or small available data sets.
The goal of this research is to propose and evaluate a method designed to alleviate the
process between information collection and decision execution by providing a risk-integrated
framework in the context of preliminary level aircraft design. It is hoped that aircraft devel-
opment decision makers can then simultaneously view and interpret competing alternatives
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and their associated aggregated risk and make the best documented, risk-aware decision
possible.
This methodology produces a strategic recommendation to program manager of such an
aircraft program facing simultaneous risks in multiple dimensions and disciplines. If success-
ful, it will improve the quality of decision making at the preliminary level in technology of
commercial aircraft structures by developing traceable, interrelated and knowledge-driven
aggregated risk formulations that are translated directly into the modern aircraft design
environment.
1.8.1 Summary of the Problem Motivation
In this chapter, the fundamental motivation for incorporating risk analyses within the air-
craft design program agenda has been explored. Three primary reasons illustrate why the
proposed research is valuable.
1. The informed handling of risk, regardless of the form in which it is manifested, is
vital to program success and therefore is a core responsibility and concern of aircraft
product development programs
2. Risk is steadily increasing with the rise in cycle time, development costs, advanced
technology (specifically materials), and globalization of supply and competition.
3. Critical review and publication of the successes and failures of the risk management
methods executed by development programs is limited or non-existent, either due to
the uniqueness of their approach or by proprietary protection.
4. Decision making methods in design must incorporate risk information to improve
decision quality and program success robustness.
1.8.2 Key Research Questions and Hypothesis
The basic themes of risk measurement, risk mitigation, and robust strategy selection of this
dissertation are captured by the following driving Research Questions:
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Research Question I
How can the present design methods be improved to measure the multidisciplinary risk
presented when using advanced technologies in vehicle development?
Research Question II
How can risk analysis and mitigation methods be improved to generate mitigation strate-
gies amid the multidisciplinary risk presented when using advanced technologies in vehicle
development?
Research Question III
How can risk analysis and mitigation methods be improved to select the robust mitigation
strategies for addressing multidisciplinary risk presented when using advanced technologies
in vehicle development?
These questions led to the development of a methdology called CASSANDRA which
structures an analysis that answers the Research Questions. CASSANDRA stands for
Computational Aircraft Sub-System ANalysis of Design Risk Alternatives. The funda-
mental hypothesis of the methodology is:
Methodology Hypothesis
The CASSANDRA methodology improved design awareness by forecasting the cost and
time risks caused by uncertainty in the technology and manufacturing decisions during the
conceptual design phase.
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1.8.3 Declaration of the Research Scope
Risk management in aerospace vehicle design is a broad and complex field, with many
technical, quantitative and qualitative methods. Many, if not most of the methods focus
on flight safety and technical performance risks. This research has instead scoped the
motivating problem away from safety and performance aspects, and assumes those are
addressed separately and held constant. This research focuses only on the cost and schedule
impacts and their risks to an aircraft manufacturer/integrator who is incorporating still-
developing technologies into its design.
There exist several fields of research on the flexibility of program control as well as the
adaptability and timing of design decisions (such as the fields of Real Options and agile
manufacturing). The design phase in consideration of this research does not encompass
those, and focuses a fixed time of the program during the conceptual design phase.
With these research constraints in place, the problem and methodology may be struc-
tured to evaluate the Research Questions in sufficient depth.
1.9 Organization of Thesis
In the following chapters, a comprehensive review of risk concepts, risk-informed decision
methods, and aircraft-specific design processes are presented. Its purpose is to examine
existing methods to explore how those approaches may be combined and adapted to form
a new way of addressing the problem presented in this chapter.
Chapter 2 covers the fundamentals in risk literature and measurement methods applica-
ble to aircraft programs, beginning with the definitions and existing taxonomies of risk and
uncertainty. Risk is a commonly misunderstood and mis-communicated term, and a key
anchor of this thesis is the selection and formalization of a risk definition and vocabulary.
The industry standards for risk measurement and mitigation are given, and the concept of
cumulative cashflow is introduced in detail.
Chapter 3 evaluates the experimental apparatus used to build and test the CASSAN-
DRA methodology. Here, the thought processes are given leading to the high-speed sizing,
synthesis, and cost estimation modeling framework (called BASUCA). An evaluation of the
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relationship between experimental run count and risk bounds are also addressed.
Chapters 4 and 5 break apart and address the two aspects of the uncertain cumula-
tive cashflow given in Figure 8. Chapter 4 addresses the Technical Uncertainty aspect
pertaining to managing cost and schedule of design processes and specifically technology
development. The elicitation and propagation of uncertainty is addressed in this Chap-
ter and the approaches for modeling and simulation of Technology Readiness are explored.
The research contributes a networked approach to mixing Technology Readiness Levels with
Manufacturing Readiness Levels to give a combined cost and schedule distribution.
Chapter 5 addresses the second aspect of the uncertain cumulative cashflow diagram: the
market (and manufacturing) uncertainty. Here the economics of manufacturing and selling
aircraft are addressed. This research contributes an approach to modeling the market
capacity or likely program production quantity, which is shown to have a strong affect
on both aircraft price and overall profitability. The total program risk and profitability is
addressed by contributing a set of metrics that measure the risk-to-reward and risk efficiency
aspects. These metrics are called the Risk Aversion angle and Risk-Benefit ratio.
Chapter 6 reviews the ability to use the uncertain cumulative cashflows of individual de-
signs and their metrics to generate risk reduction or mitigation strategies. Two approaches
are addressed, one with the availability of large data sets and inexpensive models, and one
with small data sets or expensive models. The first uses a filtered Monte-Carlo approach,
and the second uses a first order linearization of the modeling framework using the Jacobian
matrix.
Chapter 7 reviews the problem formulation and details the individual steps of the CAS-
SANDRA methodology. An in-depth look is taken to the objective function of the method-
ology user, and a case study is given where the manufacturing assumptions in costs are
perturbed.




AIRCRAFT PROGRAM RISK ESTIMATION
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do
not know. But there are also unknown unknowns: the ones we don’t know that
we don’t know.
Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense
Many aspects of life have changed dramatically, even exponentially in the last 50 years.
The list is long and familiar: population, communication, transportation, information, glob-
alization, cultural balances, etc. There are certain things which have not changed in this
time such as human need for survival, safety and quest for success and happiness. So, with
the static traits of human life amidst an ever-changing world comes the inevitable pressure
to keep up and moving forward so as to better ensure our survival, safety and happiness.
2.1 Definitions of Risk
2.1.1 Classical Definition of Risk
Frank Knight, in his seminal paper of 1921, distinguished risk and uncertainty in the fol-
lowing way:
The essential fact is that risk means a quantity susceptible of measurement [...] It will
appear that a measurable uncertainty, or risk proper [...] is so far different from an immea-
surable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We [...] accordingly restrict the
term uncertainty to cases of the non-quantitative type [68].
This perspective implies a measurement criterion to the likely state. If the measurement
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of the probability is known, or even measurable, then the term risk describes such a state.
However, if no measurement or distribution of the state is known, then uncertainty fully
describes the knowledge about the state.
This definition has been greatly contested over the course of the century; the main
criticisms are that the implication of measurement is independent of concepts of risk and
uncertainty alone.
2.1.2 Hubbardian Definitions of Risk and Uncertainty
Hubbard, among other authors, did not taken the same perspective of the measurement
criterion. Rather, Hubbard separates the measurement of risk and uncertainty and defines
them individually, as follows: [58]
Uncertainty : The lack of complete certainty, that is, the existence of more than one possi-
bility. The true outcome/state/result/value is not known.
Measurement of uncertainty : A set of probabilities assigned to a set of candidate future
states.
This approach to defining uncertainty is precise and originates from Probability Theory.
It is also time independent, as there could potentially be uncertainty about the future,
present and past. The measurement of uncertainty, in a strict mathematical sense, is a value
or set of values ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 representing impossibility and 1 representing
total certainty about a state. For example, there is a 60% chance this market will increase
this year.
Risk: A state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or
other undesirable outcome.
Measurement of Risk: A set of possibilities each with quantified probabilities and quantified
losses.
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In the Hubbardian perspective, risk is derived from uncertainty, or rather is a superset
to uncertainty, as a natural development of the implication of consequence to the associated
future uncertain states. However it makes no specification on what defines the boundary
between loss and gain. This definition is widely accepted for general use (especially in safety
and hazard risk assessment), but it often lacks completeness when implemented in formal
programmatic risk methods.
2.1.3 Risk Definition Standards
As the definition of risk is easily misunderstood and often the source of communication
difficulties, several major organizations have sought to develop standards formalizing the
definition and management processes. The first standard presented here is that of the
United States Department of Defense (DoD), which publishes and maintains a Risk Man-
agement guide for the DoD Acquisition processes. This definition is especially relevant to
aircraft design programs, as many of the aircraft developers synchronize their communica-
tion standards for the ease of integrating their products in government acquisition processes.
The latest revision of this document describes the definitions and component of risk in the
following way:
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Risk is a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and ob-
jectives within defined cost, schedule and performance constraints. Risk can be associated
with all aspects of a program (e.g., threat, technology maturity, supplier capability, design
maturation, performance against plan,) as these aspects relate across the Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) and Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). Risk addresses the potential vari-
ation in the planned approach and its expected outcome.
Risks have three components:
1. A future root cause (yet to happen), which, if eliminated or corrected, would prevent
a potential consequence from occurring,
2. A probability (or likelihood) assessed at the present time of that future root cause
occurring, and
3. The consequence (or effect) of that future occurrence.
A future root cause is the most basic reason for the presence of a risk. Accordingly, risks
should be tied to future root causes and their effects [22].
Figure 10 illustrates the separation between risk and uncertainty that will be taken in
this research. Risk is considered in the presence of uncertain system responses (results or
metrics) given by the probability density function shown, in conjunction with the presence
of a target or objective. These objectives may be defined at the system (aircraft) level or at
the subsystem level (wing, propulsion, flight controls, etc).
A number of non-military organizations have sought to standardize a modern, functional
definition of risk. The general form is not unlike the Hubbardian and DoD definitions;
there is a description of the uncertain element and some form of impact or consequence
on objectives. The most recent and widely accepted definitions though still debated [55])







System Response (or Metric)
Uncertainty Analysis
Studies variance on system results, 
including bounds and distribution shape 
but without definition of a target
System Response (or Metric)
Risk Analysis
Studies variance on system results, but 
with respect to an objective or target in 
that metric
Indifference point or Target
Figure 10: Distinction between risk and uncertainty on system results due to the existence
of a target and associated loss and gain regions.
Note the range of definitions and how certain risk definition standards describe the
impact portion of the definition. In most, an objective is described, and in others a con-
sequence is alluded to. This consequence aspect is of particular relevance to real-world
business prospects, as the consequence of a failed objective may range from negligible re-
duction in schedule, cost or performance all the way to permanent failure of the business
enterprise. New commercial or military aircraft programs are not immune to this effect;
recall the adage, every new airplane bets the entire company. On a smaller scale, the con-
sequence may manifest itself in an incremental delay or cost to a program element, which
then propagates to the other program elements and ultimately contributes to the overall
economic and business outlook. A key problem this dissertation aims to address is the
discovery and quantification of the incremental cost and performance risks from adjustment
of either the internal aspects of the program (such as design or technology selection) and
external aspects (such as market changes or supply chain disruption).
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Standard Description of Uncertainty Description of Impact
British Standard BS6079-3:2000 (2000) 
“Uncertainty inherent in plans and the possibility of 
something happening (i.e. a contingency) ...” 
“... that can affect the prospects of achieving business 
or project goals.”
British Standard BS IEC 62198:2001 
(2001) 
“Combination of the probability of an event 
occurring ...” 
“... and its consequences on project objectives.”
A Risk Management Standard 
(Institute of Risk Management et al, 
2002) 
“The combination of the probability of an event ...” “... and its consequences.”
Australian/New Zealand Standard 
AS/NZS 4360:2004 (2004) 
“The chance of something happening ...” “... that will have an impact on objectives.”
Risk Analysis & Management for 
Projects [RAMP] (Institution of Civil 
Engineers et al, 2005) 
“A possible occurrence ...” 
“... which could affect (positively or negatively) the 
achievement of the objectives for the investment.”
APM Body of Knowledge (Association 
for Project Management, 2006) 
“An uncertain event or set of circumstances ...” 
“... that should it or they occur would have an effect 
on achievement of one or more project objectives.”
Management of Risk [M_o_R]: 
Guidance for Practitioners (Office of 
Government Commerce, 2007) 
“An uncertain event or set of events ...” 
“... that should it occur will have an effect on the 
achievement of objectives.”
A Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge [PMBoK® Guide] 
(Project Management Institute, 2008) 
“An uncertain event or condition ...” 
“... that if it occurs has a positive or negative effect on 
a project’s objectives.”
British Standard BS31100:2008 (2008) “Effect of uncertainty ...” “... on objectives.”
ISO31000:2009 (2009) “Effect of uncertainty ...” “... on objectives.”
Figure 11: A summary of standardized risk definitions, organized by descriptor of uncertain
element and impact.
It is then appropriate to select the definition relevant to aircraft design programs, and
hold this definition constant in the language describing risk within this research. Common
practices for new development aircraft programs include very specific design goals (or objec-
tives), and the consequence of failure in meeting those objectives has quantifiable impact.
The existence of an objective and a consequence is a fundamental departure point for the
approach to handle risk in this thesis. This thesis will hereforth use this definition of risk
as the effect of uncertainty on objectives and its consequence in its vocabulary.
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2.1.4 Epistemic and Aleatory Uncertainty
Helton [53] distinguishes an important separation between two views of uncertainty, aleatory
and epistemic, in the following way: ‘ aleatory uncertainty derives from an inherent random-
ness in the behavior of the system under study and epistemic uncertainty derives from a lack
of knowledge about the appropriate values to use for quantities that are assumed to have
fixed but–poorly known–values in the context of a specific study. Aleatory uncertainty is
usually represented with probability and leads to cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
or complementary CDFs (CCDFs) for analysis results of interest. In the presence of epis-
temic uncertainty, there is not a single CDF or CCDF for a given analysis result. Rather,
there is a family of CDFs and a corresponding family of CCDFs that derive from epistemic
uncertainty and have an uncertainty structure that derives from the particular uncertainty
structure (e.g. interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory or probability theory)












Figure 12: Progression between knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns through
a new product development [110]/
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Figure 12 illustrates the programmatic shift in the three categories of variables through-
out a new product development program. In the beginning of the program, there is max-
imum uncertainty, of which is split between known unknowns (such as the physical shape
or weight of the final product) and unknown unknowns, which are the uncertain variables
and factors of which the program management is not even aware. An example of unknown
unknowns are unforeseen, damaging system behaviors arising from the complexity of the un-
developed system. As the program moves forward through the design phases, the unknowns
(both known and unknown) decrease, typically monotonically as the product becomes al-
most completely understood. The unknown unknowns are never eliminated completely in
practice and in theory. The program may experience non-monotonic decrease in unknowns
as external factors or conditions change the system requirements or possible uses of the
product. An example here is a transport aircraft program that acquires a launch customer
who plans on using the aircraft in Antarctica, where the new flight and landing conditions
suddenly increase the manufacturer’s uncertainty in how the product will perform in that
environment. That new uncertainty is reduced in this example with testing or re-design,
and the program returns to its steady path towards complete certainty.
2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Risk Measurement
2.2.1 Frequentist Risk Estimation
The frequentist inference approach is a mathematical perspective on risk measurement. It
is what is meant when simplistic explanations of risk are given (risk is probability of failure
times the cost of that failure). Its formulation:





• θ is a fixed possible state
• X is the vector of observations drawn from the population
• Eθ is the expectation for all X
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• dPθ(X) is the probability measure of the event space X
While brutally objective in its formulation, the frequentist approach has limited use in
novel risk management approaches, as the risk rarely is perceived linearly in real projects.
That is, a $1,000,000 potential loss, occurring at a rate of 1 in a million, has the same
expected loss in the frequentist approach as a 100% probability of losing a single dollar.
The Expected Utility and Prospect Theory (described in subsequent sections) approaches
correct for this effect by creating adjusted payoff functions that are sensitive to risk attitude.
2.2.2 Robust Design Methods
Taguchi introduced a quality improvement process that was an important contribution in
the way of system variance (and thus risk) minimization. He argued that any decrease in
the quality of a system leads to customer dissatisfaction, which he represents as a loss [122].
Originally applied to the automotive industry, the principle concept is that it is possible to
set the parameters of a system to be insensitive to uncontrollable noise effects, while still
retaining proximity to an optimum. This process was called robust design. An excerpt from
SAS Institute documentation gives a succinct overview of the Taguchi method:
The Taguchi method defines two types of factors: control factors and noise factors. An
inner design constructed over the control factors finds optimum settings. An outer design
over the noise factors looks at how the response behaves for a wide range of noise conditions.
The experiment is performed on all combinations of the inner and outer design runs. A
performance statistic is calculated across the outer runs for each inner run. This becomes
the response for a fit across the inner design runs [108].
Figure 13 shows the relationship between transmission of variance. On the section of
the curve where the slope is large, there is a great sensitivity on the output to the input
variables. Further towards the right, the curves becomes more insensitive to changes in the
inputs, and more robust. This effect, carried out across several simultaneous dimensions, is





















Figure 13: The relationship between input and output variables for sensitive design and in-
sensitive design, Robust design approaches try to shift design variables (X ) towards settings
where there is less sensitivity to the input variables, especially if some of those variables are
outside of control [124].
Chen gives a description of Taguchi’s famous quality and process improvement work,
citing two broad categories for minimization of performance variations and bringing the
mean to a target: [21]
1. Type I - minimizing variations in performance caused by variations in noise factors
(uncontrollable parameters).
2. Type II - minimizing variations in performance caused by variations in control fac-
tor(design variables).
Taguchi’s quality methods and robust design approaches have been applied to many
non-automotive applications in aerospace. A particularly good example is from a study in
2009, where Dodson and Parks applied a robust design approach combined with polynomial
chaos theory to reduce sensitivity of the lift to drag ratio to leading edge thickness [29].
34
The results demonstrated that the robust designs were significantly less sensitive to input
variation in leading edge thickness, compared with non-robustly optimized airfoils. The
non-robust, optimal design degraded 20 percent from slight variation in the inputs. One
drawback of robust design is that it can be computationally expensive to carry out the
variance study on large multidisciplinary systems; several approaches have been taken to
reduce computational time by creating efficient variance estimation algorithms that improve
the rate of convergence when compared to Monte Carlo [33].
2.2.3 The Loss Function and Signal to Noise Ratios
Taguchi advocated understanding the cost of quality in a variety of manufacturing and
business scenarios. Instead of limiting the cost estimation to the cost of products that were
outside of specification, he introduced the concept that there were costs associated with the
larger perspective of the society, and that those costs would eventually return to impact
the corporation itself. Other statisticians, such as Donald Wheeler, claimed that variance
within the specification caused no loss to the corporation or society [137], [136]. As the
specification limit is somewhat arbitrarily drawn, Taguchi instead argued for an approach
that minimized the societal cost or loss. The minimization of this measure improved quality
for the corporation and reduced loss for society at large.





where θ is the index or parameter over probability space Θ.
He identified three types of situations [122]:
1. Larger the better (for example, agricultural yield);
2. Smaller the better (for example, carbon dioxide emissions); and
3. On-target, minimum-variation (for example, a mating part in an assembly).
For practicioners, Taguchi suggested a direct approach for maximizing quality. The
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relationship to a target or utility space could be aggregated in the formation of a signal-
to-noise (S/N) ratio which was to be maximized. Taguchi offered these formulations of the
S/N ratio for each of the situations given in Equations 3 to 5.
Smaller the better:




















where yi are the n data points and σ is the variance of the set.
These formulations were part of the foundation of what became the 6-Sigma quality
movement.
2.2.4 Design for 6-Sigma
A noteworthy variance minimization design process is Design for 6-Sigma (DFSS) which is
a business management approach for the development of process guidelines so as to produce
fewer than 6σ ‘rejected’ products as possible [114]. Rejection is determined by deviation
outside the lower and upper specification limits, for which 6-Sigma processes are si standard
deviations, accounting for a shift in the mean, or 3.4 rejections per million. DFSS is an
excellent quality improvement guideline, especially for products produced in substantial
quantities.
2.2.5 Expected Utility Theory
Expected utility is a method of evaluating decision alternatives that present risky or uncer-
tain outcomes by comparing the product of the utility values and their respective probability
of occurrence. It was first proposed by Nicholas and Daniel Bernoulli as a method to solve
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Figure 14: Six-Sigma approach to minimization of process variance [114].
the Saint Petersburg Paradox. This paradox deals with naive decision criterion that only
takes into account expected value [3]. The solution to the paradox, published in 1738, was
to create a parallel concept to the outcome called utility which describes a subject-relevant
measure of value. Bernoulli states:
The determination of the value of an item must not be based on the price, but
rather on the utility it yields. There is no doubt that a gain of one thousand
ducats is more significant to the pauper than to a rich man though both gain
the same amount.
The suggested model of the utility function was a logarithmic S -curve, known as log
utility. Figure 15 illustrates a normalized, notional utility for risk adverse, risk neutral, and
risk seeking functions.
2.2.6 Application of Expected Utility Theory to Choice
Expected utility theory states that the overall utility is the statistical expectation of the
outcomes [63]. This is given as
















Figure 15: Notional utility functions for various risk attitudes.
Where U is the utility of a prospect, xn is the value of the nth outcome, and p its
respective probability. One can easily see the resemblance to the expected value of a set of
probabilities and outcomes.
The choice model describes as favorable if the utility of the prospect, when integrated
with one’s existing assets, exceeds the utility of those assets alone [63]. The context of the
utility function is then given as the final state of one’s assets instead of as a gain or a loss.
If w is the asset position, then
U(w + x1, p1; . . . ;w + xn, pn) > u(w) (7)
Expected utility theory reigned for several decades as the dominant normative
and descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty, but it has come
under serious question in recent years. There is now general agreement that
the theory does not provide an adequate description of individual choice: a
substantial body of evidence shows that decision makers systematically violate
its basic tenets [131].
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2.2.7 Prospect Theory
In the late 1970’s, two psychologists named Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky observed
that individuals make decisions involving risk differently than that prescribed by the widely-
accepted model called Expected Utility theory [63] . They published an alternative to
Expected Utility Theory in a paper published in 1979 that became the most cited paper
in Econometrica [112]. Subsequent research and refinement created an entire field of study
called Behavioral Economics, for which ultimately Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize
in Economics.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) “Prospect Theory: An analysis of decision under
risk” is the second most cited paper in economics during the period, 1975-2000
[112].
The revised descriptive model of decision making under risk was called Prospect Theory
(prospect in reference to a lottery) that improved the empirically observed discrepancy.
The new model bears the fundamental differences with Expected Utility Theory that the
value function is non-linear with the probabilities, and value is relative to a reference point.
Below the reference point, the value is perceived as a loss, and above which is considered a
gain. In addition, the functions for value are asymmetric, meaning that the value is steeper
for losses than gains.
Prospect theory deals with the way we frame decisions, the different ways we
label (or code) outcomes, and how they affect our attitude toward risk [7].
These changes, while seemingly minute, have made a profound impact on the decision
making models involving uncertainty. The body of literature on this topic and the subse-
quent ideas are vast:
Rather, in assessing such gambles, people look not at the levels of final wealth
they can attain but at gains and losses relative to some reference point, which
may vary from situation to situation, and display loss aversion – a loss function
that is steeper than a gain function [115].
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Hasite and Dawes [52] give a summary of the major contributions of Prospect Theory
has enabled, stating three key characteristics:
Prospect Theory Characteristics
1. Reference level dependence: An individual views consequences (monetary or
other) in terms of changes from the reference level, which is usually that individual’s
status quo.
2. Gain and loss satiation: The values of the outcomes for both positive and negative
consequences of the choice have the diminishing returns characteristic. The α term in
the value function equation captures the marginally decreasing aspect of the function.
Empirical studies estimate that α is typically equal to approximately .88 and always
less than 1.00. When the exponent α < 1.00, the curve will accelerate negatively (if α
= 1.00, the function would be linear; and if α > 1.00, it would accelerate positively).
3. Loss aversion: The resulting value function is steeper for losses than for gains;
losing 100 dollars produces more pain than gaining 100 dollars produces pleasure.
The coefficient λ indexes the difference in slopes of the positive and negative arms
of the value function. A typical estimate of λ is 2.25, indicating that losses are
approximately twice as painful and gains are pleasurable. (If λ = 1.00, the gains
and losses would have equal slopes; if λ < 1.00, gains would weigh more heavily than
losses) [52].
2.2.7.1 Mathematical Formulation
The decision weight scale is denoted as π(p) which reflects the impact of p on the overall
value of the prospect [63]. Note that π is not a probability measure, and it is generally
found that π(p)+π(1−p) ≤ 1. The subjective value of the each outcome x is given as v(x).
In simple prospects of the form (x, p; y, q), one earns x with probability p and y with
probability q, and nothing with the probability 1 − p − q where p + q ≥ 1. The overall
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prospect value is given as:
V (x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y) (8)
The value function reduces to Equation (6) when the π(p) = p and v(x) = U(x). A
typical value function is given in Figure 16, showing the asymmetrical value functions v−(x)
and v+(x).
Xo is defined as the reference point (the boundary between gains and losses), empirical
studies have shown that the value function v(x) is uniquely defined as v+(x) over the range
x > x0 and v
−(x) over the range x < x0.
Figure 16: Notional value function curve for Prospect Theory, showing the asymmetry
around the reference point (origin) [112].
The model form of Prospect theory is a generalized version of expected utility. The
probability and value curves can be permuted (and calibrated) to suit the descriptive or
prescriptive approach. When the probability curves are linear, the value curve reduces to
that of expected utility. Ultimately, prospect theory gives a mathematical formulation for
calibrating the probability and value scales, and a concrete measure of a risky prospect.
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Figure 17: Weighting functions for gains (w+) and losses (w-) based on median estimates
of parameters [112].
2.2.7.2 Cumulative Prospect Theory
After the initial release of the theory in 1979, several economists criticized prospect theory
and presented improvements. In the original version of the theory the cumulative proba-
bilities were transformed by π(p), leading to a dominance of extreme events occurring with
small probability [131] [70]. One of the main criticisms was in regard to continuously dis-
tributed risky propositions. That is, the available options were not individual and discrete,
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2.2.7.3 Prospect Theory as a Prescriptive Model
Prospect theory was developed as a descriptive model for empirically observed phenomena.
Its model form was created to be immediately useful for gaining insight into psychological
decision-making routines and other studies on human systems. It was not initially developed
as a prescriptive model for a basis upon which to make future decisions. Expected utility
does not distort the probability curves, and presents a more readily suitable prescriptive tool.
The difficulty with expected utility theory is that there is no principled way of measuring
risk [111].
In 2009 Sewell took a hybrid approach to Prospect Theory and Expected Utility the-
ory. He used the linear probability scales of Expected Utility functions and the grounded
(reference point) approach for establishing value functions in terms of gains and losses from
Prospect Theory. The resulting methodology was a general prescriptive model for decision-
making under risk.
2.3 Business Perspectives of Risk
The most general measure of risk within an operational business is cost uncertainty. How-
ever, although cost is today recognized as the ultimate discriminator of risk [139], it is
notoriously difficult and labor-intensive to estimate accurately in aircraft design, even with
an extensive cost database [107].
Manufacturing-based businesses such as commercial aircraft manufacturers, have ad-
vanced uncertainty and risk approaches, but typically in regards to product quality. Re-
cently methods have emerged that integrate both the design and manufacturing related
risks into the design team analyses [127].
2.3.1 Insurance Methods and the Law of Large Numbers
However, the insurance and finance communities have much to offer in the way of sheer
business experience, methods/tools, and profit-oriented perspective of risk. For an insur-
ance company, risk is a transferable commodity to be collected from consumers, adjusting
premiums to outweigh aggregated risk exposure on a daily basis. Therefore it is appropriate
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for our review risk methodology to investigate how their paradigms might be applicable to
aircraft design processes. It was found that these communities leverage the following key
concepts:
1. The Law of Large Numbers - Enough data exists to accurately fit high fidelity models.
2. Access to near real-time data - The data is continuously generated and updated.
3. Liquid and/or readily convertible expressions of risk - All forms of risk are expressed
in few dimensions: money and time.
The first is likely the most important: the bulk of insurance organizations use finely
correlated information from vast claims databases to build models of similarly-exposed
individuals, relying on the Law of Large numbers as shown in Figure 18 to generate precise
calculations of the risk they assume. For an insurance company, it does not matter if the first
fifty clients file expensive insurance claims, because the Law of Large Numbers asserts that
eventually there is convergence to a mean. More detail on the particularly mathematical
approach taken by these companies is given in this dissertation’s review of Expected Utility
Theory.
In contrast, modern advanced design methodologies considered in this thesis develop
their analytical foundation from physics-based models and other high fidelity codes instead
of from large sets of empirical data. This is done out of necessity in advanced design projects
as data substantiating the analyses needed do not usually exist. However, many aircraft
programs are evolutionary, not revolutionary, and the argument can be made to use past
similar data. Still, even with aircraft with a long history of derivatives such as the Boeing
747, the total design count is on the order of a dozen, and certainly less than 100. The
law of Large numbers and the risk mitigation methods that leverage it tend to be more
applicable to lower-level (and high quantity) aspects of aircraft design and manufacturing.
This generally precludes the application of The Law of Large Numbers, where thousands
of cases are often needed to obtain sufficient model resolution.
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Research Observation II
New aircraft development programs are increasingly challenged by the rise in advanced
technology, multidisciplinary complexity growth and implications of program failure. Un-
like financial and insurance industries that leverage the Law of Large numbers, the aircraft
design and manufacturing business must seek program risk assessment and mitigation meth-
ods using small or non-existent empirical data sets.
The second advantage of an insurance business is related to the validity of the first. The
regressed premium calculation models have access to a continually updated claims, loss
and additional other databases (for example: a driving record in the context of automotive
insurance) which is often shared across insurance companies. This allows a rapid reaction
time to changes in exposure, situation and environmental effects. This luxury is rarely en-
joyed by aircraft manufacturers, where technology, market, and other environmental effects
are matched at discordant and delayed rates.
Thirdly, insurance and other financial risk institutions monitor and exchange directly in
a small set of units, generally money and time. Risk exposure is calculated and sold over
a period. While this shares some similarities to the perspective of the function an aircraft
provides over its service life, the aircraft manufacturer is faced with risk across several
fronts in addition to money and time. Performance, market and competition risks must
be estimated and managed throughout a product development cycle and the conversion
between each of the dimensions is specific to the particular exchange of concern. This issue
is discussed and presented in greater detail in the form of risk interrelationship matrices.
Businesses place bets, staking everything (including the well-being of their employees,
and to an larger extent society) investing considerable sums of money and time, when the
outcomes are largely dependent on factors sensitive to random events or variables. So why
do some businesses continually succeed as if immune to this risk, and some fail? Part of the
answer lies in their ability to correctly manage a risky future, or more precisely, correctly
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Figure 18: The Law of Large Numbers indicates gradual and certain stabilization towards
the mean as the number of samples approaches the net population.
assess and prepare for the possible future states, likelihood and their consequence.
In the project management and financial management communities, a variety of specific
methods for assessing investment opportunities are used. In general, the decision methods
can be categorized into two groups, organized by fundamental architecture:
1. Technical Analysis: those that are empirical and employ rigorous analysis of past data
sets, searching for patterns and indicators of likely future states.
2. Judgmental: which rely on personal selection of core parameters, and rely on the law
of averages to carry the portfolio success.
Indeed, both approaches include elements of the other; judgmental processes emphasize
intuition, personal compass and weighting assignment of influential attributes. Technical
processes focus only on the mathematical effect of the factors considered and patterns
recognized therein, and bear little influence on factors not explicitly and quantitatively
defined.
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2.3.2 Risk Taxonomy and Trades
Consider an aircraft manufacturer whose CEO is faced with the decision to launch a new
aircraft program. Like any other CEO, she must weigh risk versus the potential for gain.
From the aircraft sales strategy, the supply network, the marketing forecasting, the tech-
nology investments, the international political lobbying, the partnerships, alliances, and the
development of the product itself, the concept of developing a strategy and executing it is
performed in a risk versus reward mindset. Risk management processes are fundamental
to design activities. This thesis will stay within the realm of the latter, focusing on the
product development/definition and more specifically the preliminary design of aircraft as
a central bet-placing environment.
The goal of any product development program is essentially the same: produce a product
or service that sustains a profit or value beyond which it took to build. This is no different
for commercial transport aircraft; like any other product, they must be economically viable,
competitive, revenue-generating endeavors. The fact of life is that there are clearly certain
aircraft that fail, and others that succeed. The causes of failure to meet objectives are
diverse and program-specific, but they generally fall into one of the following 6 categories:
Program Level
1. Performance - ability to meet the technical performance objectives
2. Cost - ability to meet the cost objectives
3. Schedule - ability to meet deadlines and pre-determined milestones
Enterprise Level
4. Time - The balance between long-term and short-term enterprise level objectives
5. Market - The ability to meet the voice of the customer and realize sales targets
6. Competition – The ability to maintain market share or competitive edge
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These categories for failure to meet objectives outline a multidimensional space in which
the aircraft program must manage consistently during the program. Based on the previously
described definition of risk (that risk is the effect of uncertainty on target objectives), these
6 categories translate directly into Performance Risk, Cost Risk, Schedule Risk, Time Risk,
Market Risk and Competitive Risk.
Not all are at the forefront of concern during each phase life cycle of the aircraft or at
each level of the design hierarchy. For example, the development group in charge of the
landing gear may bear no competitive risk because they do not compete externally to the
aircraft manufacturer. Browning states that:
Without a systems view, however, many risk management actions serve only
to push schedule risk into another category – such as cost or performance risk
– rather than truly reducing overall risk [17].
This overarching perspective of system-level risk can be represented in a Risk Interre-
lationship Matrix (RIM) to demonstrate the risk trade space between the six previously
identified high level dimensions. A notional example is given under each block of risk
exchange in Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Risk Interrelationship Matrix demonstrating trades between program and enterprise level risks.
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What is critically important is that these risk areas are interrelated: time is money
(Schedule versus Cost), Market is related to competition, etc. Inherently, the decisions
made during the course of the development program make trades within this space so as
to minimize the exposure to the failure modes. The risk interrelationship matrix provides
a complete view of these relationships. This perspective is appropriate for defining the
program strategy and weighing the high-level preferences and aversion to risks. Figure
20 shows the the relationship between the cost impact per decision made and the time
at which the decision is made. It also describes notional aircraft product milestones and
regions specific to design-to-cost and manufacturing-to-cost activities.
Figure 20: Cost impact per decision during product development, with relative milestones
and design-to-cost and manufacture-to-cost considerations [31].
For example, it has been well documented that the risk-sharing strategy of Boeing’s
787 program with its supply partners is an effort to reduce the cost risk of the program by
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distributing its advanced design and composite manufacturing to foreign suppliers (notably
Japan) [104]. This in turn presents an exchange of cost-risk with both competitive and time
risk, as the distribution of traditional core-competencies of Boeing to first and second tier
suppliers potentially enables them to compete as an airframe manufacturer or supplier to
their existing competition [113, 37].
2.3.3 Handling of Uncertainty with Safety Factors
The use of safety factors has been the traditional approach to designing for the uncertainty
in the load experienced by systems. Safety factors are most often employed in directly
measurable load-bearing systems, such as aerodynamic loads (structural load such as wing
or fuselage design), or aircraft electrical loads (power and thermal load management). The
safety factor approach is a practical and rudimentary approach that captures the cumulative
uncertainty in the system, accounting for factors such as the future vehicle loads experienced
by the structure, errors in the load and stress calculation, accumulated structural damage,
and variation in material properties and standards. Safety factors also mitigate potential
errors or quality issues arising from manufacturing variance. This functional approach is
historically successful at capturing risk where margin is allowed for the known unknowns
and a degree of unknown unknowns. There are two categorized approaches to handling the
uncertainty in design with safety factors:
Explicit: The safety factor is 1.5 times the maximum design load.
Implicit: Design decisions, at every scale, are made conservatively, with the implication
that the system on the whole will exhibit tolerance to states exceeding original design
specification.
There exist difficulties with each approach. The explicit safety factor approach, while
precisely defined, leaves little or no room to adjust for particularities of subsystem interac-
tions and is often therefore over designed (excessively expensive, heavy or powerful). The
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implicit approach, however allows the safety factor to be distributed as needed, yet suffers
from imprecise and unknown metrics and a lack of a formalized method.
2.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, an overview of the concepts, definitions, and perspectives of risk and un-
certainty is presented. Of the many definitions reviewed across industries, the definition of
risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives was selected as the most relevant and perti-
nent. The concept of the objective is later exploited to assign a reference point on the value
function of system responses.
A distinction between financial risk-transferring (insurance) industries and aircraft de-
velopers is argued: the majority of financial methods of risk assessment leverage the Law
of Large Numbers to develop precise risk exposure estimations. This information is typ-
ically unavailable to new, technology-driven, competitive aircraft development programs
that instead must rely on technical, exploratory forecasting methods for risk analysis.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS AND INVESTIGATION
This Chapter evaluates the two experimental apparatuses used to build and test the CAS-
SANDRA methodology. An evaluation of the relationship between experimental run count
and risk bounds are also addressed.
The two apparatuses evaluated are as follows:
1. Apparatus 1 - A ModelCenter-based execution and parsing of the lifecycle cost code
network. This apparatus was used to first explore the cumulative cashflow space with
few samples and few factors of interest as the execution time was relatively lengthy.
2. Apparatus 2 - A high speed queuing, execution, and parsing tool for the lifecycle cost
code called BASUCA. This apparatus was used to explore the need for resolution and
breadth of contributing factors to the risk measurement and mitigation frontier.
3.1 Initial Investigation of Cumulative Cash Flow Drivers
The MInD study and previous publication by the author [23] of the experimentation con-
cluded with the observation that uncertainty alone provided value to the program manager,
but that the conversion of uncertainty into risk required additional mapping onto a utility
space. Since then, the author reviewed several candidate approaches and selected the cash-
flow diagram as a potential aggregate measure of the business case risk of a new aircraft
development program.
3.1.1 Selection of the Life Cycle Cost Estimating Code
On the surface, the calculation of cumulative cashflow diagrams alone is simple, however
the level of fidelity in the constituent cost estimations must be sufficiently high to develop
a worthwhile trade space [121]. For this reason, it was selected to use and existing cost
estimation and aggregation code (or software). There were several candidate codes evaluated
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(such as SEER-MFG, a CLIPS knowledge-based code, or process and activity based cost
estimation codes) , but the author selected the code set FLOPS and ALCCA as the core
lifecycle cost code for three reasons: 1) it was readily available and open for use in the
disseration, 2) the software has been updated continuously over the last twenty-five years
and is of acceptable fidelity for commercial transports, and 2) it incorporates the cost
estimates directly with aircraft sizing and synthesis processes.
Annual and cumulative cash flows are direct outputs from ALCCA in the form of tables,
broken down by RDTE (Research, development, testing and evaluation) costs, manufactur-
ing costs, sustaining costs, and income. This level of resolution was not captured int he
MInD study framework on a cash flow basis, so it was decided to use FLOPS and ALCCA
directly, instead of within the MInD framework.
3.1.2 Experimental Setup
FLOPS and ALCCA were setup as an independent executable within a ModelCenter code-
stitching environment. This was done to facilitate varying the input parameters and cap-
turing the output parameters from the text-based output files. Figure 21 shows the setup
of FLOPS and ALCCA from within the ModelCenter environment.
Experimental Apparatus
FLOPS / ALCCA simulations were executed from Model center to capture cumulative
cashflow results.
3.1.3 Initial results with the the ModelCenter apparatus
The background documentation on ALCCA [43] indicated that the main drivers of the
cost estimation results were learning curves (LC), annual percentage inflation (API) and
production quantity.
Therefore, the initial experiment sought to evaluate the resulting uncertainty introduced
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Figure 21: Flowpath of ModelCenter, FLOPS ALCCA, and JMP codes used for cashflow

































Figure 22: ALCCA modeling methodology illustrating the main modules and examples of
their inputs [41].
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Table 3: Input variables and their ranges for Experiment 1 of the ModelCenter FLOPS and
ALCCA apparatus.
Description FLOPS Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Manufacturer’s Rate of Return RTRTN 10 8 12
Learning Curve (Block 1) LEARN1 80 70 90
Learning Curve (Block 1) LEARN2 80 70 90
Learning Curve, Assembly (Block 1) LEARNAS1 80 70 90
Learning Curve, Assembly (Block 1) LEARNAS2 80 70 90
by varying those parameters as well as a small set of basic design variables. The complete
list of variables, and their ranges in this experiment are given in Table 3:
Figure 23 shows a cumulative cash flow of an initial study from the FLOPS and ALCCA
Model center example. In this study there were X input variables that were varied according
to a design of experiments with n runs. This was done to gain an initial appreciation of the
overall scale of the output and magnitude of the impact these input variables caused. It was
also to investigate the presupposition about their impact on the cash flow diagram. The
study revealed several subtleties about the inputs of the model that were not previously
understood, such as the manufacturer’s target return on investment and the aircraft price. It
was found that FLOPS and ALCCA treat these calculations separately; the code will solve
for either the aircraft price required to meet the return on investment, or evaluate several
different aircraft pricing strategies and subsequently calculate the return on investment.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the latter approach was found to be most useful.
This is because the sales price of the aircraft varies in practice due to market forces and
unique negotiations with customers. Secondly, aircraft price is a strategically controlled
variable that strongly affects the dynamics of the business case of the manufacturer. It was
selected to keep it independent rather than the return on investment.
A few observations should be noted looking at this figure: first is the sheer magnitude
of the sunk cost maximum, and the variance in the cumulative cash flow at the end of the
program. Of the sunk cost and the peak profitability of the program or in excess of $200
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Figure 23: Manufacturer’s cumulative cashflow from FLOPS/ALCCA output, showing all
cases from the design of experiment.
they reached such heights when filtering the results by inflation rate.
Figure 24 shows the same data colored by inflation rate and it shows the effect of
vertically stretching the cumulative cashflow results. Near break even (when the cumulative
cashflow reaches zero), the variance in the overall set of cash flows is very tight relative to the
rest of the plots. This is because the inflation stretching factor decreases linearly towards
zero as the program reached break-even.
3.1.4 Statistical Methods and Prediction from Sparse Data Sets
Following the observation from the previous Chapter regarding the applicability of the Law
of Large Numbers to aircraft design problems, it is of utility to provide a brief overview of
the statistical methods available for small data sets. Fundamentally, the challenges of small
data sets is that the sample of available data provides an unclear view of the underlying
drivers for variance. Data may be missing and it becomes difficult to assume how the missing
data may affect the conclusions drawn from the sparse set. Little states that a common
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Figure 24: Manufacturer’s cumulative cashflow grouping based on average inflation rate
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Figure 25: Manufacturer’s cumulative cashflow from FLOPS/ALCCA output, for a single
inflation rate, showing the effect of split learning rates .
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are missing completely at random (MCAR); that is, whether missingness depends on the
variables in the data set [74]. Anscombe gives an example of the errors possible from
summary statistics, showing graphs from four sets of data with identical summary statistics
in Figure 26 [2].
Figure 26: Each of the above data sets exhibit identical summary statistics, showing the
importance of graphing results when dealing with sparse or missing data [2].
Here, it is evident that the summary statistics alone do not provide a complete picture
of the underlying population. Or, if indeed the statistical summary is valid, there appears
to be a substantial segment of data missing. In many circumstances, an aircraft design
decision involving new materials, processes, and technologies has never been done before
(at least not under the particular circumstances and conditions) and the data with which to
build an empirical model is either sparse or nonexistent. The typical solution to addressing
the lack or sparse data is to develop regression models, as detailed in the next section.
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3.1.5 Creating Models for Cumulative Cashflow Uncertainty
The need for creating a surrogate model for the cumulative cashflow diagrams arose from
a desire by the author to explore uncertain cumulative cash flows instantaneously, thus
enabling parametrized exploration of the business case space without having to execute the
experiment repeatedly. This additional understanding and clarity can be developed using
models. This approach was taken in developing the knowledge-based framework by Marx
in 1996 [81].
There are two approaches evaluated in this thesis; the direct and the indirect. In the
direct approach, the simulation results are analyzed with statistical analysis software such
as JMP or MINItab. These are referred to as direct in this thesis because the uncertainty
is represented by statistical metrics that are directly measured from the data, and nothing
else. Metrics such as the moments of the data set (mean, variance, skew and kurtosis), as
well as the quantiles from the cumulative distribution function can be used to describe the
resultant uncertainty.
The first approach is to model the statistical moments of the distributions in cash flows
by year. There were three indirect approaches considered in developing models for the
year-wise uncertainty, and they are listed below:
1. Neural Networks - Originally considered to be the most suitable approach, Neural
networks offer a great deal of capability in addressing non-linear effects found in review
of uncertain cumulative cash flows, yet must be trained and can introduce spurious
side effects.
2. Year-wise fitment of continuous distributions - This approach applies a con-
tinuous distribution that is regressed in by the Least Squares Method. A variety of
models can be tested, but they should generally be applied on a year-wise basis for
uncertain cumulative cash flows.
3. Response surface methodology - Using a second order RSE approach is better
suited for smoother surfaces with less compound curvatures. The cumulative cashflow
model generally has two inflection points (one positive one at the maximum sunk cost
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point, and one negative one after break-even is reach and production rate begins to
decline), therefore it was considered to be less suitable than other approaches. An
alternate approach would be to use RSM on a year-wise basis, but this approach is
much more complicated and less effective than year-wise continuous distribution.
Neural networks were found to have generally acceptable fit when modeled for the cash-
flow means, but not the associated surrounding uncertainty. Moreover, the effects of tech-
nology and scenario factors were evident on the cashflow curve, but they did not predict the
uncertainty in those effects nearly as well. The R-Squared parameter for the means occa-
sionally was 0.9 or better for the means, but rarely was it better than 0.4 for the associated
uncertainty.
Figure 27 gives an example of the model fit and associated drivers from the initial results.
The second approach is to introduce an additional modeling layer to represent the con-
tinuous probability density function underlying the simulation results. This allows the
knowledge of the relationship between the design resulting uncertainty to be estimated
with a single function. When analytical continuous distribution functions (like the Normal
or Weibull) are fit to the data, that knowledge may be called upon without executing new
simulations and in any of the density function moments.
Table 4: Comparison of the available continuous distribution surrogate models in JMP and
their applicability for modeling uncertain cashflows.
Distribution Number of Parameters Suitability for Cash flows
Normal 2 Poor, no asymmetry
Normal 2 Mixture 5 Fair, requires dispersion
Normal 3 Mixture 8 Good, but too many parameters
Johnson Su 4 Excellent, both fit and bounds
Johnson SI 3 Good but under-damped
Beta 4 Fair, too thin in tails, thick else-
where
Weibull 3 Fair, requires threshold term
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Figure 27: Neural network model demonstrating fit for an uncertain cumulative cashflow.
Shown here is the fit for the Net Cash Flow Mean.
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Figure 28: Comparison of the different fits reviewed of continuous distributions to typical
cumulative cashflow probability distribution function, (in this case year 15 of the program).
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3.1.6 Formulation of the Cost Estimating Relationships in ALCCA
FLOPS and ALCCA use cost estimating relationships for the most of the constituent cost
breakdown structure. These are calculated on a per-component basis [42], and then summed
appropriately based on the cost structure. The n component cost estimating relationships
(CERs) are given generally as:





where A,B,and C are solutions from a linear regression of the component cost against
empirical data. The x1 and x2 variables are traditionally weight-based cost predictors. In
this dissertation based on FLOPS and ALCCA output, the B and C regression coefficients
are denoted as complexity and efficiency factors. Using weights as the independent variables
have traditionally been the best available predictors for aluminum aircraft structures. Air-
craft manufacturers have thus become keenly aware of the relationship between weight of
the aircraft structure and the business case and economic viability of the aircraft program.
Several manufacturers have even reportedly offered cash bonuses to engineers as a function
of the pounds of weight saved from an engineering or system configuration improvement
[64].
However, the emergence of new composite materials has challenged the historical validity
of the weight-based estimator. These materials tend to be both lighter and more expensive
(in raw material and tooling costs). Therefore, the traditional CER model form relationship
has suffered poorer fit error as composites become a more prevalent structural material. The
MInD study was launched in part because of this observation.
Experimental Result
Cumulative cashflows indeed provide an aggregated wealth of programmatic insight, show-
ing wild swings as a function of scenario and design variables.
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3.1.7 Dimensionality, Risk and the Need for Speed
The CASSANDRA methodology, like other uncertainty propagation approaches, is based
around exhaustive sampling of a multidisciplinary sizing and cost estimation code. For the
selected design problem with dozens of control and noise variables, thousands of executions
of the design code are necessary for basic risk analysis and millions of executions are desired.
This leads to the observation that a key challenge in this thesis is therefore to establish a
balance between analytical fidelity and computational speed. This issue has been addressed
in various ways and in multiple publications and theses, and is covered in great detail by
Stults in 2009 [121]. His work focused on the selection of appropriate modeling fidelity
in the context of the problem being solved under finite available resources. His approach
included a methodology for unifying the level of uncertainty expressed in the system in
order to achieve minimized computational time. This is a characteristic inherent to the
baseline problem of aircraft design, as the multidisciplinary nature forces the number of
factors required for holistic analysis.
3.1.8 Exhaustive Nature of Risk Analyses
As with almost any analysis, the adage of garbage in, garbage out applies with risk analyses
as well. In most analyses though, this applies in two ways: primarily to the quality of the
data and model/analysis structure, and secondarily to the number of analyses performed.
The probabilistic nature of risk analyses suggests that the number of simulations or cases
evaluated plays a larger role. To illustrate this with an analogy, consider again the thought
experiment of asking the question, Is it warm outside? The quality of the data from a
single temperature and humidity measurement will likely matter more than how many of
those measurements were made outside. The temperature is not likely to vary with position,
direction, or within the near future. Now consider the question, Is it safe outside? In this
case, the associated measurements of safety are exhaustive in nature. Safety, or danger,
would need to be measured in all directions, or along an entire perimeter. A small breach
in a perimeter may be enough for safety to be compromised, and so the analysis measures
at a resolution finer than the smallest expected danger.
65
This effect is recognized in many standardized risk analysis approaches, typically in steps
such as Enumerate the Risk Factors / Danger Modes. The weakness of these approaches
is that they rely on the analyst to identify all of the adverse states. In a deterministic
or discretized space this is possible; but in an aleatory, continuous space (such as the real
world), this is essentially impossible. Guassian approaches are often satisfied with the 95
percent solution, however the highly unlikely can have great impact. This notion was studied
at great length by Nassim Taleb [123] in The Black Swan. In his research, he illustrated
several examples where the most improbable events caused dramatic shifts in systems not
bounded by gravity such as markets, ideas, monetary value, policy, sales volume, etc.
There is also little to suggest that safety is stable over the near future, as threats
could appear suddenly. The system has no mass or momentum effect, as in the case of
temperature and humidity. Thus the combinatorial aspect of the problem is also introduced:
if safety is measured to be true in all directions, does it hold true over time? As more and
more dimensions are included in the analysis, the number of runs required to reach the
same statistical clarity increases exponentially (see equation 57 for a two-level experiment).
Therefore, the quality of a risk analysis is typically more dependent on the exhaustive nature
of exploring possibilities than the quality of a single measurement. In the probabilistic
domain, this results in a high number of simulations as the bulk addresses both resolution
and the combinatorial aspects of the problem.
In the case of financial (or cashflow) risk analysis of aircraft programs, the problem
resembles that of Is it safe outside?, rather than Is it warm outside?. The main reason for
this is that the danger from a cashflow perspective may come from any number of variables
or settings and cause sudden economic infeasibility states. This fragility is analogous to the
dimensional problem of safety in which all directions, at all times, must be measured.
Appendix A addresses this exhaustive risk simulation and risk factor dimensionality by
examining the growth of the boundary extrema as a function of the number of simulations.
Here it the width of the simulation maximum and minimum grows by approximately 1-σ
with every additional order of magnitude of simulation trials.
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New Research Observation III
Execution time in ModelCenter was slow and limited the number and resolution of factors
in the uncertainty analysis.
This examines the effect of boundary analysis and the likely effect of risk resolution
under the central limit theorem. For the purpose of the CASSANDRA methodology, it is
also worthwhile to examine how many executions are needed to resolve the same design
and strategy mitigation results? This subsequent question leads to the following Research
Question:
Research Question IV
How many executions are enough to propagate the uncertainty to the cumulative cash flow
space and draw the same design conclusions?
To answer this question, a high-speed apparatus was developed so that this question
could be explored without experimental constraints.
3.2 Development of the High-Speed Apparatus
As described in the previous section, it was observed that tens of thousands if not hundreds
of thousands of executions were possibly required to capture multi-dimensional risk analysis
problems in sufficient detail to draw design conclusions. This causes the total experimental
time to be unacceptably large for slow experiments, reaching tens of several hours or possibly
days per experiment. The new experimental apparatus could improve the speed concern by
an order of magnitude, and thus enable key trades arising from the fidelity and capability
of multi-disciplinary risk analysis.
With this in mind, the author considered several approaches to solving the speed and
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fidelity issue:
1. Develop an additional surrogate model layer around the FLOPS/ALCCA
Environment. This solves the speed problem easily as response surface equations
and neural networks enable near-instantaneous rates; however the additional layer of
modeling may introduce artifacts and force the user to make even more assumptions
regarding the drivers for risk and uncertainty. The FLOPS and ALCCA cost models
are already a layer of modeling which introduce loss of fidelity, as they are developed
from empirical data from heterogeneous sources.
2. Develop a queuing, executing, and parsing tool that could leverage ad-
vancements in multi-core processors. This approach suffers no loss of fidelity
from the FLOPS and ALCCA outputs, yet it may not be able to accelerate the
analyses sufficiently as it was initially unclear how much of the execution time was
processor-based, software-based, and read+write-based.
3. Execute experiments over a distributed or cloud-computing. environment
This approach also suffers no loss of fidelity from the FLOPS and ALCCA cost mod-
els, and the execution time for the analyses increases with the number of computers
available. However, the setup and reliability, and availability of a distributed network
may prove to be challenging.
4. Develop an all-new cost model (process or activity-based). This alterna-
tive was considered as well since it has been done previously by Marx [81], Lee [72],
Madachy [76] and many others studying cost model research. However the result-
ing speed is not necessarily guaranteed, and the fidelity of the resulting models, the
availability of cost information and the programming time needed to be taken into
consideration.
In order to select which apparatus would be used to capture the program economics, the
following criteria were identified and are given in order of importance to the CASSANDRA
methodology:
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1. Fidelity: The cash flow model must be at an industry-accepted level of cost estima-
tion fidelity and incorporate aircraft design trades, technology trades, scenario trades.
Additionally, the risk sensitivities to fidelity are preferred to be taken as late as pos-
sible, if at all in the methodology. This gives less opportunity for spurious artifacts
to enter the decision space.
2. Speed: As argued previously, the speed is directly proportional to the fidelity given
a fixed experimental period.
3. Availability of experimentation: Due to the iterative nature of the methodology,
it is preferred that the apparatus be as available as possible to the author.
4. Ease of setup: While ease was the least of the concerns to the author for the
methodology development, programming experience and software development were
also considered in the apparatus decision.
From the above concerns to the author, it was clear that Approaches 1 and 4 were to
be eliminated. The fidelity issue is a principle concern to risk analyses and an additional
modeling layer may mask those effects. For Approach 4, the ground-up development of a new
cost model suffers from fidelity issues as well due to the availability of cost data. It should
be noted that SEER-MFG, the industry approved cost and labor estimation tool used in the
MInD project, was considered as a source of information for Approach 4. However, this tool
provides excellent detailed cost information for part and assembly manufacturing, and much
less detailed information on non-structure-related costs that are present and substantial in
aircraft development (such as avionics, programming, and research and development).
This leaves approaches 2 and 3: the development of a queuing, executing, and parsing
tool or evaluating the experiments in a distributed or cloud computing environment. In
considering approach three, the reliability and availability of a distributed network was a
major concern. The author looked into several approaches for doing this, such as acquiring a
cloud computing account with a large Internet cloud computing retailer; but, it was found
to be unnecessarily complicated and expensive. The other alternatives were distributed
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computing over the Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) computing network, or
on a clustered array. The availability of this network and computing array was found to be
unsatisfactory to the author, as it imposed experimental setup constraints and scheduling
difficulties with other researchers.
In evaluating Approach 2, it was necessary to review how much improvement could be
achieved using multiple core processing. As mentioned above it was unclear how much
execution time was devoted during the FLOPS and ALCCA cycle towards core processing,
hard drive access, and software constraints within ModelCenter.
Hypothesis
Queuing, executing and parsing FLOPS / ALCCA data would be substantially faster on a
stand-alone software that enables multiple CPU core technology.
A single execution of FLOPS / ALCCA from within ModelCenter was metered using
performance measuring software in Windows. The results are plotted and shown in Figure
29 and demonstrate the excessive time spent not operating FLOPS.exe. The hard drive
read and write time was negligible, yet the ModelCenter time was substantial. There was
also an unexpected segment of time where nothing was happening. It was discovered that
ModelCenter was waiting for read+write access from the input and output files. It was later
found that FLOPS.exe requires that the input and output files be locked during a single
execution. This process slows down the batch execution because ModelCenter must wait
for FLOPS.exe to release the files.
After observing these CPU effects and their relation to time management of ModelCen-
ter, it became clear that there were gains to be had by writing a customized multi-core batch
software. Before committing to writing about software, further investigation was done in
how Model Center could be adapted to use multiple cores. Certain versions of ModelCenter



















Figure 29: Activity log for a single execution of FLOPS / ALCCA from within ModelCenter,
showing the hard drive read+write access, FLOPS.exe and ModelCenter process loads.
gains observed. This is potentially due to the fact that Flops.exe was preventing read or
write to the input and output files.
With these considerations in mind the Batch Accelerated Sequencer of Uncertain Cash
Flow Alternatives was written in C++ to accelerate parsing execution, and queuing of
FLOPS and ALCCA.
3.2.1 FLOPS/ALCCA accelerated sequencer and parsing method
The batch accelerated sequencer uncertain cash flow alternatives, or BASUCA was written
to automate and sequence the vertical simulations of sizing synthesis and cost estimation
tool. It was found that running these cost and sizing tools in an integrated environment
(such as Model Center) the total execution time was approximately 0.5 to 1.5 seconds per
execution. This included the preparation of the input file and parsing of the output file.
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Table 5: Improvement to FLOPS/ALCCA execution rate by the BASUCA queu-
ing/executing/parsing code which leverages multi-core processing of experiments.
Metric Model Center BASUCA Change
Straight executions per second (eps) 1.25 150 120X
Converged executions per second 0.5 55 110X
Time to 1 million runs 277 hours (11 days) 2hr 15min 120X
Experimental Apparatus
BASUCA (Batch Accelerated Sequencing of Uncertain Cashflow Analyses) was written in
C++ to reduce the total experimental time by accelerating the preparation, execution, and
parsing of data.
BASUCA was coded in C++ by Karl Janus, using modern libraries that enable and make
the most use of multiple core processors available and most computers today. The software
also addresses the problematic file lock on the input and output files. It achieves this by
creating all of the input files for the entire experiment before executing a single instance
of FLOPS. It also creates copies of all of the supporting files needed for each execution,
such as the engine deck. Then, BASUCA is able to queue jobs (whether executing flops,
or parsing output files) for all of the processor cores such that no core remains idle during
the experiment. This approach proved to be successful in reducing the overall experimental
run time. It was found that on certain computers, typically with more recent processors,
BASUCA was able to reduce the run time to approximately 100th of a second. A table of
results is given in Table 5 comparing the execution speed (for both converged solutions in




One to ten orders of magnitude reduction in total execution time, enabling exhaustive
analysis of candidate factors and their contribution to the uncertain cumulative cashflow.
Note that there was a slight decrease in the factor of improvement when converged
cases of FLOPS were executed instead of straight-through cases. This reduction in benefit
of BASUCA over ModelCenter is likely due to the fact that in the converged cases the
duration of FLOPS.exe is longer in proportion to the total execution time because of the time
devoted towards converging the cruise fuel segment. As BASUCA increases the efficiency
of execution by minimizing waste CPU idle time, this effect was not unexpected.
Similar to the Taguchi method of using an inner and an outer array within a design of
experiments for quality improvement, BASUCA allows inputs in the form of two separate
comma separated value (CSV) spreadsheets: a control file and a noise file. This input format
that allows for independent runs over a set of designs within the control space, where each
of the designs are exposed to the possible instances described by the noise set. This same
approach was used in the MInD study. The goal is to analyze the design-specific reaction
to the set of possible future instances (given as distributions of variables out of the user’s
control).
This inner and outer array format is flexible for screening tests as well as uncertainty
analysis. When no noise states are identified, BASUCA functions as simply a batch queuing
tool, and can execute screening tests with many control variables. Similarly, reverse noise
and control experiments can be executed to observe what impact the control space has when
the noise space becomes the independent set.
To further facilitate the uncertainty analysis, BASUCA calculates statistics from the
noise set on each of the outputs, for each of the control runs. The statistics include the four
fundamental statistical moments of sets: mean, variance, kurtosis, and skew. BASUCA
also calculates the values at a given set of quantiles in the cumulative distribution function.
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Typically, the author specified 0th, 5th, 95th and 100th quantiles. These statistical results
are given in the output file which is arranged by row for the control runs, and by column
for the parsed outputs and their statistical results. This process is shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 30: Process flowchart of BASUCA showing the application of control and noise
parameter changes to the template. Note that statistics on the total noise set is calculated
per control run as the method used for evaluating design-specific risk.
3.2.2 Results with the BASUCA apparatus
After verifying that the BASUCA apparatus was functioning properly, the first step in
addressing the cash flow risk problem with BASUCA was to identify the factors most likely
to affect the cash flow in greater detail than before. Recall that it was hypothesized that
there may be a substantial number of variables that affect the risk of the aircraft program.
With BASUCA, thorough exploration of these variables is now possible. This was done
by a large screening test similar to other experimental methodologies with large degrees of
freedom.
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3.2.2.1 Effect of Aircraft Price on Cashflow Uncertainty
ALCCA computes cumulative cashflows two separate ways and both approaches are eval-
uated in the CASSANDRA methodology. The aircraft price, the return on investment are
co-dependent variables; one may fix one and solve for the other. The following bullets
segment the rationale behind each pricing and return-on-investment approach.
• Price fixed, solve for ROI - in this approach, ALCCA takes a target aircraft
price and computes the return on investment over a input production quantity. This
approach is useful when the market is extremely price sensitive and known a priori.
• ROI fixed, solve for Price - This approach actually computes the ROI for 5 different
aircraft prices, then linearly interpolates to solve for the price that meets the target
ROI. This approach is useful when considering that the manufacturer has a fixed
internal rate of return that must be guaranteed by its creditors.
This dissertation takes a neutral perspective to price versus ROI fixation. This is because
the reality of pricing and sales of aircraft exhibits the fixation of neither specifically [66],
rather that the price of the aircraft is driven by the market and what the customer is willing
to pay. Forces such as private negotiations, governmental and manufacturing agreements,
order size and program maturity affect the actual sales prices substantially [48] [125].
Similarly, the manufacturer’s return on investment is not held constant. They may enjoy
handsome return on investment when the products continue to sell past their accounting
life or when the demand exceeds supply, typically from lengthy competitive advantage [4].
The approach taken in this thesis then is to consider both simultaneously. The execution
of ALCCA occurred in the second approach where a Desired ROI was specified; then five
candidate aircraft prices were explored, with the sixth being the price which meets the ROI
requirement. This allows a healthy variance in the uncertain cumulative cashflow space
and gives the program manager (and associated marketing and sales forces of the aircraft
manufacturer) further insight on the pricing and ROI effects.
Figure 31 illustrates the view of the cash flow uncertainty broken down by expectation
(represented as quantiles). Note the mean of the distribution is represented as numerically
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as the Quantile -2. Looking at the quartiles from zero to 100, it is evident that there is a
shift in the variance of the cashflows toward the end of the program. This is likely due to
the compounding effect of the reduction in manufacturing costs due to learning, the steady
3% increase in aircraft price per year, and the growth of inflation. On a lighter note, the
quantile perspective of the uncertain cumulative cashflow clouds resembles a bird landing,
with the developmental and investment phases representing the head, and the wings and
feathers of the cashflows the different aircraft prices used by ALCAA.
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Figure 31: Aggregation of cumulative cashflow diagrams, arranged by quantile (Note: -2 refers to the mean).
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In addition to exploring the aircraft pricing effects on cashflow, a full factorial design of
experiments was executed, permuting the allocation of composites materials to the wing,
body, empennage and engine nacelles. All other variables were held constant. The resulting
variance is shown in Figure 32. It was observed that the composites perturbation exhibited
substantial uncertainty in the cashflow space, especially on the cost side where Aircraft
Prices 1 and 2 were extremely negative and never broke even.
Figure 32: Experimental results showing the mean, variance, 0th and 100th quantiles from
an experiment where only variables related to composites manufacturing were evaluated.
The effect of aircraft price was also evaluated against the break-even date. Figure 33
illustrates the strong trend and the range of breakeven dates possible. Note that for prices
1,2 and 6, the aircraft never broke even.
3.2.2.2 Screening tests
For the screening test, 73 variables were identified within the design, technology, and sce-
nario variables sets available within FLOPS and ALCCA. These were selected largely based
on prior experience with FLOPS and ALCCA and the software’s documentation on the
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Average Slope: 
$370,000 ACPrice Per BreakEvenMonth
Figure 33: Average break-even month versus price, showing overall trend as well as aircraft
price bucket deviation.
drivers of cash flow economics. For each of the variables identified, it was necessary to es-
timate ranges of experimentation that were likely possible in the single aisle 150-passenger
aircraft design problem identified in Chapter 7. The variables, their taxonomy type, and
their associated ranges are given in Tables 6, 7 and 8.
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Table 6: Control variables and their associated ranges used in the Screening Test.
Design Type Taxonomy Category Description Variable Handle Min Max Units
Control Design Aspect Ratio (Wing) AR 7 9 -
Control Design Aspect Ratio (Horizontal Tail) ARHT 5.13 6.33 -
Control Design Aspect Ratio (Horizontal Tail) ARVT 1.12 1.38 -
Control Design Design Range DESRNG 2200 2800 Miles
Control Technology Percentage of Composites (Body) PWBODYCO 0 1 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Titanium (Body) PWBODYTI 0 0.5 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Composites (Empennage) PWEMPCO 0 1 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Titanium (Empennage) PWEMPTI 0 0.5 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Composites (Wing) PWINGCO 0 1 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Titanium (Wing) PWINGTI 0 0.5 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Composites (Nacelle) PWNACCO 0 1 Percent
Control Technology Percentage of Titanium (Nacelle) PWNACTI 0 0.5 Percent
Control Design Area (Horizontal Tail) SHT 300 400 ft2
Control Design Area (Vertical Tail) SVT 270 300 ft2
Control Design Area (Wing) SW 1250 1350 ft2
Control Design Sweep (Wing) SWEEP 22 30 Degrees
Control Design Thickness at Chord TCA 0.12 0.14 -
Control Design Taper Ratio TR 0.18 0.22 -
Control Design Taper Ratio (Horizontal Tail) TRHT 0.25 0.31 -
Control Design Taper Ratio (Vertical Tail) TRVT 0.35 0.43 -
Control Design Thrust to weight Ratio TWR 0.24 0.29 -
Control + Noise Scenario Number of Vehicles Produced/Sold NV 600 1000 Aircraft
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The complexity factors and efficiency factors were selected near their default values. It
was found that if these complexity and efficiency factors deviated too much from the default
values, then FLOPS and ALCCA returned failed values for aircraft weight and subsequently
aircraft cost.
Figure 34: Aggregate cumulative cash flow diagram for the effects screening set, divided by
aircraft price range.
3.2.2.3 Visualizing Uncertain Cumulative Cashflows
Figure 36 shows the year-wise approach to dissection of the drivers for cumulative cashflow
uncertainty. The distributions were then fitted to the Johnson-Su continuous distribution
function, then the 4 distribution parameters were modeled using the control, scenario,
and technology variables. The result is a parametric uncertain cumulative cashflow trade
environment, allowing the program manager to explore risk trades to tailor the business
case and risk-aversion profile of the program.
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Table 7: Scenario (Noise) variables and their associated ranges used in the Screening Test.
(1 of 2)
Description Variable Handle Min Max Units
Complexity Factor CFBODYAL 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFBODYCO 0.31356 0.39 -
Complexity Factor CFBODYTI 1.2744 1.57 -
Complexity Factor CFEMPAL 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFEMPCO 0.4518 0.56 -
Complexity Factor CFEMPTI 1.3617 1.68 -
Complexity Factor CFLGAL 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFLGCO 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFLGTI 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFNACAL 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFNACCO 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFNACTI 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFWINGAL 0.9 1.11 -
Complexity Factor CFWINGCO 0.4518 0.56 -
Complexity Factor CFWINGTI 1.3617 1.68 -
Efficiency Factor EFBODYAL 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFBODYCO 1.17945 1.46 -
Efficiency Factor EFBODYTI 0.90315 1.12 -
Efficiency Factor EFEMPAL 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFEMPCO 1.1034 1.36 -
Efficiency Factor EFEMPTI 0.89604 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFLGAL 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFLGCO 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFLGTI 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFNACAL 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFNACCO 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFNACTI 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFWINGAL 0.9 1.11 -
Efficiency Factor EFWINGCO 1.1034 1.36 -
Efficiency Factor EFWINGTI 0.89604 1.11 -
High-Value Material Cost (Buy-to-fly) HIMAT 0.7875 1.40 Percent
Learning Curve (Block 1) LEARN1 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve (Block 2) LEARN2 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Avionics (Block 1) LEARNA1 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Avionics (Block 2) LEARNA2 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Assembly (Block 1) LEARNAS1 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Assembly (Block 2) LEARNAS2 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Fixed-Equipment (Block 1) LEARNFE1 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Fixed-Equipment (Block 2) LEARNFE2 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Engine (Block 1) LEARNP1 75 85.00 Percent
Learning Curve, Engine (Block 2) LEARNP2 75 85.00 Percent
Other Direct Cost Factor ODC 0.03 0.05 Percent
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Table 8: Scenario (Noise) variables and their associated ranges used in the Screening Test.
(2 of 2)
Description Variable Handle Min Max Units
RDTE Labor Rate RDEVPMHR 38 68 Dollars
Engineering Labor Rate RE 60 80 Dollars
Markup for Other Direct Cost RGA 0.82 1.45 Dollars
Manufacturing Support Labor Rate RMANSUP 41 73 Dollars
Manufacturing Labor Rate RMANUMHR 38 68 Dollars
Rate for Manufacturing Material Cost RMFGMAT 0.78 1.39 Percent
Quality Assurance Labor Rate RQA 43 77 Dollars
Tooling Labor Rate RT 35 55 Dollars
Test Engineering Labor Rate RTENGMHR 65 115 Dollars
New Research Observation IVa
Price and volume produced trends emerge, and seem uncorrelated to the performance and
likely value to the end customer.
New Research Observation IVb
Quantity produced is equal to the quantity consumed and is treated as an input in the
FLOPS/ALCCA model. There was no consideration for the level of value to the customer
in a competitive environment.
3.2.3 Input Variance and Simulation Count Study
Essential to providing insight into the use of the CASSANDRA methodology is an awareness
of what affect the inputs and operational setting have on the dispersion of the results. The
width of the input ranges on the noise variables is of particular concern, as the resulting
cumulative cashflows are capable of enormous variance. Similarly, there exists the possibility
that the simulation exhaustiveness itself interacts with the estimates, particularly when
evaluating the bounds as discussed in the previous section.
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Table 9: Effects screening study on Cumulative Cash Flow (Year 2024) showing the average
factor rank from two experiments. Tabulated are the top 25 of 73 factors evaluated. Number
of Runs=5,000., Experimental configuration: Experiment 1: Monte Carlo, Experiment 2:
D-Optimal Design
Factor Rank in Exp. 1 Rank in Exp. 2 Average Rank Rank Difference
RE 6 4 5 2
ARHT 9 1 5 8
RT 1 10 5.5 -9
CFWINGTI 8 11 9.5 -3
SVT 10 14 12 -4
EFLGAL 12 15 13.5 -3
LEARN2 25 5 15 20
EFNACAL 5 26 15.5 -21
ARVT 26 7 16.5 19
RMANUMHR 4 33 18.5 -29
RGA 7 30 18.5 -23
PWINGTI 15 22 18.5 -7
LEARNA2 35 3 19 32
PWNACTI 17 24 20.5 -7
TRHT 16 28 22 -12
HIMAT 3 46 24.5 -43
LEARNAS1 30 20 25 10
CFNACAL 51 2 26.5 49
EFNACTI 37 23 30 14
CFBODYTI 46 16 31 30
PWNACCO 2 61 31.5 -59
PWEMPCO 29 34 31.5 -5
EFEMPTI 32 31 31.5 1
EFBODYTI 20 45 32.5 -25
RMANSUP 61 6 33.5 55
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Table 10: Effects screening study on Break Even Month showing the average factor rank
from two experiments. Tabulated are the top 25 of 73 factors evaluated. Number of
Runs=5,000., Experimental configuration: Experiment 1: Monte Carlo, Experiment 2: D-
Optimal Design
Factor Rank in Exp. 1 Rank in Exp. 2 Average Rank Rank Difference
RT 5 3 4 -2
HIMAT 6 9 7.5 3
EFNACAL 10 6 8 -4
ARHT 13 4 8.5 -9
RMANSUP 17 2 9.5 -15
ARVT 20 1 10.5 -19
PWEMPTI 21 7 14 -14
EFLGCO 19 15 17 -4
CFBODYTI 25 10 17.5 -15
LEARNA2 24 13 18.5 -11
EFWINGAL 30 8 19 -22
PWINGTI 4 35 19.5 31
RQA 23 18 20.5 -5
CFNACTI 14 31 22.5 17
EFLGAL 16 33 24.5 17
CFLGAL 22 28 25 6
DESRNG 12 40 26 28
EFEMPTI 8 47 27.5 39
RMANUMHR 9 48 28.5 39
EFLGTI 7 50 28.5 43
CFWINGTI 39 21 30 -18
LEARNAS1 46 16 31 -30
RDEVPMHR 40 22 31 -18
CFWINGAL 2 61 31.5 59
RE 1 62 31.5 61
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Figure 35: Aggregate cumulative cash flow diagram for the effects screening set, divided
by the FLOPS / ALCCA aircraft price number (not aircraft price). Note that aircraft
price number 6 refers to the converged aircraft price to reach a manufacturer’s return on
investment goal.
To capture this effect, a 4-level, full factorial experiment was executed on a single control
setting for the design. The baseline setting was that of the Screening Test, as given by the
centerpoints of the distributions given in Table 6.
The noise variable ranges were expanded by setting the input distribution types to
Normal/Gaussian and setting the variance to be a fixed percentage of the mean. This
percentage ranged from 3% to 12%.
The simulation run count was varied from 10 to 1000 runs in the noise array. As
mentioned previously, the BASUCA apparatus was designed to handle millions of total
executions of FLOPS and ALCCA. Setting the noise (outer) array length to 1000 would
result in 1 million total executions if the control array were of the same length.
The results described the mean, variance, skew, and bounds are given in Table 11.
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Program Year
Figure 36: Continuous distributions fitted to cumulative cashflow drivers, then regressed as
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Figure 37: Overview of the information and data flow of the experimental apparatus (BA-
SUCA) that used to accelerate FLOPS and ALCCA cumulative cashflow analysis. Note
the three steps : the Effects screening, the Surrogate Model construction, and the Inverse
Design.
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Table 11: Results from the BASUCA noise array variance and simulation run count study.
Input Variance (%) Simulation Run Count Mean Variance 0th Quantile 100th Quantile Skew
3 10 20084 150 19765 20508 -0.49
3 25 20311 164 19233 21430 0.37
3 100 20043 104 18456 22399 0.52
3 250 20043 63 17938 22399 0.28
3 1000 20055 32 17439 22991 0.16
7 10 22386 1090 19451 23475 0.57
7 25 20722 589 17421 23475 0.92
7 100 20751 273 16366 27230 0.58
7 250 20867 169 16203 28487 0.66
7 1000 20675 84 15148 29973 0.64
10 10 20657 1897 16614 21804 1.63
10 25 21242 1213 16120 26676 1.98
10 100 21323 508 14115 34967 1.30
10 250 21143 283 13862 36407 1.14
10 1000 21218 162 11935 47381 1.74
12 10 23750 1973 18986 27675 0.84
12 25 21995 1068 16466 30208 0.96
12 100 21964 584 14235 37836 1.16
12 250 22005 401 12806 44254 1.54
12 1000 21834 198 12280 58812 2.14
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Figure 38 shows the effect of stabilizing mean estimate in the cumulative cash flow as a
function of increasing run count and input variance. For each of the input variances, this
effect is evident. Of particular interest is noting that between 50 and 100 executions, the
mean has already stabilized. This effect was expected. As the input variance grew from 3
to 12%, a steady but slight increase in the cumulative cash flow was observed. This was
likely due to the slight asymmetry of the learning curve effect input distribution.
Figure 39 shows the effect of the output variance in the cumulative cash flow as a function
of increasing run count and input variance. Here, two trends are evident. The first was
that as the simulation count was increased, the variance estimate decreased substantially
in each case. At first glance this was surprising, however examining the other results made
this effect more clear. As the number runs increased in the noise array, the estimate of
the variance in the output decreased exponentially. More specifically, the estimate for
variance on the set decreased with increasing simulation run count as the peakedness of
the distribution, or kurtosis, was found to decrease with simulation run count. The second
trend was expected: increasing the input variance also increased the output variance, and
this effect was approximately linear.
Figure 40 shows the effect of simulation run count and input variance on output kurtosis
in the cumulative cash flow. Recall that the kurtosis describes the peakedness of a distri-
bution. Here the sample excess kurtosis K (kurtosis value minus 3) was largely invariant
with the input variance, and like the mean estimate tended to settle down as the simula-
tion count increased towards a slightly less kurtotic distribution than the perfect normal
distribution (in which excess kurtosis = 3). For reference, the sample kurtosis of a set of n













)2 − 3 (12)
where m4 is the fourth sample moment about the mean, m2 is the second sample moment
about the mean (that is, the sample variance), xi is the i
th value, and x is the sample mean.
Figure 41 shows the effect of the increasing run count and input variance on output skew
in the cumulative cash flow. It was found that the skew increased as both the input variance
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Figure 38: The relationship of noise array input variance and simulation results on the
mean of the cumulative cashflow space.
Figure 39: The relationship of noise array input variance and simulation results on the
variance of the cumulative cashflow space.
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Figure 40: The relationship of noise array input variance and simulation results on the
excess kurtosis of the cumulative cashflow space.
Figure 41: The relationship of noise array input variance and simulation results on the
skew of the cumulative cashflow space.
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Figure 42: The relationship of noise array input variance and simulation results on the 0th
and 100th Quantiles of the cumulative cashflow space.
increased and settled slightly as the simulation run count increased. The simulation run
count had a weaker impact on skew and was found to settle to usable value by approximately
100 runs. The input variance showed a strong impact on skew, likely due to the inflation
rate distortion effect by cumulative cashflow values that were further and further from zero.
Here, as the input variance increased, the ending program cash flow skew was increased.
This effect is also shown in Figure 42, demonstrates the effect of the increasing run count
and input variance on output bounds in the cumulative cash flow.
Here the results from the Monte Carlo simulation evaluating growth in normal distri-
bution bounds as a function of samples is repeated. The spread between the 0th and 100th
Quantiles increases dramatically with input variance, as well as simulation count. The effect
is stronger with input variance than with simulation run count.
3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed the experimental apparatus and explored two different setups for eval-
uation. The first apparatus evaluated the sizing and simulation software from an embedded
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code stitching environment. This gave the initial exploration and sensitivity confirmation
of the uncertain cumulative cashflow concept. The execution time was approximately 1.5
seconds per run, and it was originally assumed that a million executions might be neces-
sary when using the control-by-noise array structure. The reason for this assumption was
due to the desire to capture all of the interactions possible for generating design risk. A
full-factorial experiment of the control and noise variables to the risk space led to an unac-
ceptable total experiment time of approximately 11 days. Note that the full factorial design
of experiments could be reduced to a fractional factorial or Latin Hypersquare design, but
both of these approaches concede interactions which were not desired to be assumed.
Therefore, a high-speed apparatus was built called BASUCA to reduce the CPU idle
time of the experimental process. From here, it was then possible to evaluate the validity of
the full factorial assumption, which was found to be false. The initial hypothesis of needing
1000 executions in the noise array turned out to be invalid: approximately 75-150 executions
captured the majority of the cumulative cashflow statistical estimates sufficiently.
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CHAPTER IV
ALLOCATING RISK TO MANAGE SCHEDULE AND COST
4.1 Introductory Remarks
As described in the previous chapter, the aircraft designer’s management problem is to
balance the consequences of design decisions in the dimensions of performance, cost, and
schedule to higher-level goals of generating sustainable, profitable products. The program
manager’s values place risk constraints on the level of acceptable risk in each of those
dimensions. To meet those constraints, only a few parameters can be controlled: capital
allocation and investment, technology selection, and time resources.
This allocation problem poses a unique challenge to the designer or program manager,
and in order to succeed in the aircraft program, measures are needed to identify the gaps
and the excesses in risk allocation.
Developing a methodology that identifies the relationship between technology risk and
overall economic impact could meet this challenge, however it must address the investment
variations as well of the production variations in order to make the recommendations useful.
The goal of this chapter is to address the allocation problem of technology risk and iden-
tify methods in which the consequence to program schedule and cost may be measured. In
addition, it will present a brief summary of the literature relevant to identifying, measuring,
and interpreting uncertainty and risk in the context of aircraft development programs.
4.2 Literature Review of Relevant Background
The literature review begins with the assessment of uncertainty methods into the aircraft
product development process, and it begins on the ground floor with an engineer. One of
the first publications revealing the use of engineer-level uncertainty elicitation was given by
Batson, et al. in 1988 in their report of uncertainty analysis of new aircraft development
at Lockheed Martin [5]. This is illustrated in Figure 43. They used a Monte Carlo process
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to map the input uncertainty to payload-range outputs of various conceptual design alter-
natives. The risk was identified by the overlap of the maximum payload at critical range
and the frequency of loads carried [5]. This approach to calculating risk by load-stress
probability overlap is common in reliability and structural safety analyses [6, 26, 129, 138].
This is illustrated in Figure 44.
Risk assessment in aircraft design is a broad, comprehensive field, and there have been
several trends and methods to address system design risk. In 2009, Curran used stochastic
modeling to capture uncertainty and sensitivity analysis for the minimization of operating
costs by permuting structural design variables. They found that the minimum weight system
did not correspond to the lowest direct operating cost [26].
Real Options is another trend for studying the variance and managerial adaptability of
large, complex system design. Real options uses financial valuation models to capture ’pay-
offs’ of possible future states of real-world problems, then uses the stochastic Black-Scholes
options pricing model to evaluate and compare the value of non-permanent alternatives
[32, 20].
Peoples and Wilcox looked at an alternative design technique by comparing performance-
optimized and value-optimized designs. They showed that there existed a trade off between
aerodynamic efficiency and manufacturing costs when value was used as a design metric, and
that the stochastic methodology indicated an advantage in strategy of spending up-front
capital to improve long term profitability [101].
Lessard [73] provides a broad distinction between risk management approaches that is
appropriate at this time:
1. Type I : Decision theoretic approaches that by and large assume that risks
are exogenous.
2. Type II : Managerial approaches that recognize that risk depends on the
interaction among exogenous risk drivers, managerial choices during the
front end, and the shaping of risk drivers throughout the process.
A relevant example of an exogenous variable is manufacturing labor rate. In Lessard’s
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Figure 43: Uncertainty elicitation questionnaire released in 1988 [75].
Type 1 approach to risk management, the risk on cost and schedule objectives arising from
labor rate is considered as something that comes from outside the model and is unexplained
by the model. Risk management approaches in this case are static: the labor rate is assumed
to be fixed, and the risk mitigation process aims to reduce sensitivity to the exogenous
variable. In the Type II approach, there is an active interaction between the fluctuating
labor rate and the subsequent development processes: the risk can be continuously managed
assuming sufficient managerial flexibility. The field of Real Options has emerged to model
the time-variant strategic adaptability of decision alternatives in the same way as financial
options pricing mechanisms [14].
For the sake of simplicity, the scope of the proposed research is kept to time-invariant
analyses (similar to Lessard’s Type I approach), although Real Options is certainly a promis-
ing area of research.
Classical venture valuations methods apply the Discounted Cash Flow method, where
a decision maker makes future cash flow estimates and discounts them to present day, then
considers the investment cost associated with creating the cash flows. Typical research
and development efforts display a high amount of uncertainty, rendering the deterministic
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Figure 44: Uncertainty propagation to Payload-Range diagrams, illustrating the probabilis-
tic load and ultimate stress overlapping perspective of structural risk [5].
discounted cash flow method difficult to apply [92].
4.2.1 Uncertainty Elicitation and Mitigation Processes
Risk management processes are as diverse as definitions and interpretations of risk. A
simple literature search will reveal hundreds upon hundreds of various risk management
processes, of varying degrees of fidelity and utility. There is an evident trend that appears,
as with the definition of risk, and the generalized steps are summarized below.
1. Step I : Identification of uncertainty
2. Step II : Representation or elicitation of uncertainty
3. Step III : Propagation of the uncertainty through the system
4. Step IV : Analysis and interpretation
5. Step V : Mitigation of resulting risk
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There has been extensive research in each of these broad steps. A more detailed, refereed
example from the ISO31000:2009 [60] is given.
Figure 45: The ISO31000 risk management process [60].
Long and Narciso [75] used probabilistic design methods to evaluate sensitivities of de-
sign variables to evaluate risk of composite systems for the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). NASA published an iterative risk management process [97] that identifies a system
hierarchy as well as a risk management processes executor. This identification is given in
the form of a pyramid, with the hierarchy broken down into agency, directorate, program,
project, and element in Figure 46. The risk management process itself is similar to that
given in ISO31000:2009 shown before.
4.2.2 Identification of Uncertainty
As with any transfer analysis, the quality of the results is only as good as the quality of the
inputs and model itself. Risk analysis is particularly sensitive to this effect as measurement
of the error, variance and bounds of the results is the primary goal. Because of this effect,
careful attention must be paid as to how uncertainty about the system is described. Without
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Figure 46: NASA Agency Risk Management approach, breaking down the user and system
level iterative processes [97].
a clear understanding of the assumptions going in to the elicitation, the resulting analysis
is either difficult or meaningless to interpret.
As described in Section 2.1.4 aleatory and epistemic uncertainty are used to describe un-
certainty in fundamentally different ways. For risk analyses measuring the inherent variabil-
ity of the system, such as the price of oil in future states, or the dimensions of manufactured
parts, aleatory uncertainty elicitations and subsequent treatment theory are appropriate.
Probability Theory is widely accepted in the reliability engineering community as the most
suitable approach [121].
In contrast, epistemic uncertainty exists when there is a cognitive lack of knowledge
about the system. Several representations and model theories exist for capturing epistemic
uncertainty, such as Bayesian Theory, Possibility Theory, and Dempster-Shafer’s Evidence
Theory. Discussion of the various advantages and relative performances for aerospace prob-
lems is well documented in Stult’s thesis [121].
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When surrogate models are used, a new source of epistemic uncertainty may exist re-
lated to the Model Fit Error (MFE) and Model Representation Error (MRE). Delaurentis
describes uncertainty in regards to modeling and simulation as the “...the incompleteness in
knowledge (either in information or context), that causes model-based predictions to differ
from reality in a manner described by some distribution function.” [27].
For the scope of this thesis, epistemic uncertainty is considered in Probability theory














Figure 47: Three-level decomposition of the entry points and interdependencies of uncer-
tainty during the design process [49].
4.3 Uncertainty Propagation
There are two general approaches to propagating uncertainty throughout a system: Approx-
imation and Sampling Method. In the approximation approach to propagating uncertainty,
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the uncertainty of the output is directly computed through the linearized function describ-
ing the system using statistical propagation theory, and provides limited information on the
resulting output: mean and variance. This is useful when the mathematical representation
of the system is linear and when the propagated uncertainty is sufficiently described by the
variance alone. This approach is rare in aircraft design methods as the restrictions imposed
on the function are often undesirable and additional information is needed regarding the
shape of the output distribution. There have been notable improvements in central dis-
persion approximation methods, including Quadratic Combination and Perturbation, but
discussion on those methods is out of the scope of the research.
The second method to propagating uncertainty is sampling. In sampling, no linearization
or preparation of the system functions is needed. Instead, the propagated uncertainty
arises simply from mass collection of independent samples from the function. Monte Carlo
Sampling is an example of such a technique and is widely used in system design problems.
4.3.1 Monte Carlo Sampling
A standard technique for the exploration of a design space as well as analyzing uncertainty
through a system is Monte Carlo (MC) simulation [10]. In this technique, the subjects
(often deterministic analysis codes or surrogate models) are stochastically sampled to pro-
duce correctly scaled dispersion of results. Depending on which variables are selected in
the sampling set, the Monte Carlo process can be used for design space exploration (from a
Design of Experiments on the design variables) or a uncertainty propagation, or both simul-
taneously. This subtle distinction is often the source of confusion in interpretation of the
results. Design space exploration by itself is a deterministic activity ; the assumptions and
scenario variables are held constant and the resulting variance in responses is due to static
design permutation. When the distributions are instead applied to scenario variables (or
as future-path influences on design variables), the resulting distributions describe possible
outcomes of frozen design due to variance in the assumptions. Both approaches are useful
in the Risk Management process.
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Monte Carlo Sampling may require a substantial number of samples in order to pop-
ulate and resolve output probability density distributions (PDFs); sample set sizes in the
thousands and millions are not uncommon [121]. If the individual clock time of the subject
is lengthy, this computational expense can quickly exceed reasonable limits. It is for this
reason that surrogate models are used to accelerate net analysis time. Though there are
a variety of Monte Carlo (MC) sampling algorithms such as Stratified Monte Carlo sam-
pling, Importance Sampling and Quasi Monte Carlo sampling, this thesis aims to default
the uncertainty propagation method to Monte Carlo sampling of surrogate models.
4.3.2 Fast Probability Integration
An alternative approach in uncertainty propagation to full sampling techniques was devel-
oped by Southwest Research Institute for NASA. In this method the cumulative probability
functions (CDFs) are approximated by creating a linearized form of the system response,
then calibrated the CDF with additional samples [138] [86].
























































Figure 48: Illustration of various probabilistic design methods [67].
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4.3.3 Response Surface Methodology
The Response Surface Methodology (RSM) is one of the multi-variate reduced-form mod-
eling approaches used in this study. The acceleration enabled Monte Carlo simulations
with high run count, and thus thorough explorations of the uncertain permutations. The
formulation of response surface methodology is given below in Equation 13.













bijxixj + ε (13)
The b coefficients result from linear regression of the empirical outputs (R) with respect
to the inputs (xi and xj). The response surface equation is suitable for smooth outputs
with few non-linearities within the range of interest. It was found that the majority of the
responses in the MInD could be modeled with response surfaces of an acceptable R2 fit.
4.3.4 Multi-disciplinary System Interactions
In multi-disciplinary design of systems, the individual components (or sub-systems) must
be designed to work in concert to serve the greater system. This simple fact introduces an
opportunity for risk entry in the integration of the hierarchical linkages between the systems.
A common measure of systemic risk is the maximization of the component hierarchy; that
is to say, the risk of the entire system is equal to that of the component with the greatest
risk. In this squeaky wheel approach, managerial resources are then allocated to mitigating
risks of that particular component– whether in reduction of uncertainty contributing to the
risk or in hedging the consequential impact.
This hierarchy also provides a structure with which to exchange risk parameters, specif-
ically in regards to objectives. During the Preliminary design and Detailed Design phases,
contributing disciplines are exchanging information in cycles as the design is refined. The
system level design is also re-evaluated using the latest estimates, and component level ob-
jectives are re-distributed to the various disciplines. A prime example of this is the structural
load sizing. As the aircraft control systems, propulsion systems and various other systems
are designed in greater detail, the weight estimate of the overall aircraft evolves. This weight
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Figure 49: Hierarchal system risk evolution over time as a function of maximum risk
estimate (often Empty Weight) is redistributed to the wing aerodynamics and structural de-
sign disciplines–which may then need to be re-sized. Following the definition of risk selected
in Section 2.1.3 of effect of uncertainty on objectives, this shifting in the component-level
objective causes a subsequent possible shift in that discipline’s component-level risk.
4.4 Risk Matrices
Risk matrices are a common approach to mapping likelihood and impact in one visual
matrix, usually color according to the product of the axes. Several private organizations
and governmental standards have adopted the use of risk matrices as a generalized method
of evaluation and visualization of risk thresholds.
However, much like overall validation of risk methods mentioned earlier by Galway [40].
Cox argues that there has been little research that risk matrices validates the performance
in actually improving risk management decisions [24]. The criticism of their use was broken
into four reasons:
1. Poor resolution - Unambiguous differentiation between hazards can only be done for
a small fraction of the alternatives.
2. Errors - Risk matrices can mistakenly assign higher qualitative ratings to quantita-
tively smaller risks. For risks with negatively correlated frequencies and severity, they
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Figure 50: Risk reporting diagram [22].
can be worse than useless, leading to worse-than-random decisions.
3. Sub-optimal Resource Allocation - Effective allocation of resources to risk-reducing
countermeasures cannot be based on the categories provided by risk matrices.
4. Ambiguous inputs and outputs - Categorizations of severity cannot be made objectively
for uncertain consequences.
4.4.0.1 Example Uncertainty Analysis using FLOPS
NASA Langley and the National Institute of Aerospace conducted an uncertainty study
on a multi-disciplinary, multi-objective subsonic mission using FLOPS design analyses to
determine the reduction in design space due to uncertainty [25]. They varied the take-
off weights, aerodynamic coefficients, technology readiness levels, and uncertain future fuel
prices for cost analysis. Their research illustrated the difference between the probabilistic
design space boundary and the deterministic design space boundary. Figure 51 illustrates
the relative shift in the boundaries in two response dimensions.
4.4.1 Value-Based Aircraft Risk Management
Markish and Wilcox evaluated a method that augments the net present value method to




Figure 51: Reduction of the actual design space due to uncertainty [25].
separate models: cost, revenue and performance [79]. The result was a quantification of
value to make program level trades.
4.5 Technology and Manufacturing Risk
As previously described, the total program risk is sensitive to the uncertainty around the
development and success of technologies that are critical to the overall program. The
example described in the motivation was the advanced materials technology associated with
the fastening of the upper wing joint to the airframe. The upper wing joint issue–if found
earlier–would have allowed time for re-design to correct the problem before certification
testing. The original joint passed sub-component testing. Had the issue been identified
during an earlier phase of development, the impact to the risk frontier would have been
much smaller.
As manufacturers have become increasingly aware of the relationship between technol-
ogy maturation and program schedule, quantification approaches to the risk have been
introduced. Metrics such as technology readiness level (TRL), manufacturing readiness
level (MRL), and systems readiness level (SRL) have entered the development paradigm.
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These readiness levels help gauge the progress and integration of program aspects. New
technologies programs are often measured by their TRL Level. In 1995, NASA released
their widely accepted definitions for Technology Readiness Levels, a measure by which to
gauge the development of new technologies [77]. The definitions are given in Figure 52.
New technologies are developed and integrated in a just-in-time basis with new aircraft
design. This is done to maintain competitive advantage because technology factors are
often the deciding factor for customer procurement. Therefore, the technology, and its
integration are typically managed simultaneously. This simultaneous integration means
that if certain elements are behind schedule or development then it increases the schedule
risk and therefore overall program risk. An example of this relationship is given in Figure
53. In this figure, the technology maturity (described by TRL) is plotted clearly against
program phase, showing the gradual increasing risk as supporting technologies fail to reach
maturity milestones.
Much research has been done to succinctly define and correlate the TRL and MRL lev-
els to program phases. The relationship between the two is also a source for risk entry.
Figure 54 relates technology readiness levels, manufacturing readiness levels, and the de-
fense acquisition lifecycle framework. While the defense acquisition framework is somewhat
comparable to the program phases of commercial development, the key relationship shown
here is there exists risk entry opportunity based on the timing of the program milestones
and the technology transfer into manufacturing and product application.
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Definition Of Technology Readiness Levels 
 
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported: Transition from scientific research to applied 
research. Essential characteristics and behaviors of systems and architectures.  Descriptive tools 
are mathematical formulations or algorithms. 
 
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated: Applied research.  Theory and 
scientific principles are focused on specific application area to define the concept. Characteristics 
of the application are described.  Analytical tools are developed for simulation or analysis of the 
application. 
 
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-
concept: Proof of concept validation. Active Research and Development (R&D) is initiated with 
analytical and laboratory studies.  Demonstration of technical feasibility using breadboard or 
brassboard implementations that are exercised with representative data. 
 
TRL 4 Component/subsystem validation in laboratory environment: Standalone prototyping 
implementation and test.  Integration of technology elements.  Experiments with full-scale 
problems or data sets. 
 
TRL 5 System/subsystem/component validation in relevant environment: Thorough testing 
of prototyping in representative environment.  Basic technology elements integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements. Prototyping implementations conform to target 
environment and interfaces.  
 
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototyping demonstration in a relevant end-to-end 
environment (ground or space): Prototyping implementations on full-scale realistic problems.  
Partially integrated with existing systems. Limited documentation available.  Engineering 
feasibility fully demonstrated in actual system application.  
 
TRL 7 System prototyping demonstration in an operational environment  
(ground or space): System prototyping demonstration in operational environment. System is at 
or near scale of the operational system, with most functions available for demonstration and test.  
Well integrated with collateral and ancillary systems.  Limited documentation available. 
 
TRL 8 Actual system completed and "mission qualified" through test and demonstration in 
an operational environment (ground or space): End of system development.  Fully integrated 
with operational hardware and software systems.  Most user documentation, training 
documentation, and maintenance documentation completed.  All functionality tested in simulated 
and operational scenarios. Verification and Validation (V&V) completed. 
 
TRL 9 Actual system "mission proven" through successful mission operations (ground or 
space): Fully integrated with operational hardware/software systems.  Actual system has been 
thoroughly demonstrated and tested in its operational environment.  All documentation 
completed.  Successful operational experience.  Sustaining engineering support in place. 
 



















9 Production Flight Proven
8 Flight Test Qualified No Risk
7 Full Scale Ground Test
6 Component Level Ground Test Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk
5 Subcomponent Ground Test
4 Panel Level Testing




1 Basic Principles Reported
Figure 53: Technology maturity risk matrix overlaid on the product development phase
timeline [110].
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Figure 54: Technology and manufacturing readiness maturity in relation to a product development phase timeline (in this case, the DoD
Acquisition Framework [96].
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Figure 55: Risk entry due to the differing view of technology readiness with system (appli-
cation) readiness levels [110].
The uncertainties associated with technology development and integration are often
estimated using modeling and simulation. These models help organize and schedule as well
as estimate the impact of technology integration.
However, models introduce additional errors to the ones already existing due to lack of
knowledge, inability to represent physics with mathematical expressions, incomplete infor-
mation, numerical arithmetic errors, uncertainty, and its propagation, as illustrated in the
Equation 14: [69]
R = f(x) + ePhysics + eModel + eMetamodel + eData + eNumerics + eUncert. + eUncert.Prop. (14)
4.5.1 Modeling Technology Schedule and Cost
Technology costs and duration have been notoriously difficult to estimate accurately, due
to the largely aleatory nature of the steps involved. They may not reach desired readiness
levels on time and on budget due to physical, technological, human or management causes.
There are empirical models which can be used to estimate deterministically. An example
breakdown of the technology development and personnel costs per TRL step is given in
Figure 56. Note the peak in cost and personnel during TRL Phase 5, precisely when inte-
gration between the technology development team and the manufacturing and application












































































Figure 56: Chart showing the approximate cost per step of TRL as well as the breakdown
in personnel for each phase of the technology maturation [110].
In addition to the cost and schedule uncertainty, the performance impact is also un-
certain during the technology development phases. To model this approach, Kirby gives a
probabilistic depiction of TRL versus desired capability in Figure 57, showing the transfor-
mation of uncertainty throughout the development process.
As identified in the previous sections, the interaction between the technology develop-
ment process and its application causes uncertainty in cost and schedule for the technology
development processes. This uncertainty causes schedule and cost slippage when individual
elements do not meet their estimated schedule. Some of the development aspects cannot
be done concurrently, causing later steps (or development goals) to be pushed further back
in time.
To address the serial development aspect of technology and manufacturing (or alterna-
tively application) readiness, the interaction between technology readiness and manufactur-
ing readiness, was modeled using a networked approach for the implementation and total
RDT&E cost and duration scheduling. This led to the conceptual exploration of what was
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Figure 57: Probabilistic illustration of Technology Readiness Levels [67].
called a Technology Network Model (TNM).
Figure 58 shows the flow of uncertainty elements into the technology network matrix
model. Here the cost and time elements are combined together, producing a single distri-
bution for the total development cost and time for the technologies in consideration. These
distributions then serve to map to input variables in the experimentation framework.
Looking inside the model, the core functionality of the TNM is to enable stop-gap
requirements for the readiness levels of technologies and their manufacturing readiness.
These stops trigger delays and increments in cost when the condition is not met. It then
functions similar to a FIFO queuing model with multiple servers and a processing condition
imposed.
To illustrate this effect with the technology and manufacturing example, consider the
composites technology Stitched Resin Film Infusion (S/RFI, detailed in the next section):
the TNM could specify what TRL level this technology must reach (for example, TRL







































Figure 58: Illustration of the uncertainty flow into the Technology Network Matrix (TNM).
Deterministically, this constraint may not cause any issue as the MRL and TRL of the
S/RFI have already been scheduled; but, due to the probabilistic nature of the duration
and costs of those steps, it is possible for the technology to be delayed in reaching TRL 7,
thus forcing the development of the application to idle at MRL 4 until TRL 7 is reached.
This is illustrated in Figure 59.
This was demonstrated and was explored in a MATLAB code called TekNET. This
code takes a set of Technologies, their mean development times per TRL, and symmetric
triangular uncertainty and produces a time-based portfolio growth model. The code is then
expanded to handle enabling technologies (by TRL) that often exist within the technology
network. Each of the lines in Figure 60 is a different technology as it progresses through the
development stages. At launch, the technologies are at different stages; but, the sequenced
requirement of manufacturing readiness levels means that once the requirement is imposed,
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Figure 59: Illustration of the Technology Network Matrix (TNM) which requires pre-set
technology readiness levels to be reach goals before manufacturing levels may be reached.
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Figure 60: Demonstration of the Technology Network Matrix (TNM) which requires pre-set technology readiness levels to reach goals
before manufacturing levels may be reached.
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4.5.2 Demonstration Technology and Calibration
NASA released an AST report in 2001 [65] that verified the manufacturing and implemen-
tation of a new low-cost composite technology in primary wing structures of civil transport
aircraft while maintaining a strength-to-weight performance advantage over aluminum. The
technology, called stitched resin film infusion or S/RFI, enables cost savings by assembling
the dry composite preforms with a computer-controlled stitching machine, then infusing the
epoxy resin and curing the assembly as a whole. This approach has several procedural ad-
vantages in the manufacturing of complex parts and assemblies, as mechanical fasteners are
replaced. The report focused around a composite redesign of the aging McDonnell Douglas
MD-80 (also a single aisle transport with approximately 150 passenger capacity and 2000+
nautical mile range), and included several new manufacturing technologies and detailed
cost estimations. This report provided a detailed reference for technological and fiscal cost
methodology calibration. The unique availability of this report, and the detail provided in
the cost estimation and manufacturing technology proof-of-concept were therefore ideal for
use as a baseline to evaluate the methodology.
Figure 61 gives a detailed overview of the trade study between aluminum wing weight
and the S/RFI technology. It shows the weight savings over the aluminum structures broken
down by the wing components. The baseline trade study shows approximately 30 percent
improvement in part weight at both room temperature and with environmental effects taken
into account. Only a single component, the rib and spar shear clip, actually increased in
weight with S/RFI technology. The NASA AST report verifies the economics associated
with this new technology by actually building a full-scale wing box. Figure 62 shows the
full-scale wing box design with the stitched cover panel design.
Figure 63 shows a close-up photograph of the computer-controlled stitching machine
assembling the drive preforms of a rib clip to the skin. This technology made it “possible
to incorporate various elements of the wing box into interval structure that eliminates the
requirement for thousands of mechanical fasteners” [65]. The challenge with this technol-
ogy which introduced risk and uncertainty into both the economics and performance, was
whether or not the resin could be reliably infused into the drive preform assembly. Failure
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Figure 61: Weight comparison for aluminum and Stitched/Resin film infusion (S/RFI)
composite wing structures [65].
to penetrate the entire drive preform structure could introduce mechanical weaknesses and
therefore safety concerns at this was for use in primary aircraft structure. The final part of
the AST report verifies the structural integrity by measuring ultimate load of the proof of
concept part. It was shown that the assembly failed within acceptable limits.
The economic results of the technology demonstration are given in Figure 64. The
cost data are given for the cumulative average of 300 aircraft, and show an average of 20
percent cost improvement over the baseline aluminum structure for the wing box, the wing
cover, and wing assembly. The wing substructure achieved its goal of approximately 7
percent. These results provide valuable calibration key points to testing the CASSANDRA
methodology, as detailed cost and weight information of composite structures relative to
equivalent aluminum structures provide.
4.6 Summary
This chapter reviewed the technology and development factors that drive cost and uncer-
tainty during the RDTE phase of the design process. Recalling the figure illustrating the
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Figure 62: Detail view of the MD-90 wingbox and sections of the S/RFI joining processes
[65].
Technical Uncertainty on the cumulative cash flow space and its relationship to the Mar-
ket Uncertainty, this chapter addressed the factors driving the manifestation of cost and
schedule. The human resources, materials, technology development, manufacturing setup,
testing, and certification processes all contribute during this phase. The core management
problem of addressing how and where uncertainty could be allocated in this phase was ad-
dressed through the use of risk management processes and modeling and simulation. Several
analysis techniques were identified, specifically Monte Carlos simulation and the associated
sampling techniques (fast probability integration, response surface modeling, etc). The en-
try points of uncertainty during these phases were discussed, and the consequence of that
uncertainty were mapped to several risk measurement methods. First, the use of risk ma-
trices was reviewed, especially in relationship to the technology modeling approaches with
readiness levels. The author also addressed how the readiness of a technology and man-
ufacturing were interrelated, and could be probabilistically modeled using the Technology
Network Model, giving the total networked cost and schedule density distributions as a
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Figure 63: Photograph of the stitching of a rib clip the skin prior to resin infusion [65].
function of the elicited inputs for each technology level.
Finally, a technology called Stitched Resin Film Infusion for improving the weight and
cost of the primary structure was detailed following a NASA report. The cost models and
schedule models used in this dissertation were able to be iteratively calibrated thanks to
the detailed report of the technology demonstrator.
This modeling and simulation framework sets up the CASSANDRA methodology to
evaluate how the uncertainty in technology affects not only the cost and schedule impacts
of the development, but then prepares the estimation for the market and production effects.
In this way, the payback and profitability of the technology infused aircraft can be addressed.
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Figure 64: Aggregated cost comparison of the aluminum wing to the S/RFI wing, over 300
sets of wing boxes [65].
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CHAPTER V
MANUFACTURING RISK AND MARKET ESTIMATION
5.1 Introductory Remarks
Recalling the Figure 65, the program uncertainty arose from two fundamentally different
sources that were illustrated on the cumulative cashflow diagram. The technical uncertainty
was covered in the previous chapter, focusing heavily on the costs and time to develop and
integrate new technology. The result was a modeling approach that identified the uncer-
tainty between development costs and program sunk cost, as well as the development time
and the production launch year. These characterize the Technical uncertainty described by
Figure 65, shown here again for convenience.
This chapter addresses instead the drivers for the second element shown on this figure:
the Market uncertainty. Identification of design risk and technology implementation risk
is one thing, propagating their impacts to the revenue, production costs, and program
profitability are another.
This chapter reviews the manufacturing cost drivers and revenue capability. The learn-
ing effect and discount factor theory is reviewed and demonstrated through modeling and
simulation on the baseline problem.
The cost structure of the new aircraft development and operation lifecycle is shown in
Figure 66. This diagram gives an overview of the cost structure experienced during the
lifecycle, organized by acquisition and sustaining costs.
5.2 Aircraft Program Economics
As with almost any new product development, there is an initial investment required to
explore the feasibility and viability of the product. The cost can be generalized by the
point of maximum sunk cost (sometimes referred to as acquisition cost) which usually
occurs at the point of delivery of the first example of the new product. The schedule can be
considered as the mean time expected to reach first delivery (or as time to break even, but
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Figure 65: Life cycle cost tree hierarchy for both acquisition and sustaining costs, broken
down by branch [110].
that assumes more information related to performance). The performance, or desirability of
the product by the market, is related to the slope at which products are generating revenue
from sales. Products with poor relative performance (or high variable manufacturing costs)
tend to have shallow payback slopes and may never reach break even. There are many
other convoluted factors at play during this period, such as in the sales or production rate,
and unit sale price (which tends to vary based on order size, partnership agreements, and
program maturity level).
Recall in Chapter 1, where it was stated that products with a positive expected return on
investment (or positive Net Present Value) are green-lighted, but the assumptions substanti-
ating the product performance, cost, market availability and future presence of competition
are subject to sizable uncertainty. This uncertainty ultimately can be translated to a pos-
sible shift in the expected cash flow chart, shown with the lines above and below the mean
expected return in Figure 65. Note that the uncertainty around the expected line increases
with time, following general assumptions of stochastic diffusion processes.
Figure 68 shows the estimated annual cash flows for a modern commercial transport
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Figure 66: Total uncertainty in cumulative cash flow for complex engineered systems broken




























































Figure 68: Cumulative cash flow for a typical commercial transport aircraft, without cor-
rection for discount factor [91]. .
aircraft program. Note the sharp ramp up in magnitude of both costs and revenues as
production begins, as well as the exponential decrease in production costs over time. Also
note that there are typically some payments early in the development phase. These inflows
are typically a result of purchase agreements with customers, as many sales incorporate a
down-payment of approximately 10-50 percent of the aircraft. This down-payment varies
between customers as a function of the other purchase agreement details.
Figure 69 shows annual cash flows similarly, but this time with the discount factor
demonstrated. In this example a discount rate (similar to inflation rate adjustment) of 10
percent was used. The effect of this is that as the value of money now is greater than money
in the future, the large capital returns in the future may not balance with large expenditures












Figure 69: Cash flow diagram, showing the annual and cumulative cash flows for a typical
commercial transport aircraft. Also note the discount factor and its effect on the present
value of future payments (in the darker shading) [91]. .
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Figure 70: Program costs by category and time spent on a unit basis, reaching the cost-time
frontier [110].
5.2.1 Development of Unit Cost Versus Time
Another approach of visualizing the constituent parts of the cash flow data is to look at the
cost-time frontier, as shown in Figure 70. This view of the development and setup costs
illustrates essentially the same information as the cashflow diagram: both time and cost
dimensions are decoupled. However, in this representation the cost is normalized by unit.
This representation is useful for estimating the relationship between desired production rate
and unit production cost attribution. The key points of this graph are the point at which
the first aircraft can be produced and the placement of the theoretical first unit cost curve.
The production run then drives the cost per unit up or down along the curve as a function
of the run quantity.
As more new technology is introduced, the location of the first unit key point tends to
become higher and to the right, reflecting schedule slippage and cost overrun. The pro-
grammatic value of this effect can be restored either by increasing the production quantity






































Figure 71: Program costs by category versus number of aircraft planned in amortization
schedule.
5.2.2 Production Quantity and Program Cost Amortization
On the customer or airline operator side, Figure 75 gives a visual description of the operating
cost metrics relationships between the direct operating costs (DOC), indirect operating cost
(IOC) and total operating costs( TAROC). In FLOPS and ALCCA, these are given by flight
hour, by flight (over two different trip lengths) and by year. These metrics heavily influence
the airliner acquisition decision making [135].
5.2.3 Inflation Rate Effect
Inflation is a fundamental concept of economics that describes how the value of money
changes over time in conjunction with two things: 1) the available supply of money and
2) the generation of valuable goods and services. The principle measure of inflation is the
inflation rate, typically as a percentage per year, which is based off a price index such as
the Consumer Price Index. Changes in the inflation rate have a direct effect on the viability













































Figure 72: Cumulative cash flow diagram for baseline aircraft, showing both the cumulative






































Figure 73: Annual cash flow diagram for baseline aircraft, showing both the cumulative





























Figure 74: Annual aircraft production schedule over the life of the program. Note the 5
year development and manufacturing delay, and the second hike in production rate during
Block 2 of the manufacturing schedule.
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Figure 75: Visual descriptions of the relationship between Direct Operating Costs (DOC),
Indirect Operating Costs (IOC) and DOC+I [62].
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Figure 76: Historical percent inflation rate (API) in the United States through 2009 [45].
increases, it has an adverse effect on likelihood for a person or enterprise to undertake a
risky prospect. This effect is found to exist in the uncertain cumulative cashflow profiles as
well. Figure 76 shows the historical inflation rate for the US dollar over the last century.
5.2.4 Learning Effects on Manufacturing Cost
As mass production of aircraft (and vehicles in general) was continuously improved, a
cost-savings effect was discovered. It was found that as the number of produced vehicles
increased, the costs of each subsequent vehicle tended to drop. This was called the learning
curve effect, and it has historically played a strong role in the overall lifecycle cost of the
program. A feature of the learning curve effect is that it diminishes as the most efficient
tasks for each of the elements of the work breakdown structure are discovered.
The learning curve exhibits an exponential decay in cost as a function of vehicles pro-
duced. Figure 77 shows the learning curve effect on production cost as the quantity of
vehicles produced is increased. Note the two differing learning curves: one with LC = 0.8
and the other with LC = 0.7, and note how their magnitude affects the long-term unit
production cost, and the location of the first unit cost point.
The general approach is to calculate the first unit cost (FUC), then amortize that costs
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Figure 77: Effect of the learning curve on long term production costs per vehicle produced.
over the entire estimated production run. The production effort P (expressed as either cost
per unit or labor hours per unit) is given as:
Punit = P0 ∗ xLCrate (15)
where x is the number of units since the first unit and P0 is the first unit production





An alternative view of the risks associated with the amount of technology infusion is
given in Figure 78. In this graphic, the net, aggregate measure of system risk is given
as a function of the amount of technologies applied to the product. With little to no
additional technologies, the main driver of product risk arises from the Performance Risk as
requirements and the voice of the customer continually demand better performance. The
lack of new technology to meet those demands thus creates a substantial probability of
failure.
However, when many or all available technologies are assigned to the future product, the
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Figure 78: Notional aggregate risk versus the amount of technologies applied to an aircraft
design, with the risk driver types illustrated below the aggregate line.
limited resources reduce the probability of successfully incorporating the maximum set of
technologies. The minimum aggregate risk design lies somewhere in the middle, considering
the costs and schedule risks associated with integration difficulty and the ability to meet
customer requirements.
Traditionally, this minimum risk point could be collapsed to a single variable: aircraft
weight. Before the rise in advanced materials, weight has been empirically shown to be well
correlated with performance and cost. Advanced materials technologies have broken this
heuristic, as the costs and development time associated with composite materials does not
follow the same trend.
Research Observation V
There exists a trade- off in systemic risk between aircraft design parameters, scenario vari-
ables, and technologies.
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The subsequent Research Question:
Research Question V
How should risks associated with portfolios of advanced technologies be optimized for a
given aircraft design and scenario description? How does this change as a function of
the system-level objectives? Which is preferred: a normative approach (what risks must be
assumed to reach target) or an explorative approach (What is achievable within the tolerable
level of risk? )?
The performance, cost and schedule risks can be interpreted from this probabilistic
representation of the cash flow chart. If the expected return is held as the target objective
(keeping with the established definition of risk), then the variance around the expected
line is the risk. In the schedule dimension the horizontal uncertainty in time, before and
after the first delivery (sunk cost) point is the schedule risk. The variance in cost (vertical
dimension) around that same point is a description of the cost risk by the same token.
The performance risk, however, can be simplistically illustrated by the longevity of aircraft
production and sales, under the rationale that better performing aircraft deliver customer
value longer into the future. Put a different way, a higher performance aircraft buys the
manufacturer a longer period of time to maintain a competitive edge, thus staving off the
threat of substitute products and competitive rivalry for a greater time period.
The risks in performance, cost and schedule are given notionally by the shift in these
lines shown in Figure 79.
The result is a region of uncertainty around the resultant positive net cash flow region
(known as in the money by financial traders). Unfortunately, history has several examples of
real aircraft programs that never reached this region; a noteworthy example is the Lockheed
L-1011 Tri-Star, which produced roughly half the aircraft needed to break even, ultimately
























































Figure 79: Notional cumulative cash flow chart illustrating the performance, cost and sched-
ule risk in each dimension for a typical product development program.
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From this depiction of the cash flow and related risks, one can see that there are several
possible paths to end up with positive net cash flow. If the acquisition costs are reduced,
the required time to break-even is shortened, or the required sales rate (performance) is
relaxed. Therefore, it follows that a key concept is that they must all be managed simul-
taneously and that there exists a trade-frontier between risk types. Making these trades,
or exchanges between types of risk exposure, is a central task of the risk mitigation and
strategic alignment of the program.
In the previous phase, price and volume trends were observed to have large impact
on the cash flow response. This result was not unexpected, however, it became obvious
that there existed a need for connecting the value of the aircraft product to the number of
aircraft produced. This phase addresses the need for a model to connect those two metrics
in a traceable manner. It begins with a review of the observations from the software
economics discovered in the results from the previous phase. Next, a set of alternative
routes is identified and an approach is selected, then developed to meet the market and
manufacturing requirement. Finally, the section ends with a demonstration of the model,
an expert-based calibration process, and the filtration process of results.
5.3 Market Share Modeling
Following the Observations in previous sections, the preliminary results from the FLOPS/ALCCA
exploration indicated that the parameter Number of Vehicles (NV) greatly affected the re-
sulting cash flow trajectory due to its connection to aircraft price and the amortization
of the development costs. It was particularly important with regard to the likelihood of
profitability by the end of the program duration. This result is expected, as with most
manufacturing problems, the break-even (and consequently profit) is a function of costs per
unit, revenue per unit, and volume. The volume of goods sold scales the revenue linearly.
Flops and ALCCA treat the number of vehicles and the production rate as inputs, and
therefore treat the market capacity independently from the value (or saleability) of the
aircraft design itself.
A brief review of Porter’s famous publication in the Harvard Business review about
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the Five Forces of business [103] is perhaps useful in preparing the experimentation and
development of the Market model for this phase. Porter argues that there are the Five
Forces at the core of successful business practices. They are given here with commentary
about their relationship to the commercial transport market:
1. Bargaining power of suppliers - commercial transport integration is extremely sensitive
to the supply chain. A typical commercial airliner contain hundreds of thousands of
parts sourced outside the airframe manufacturer/integrator. The risks associated with
the fragility and schedule of these supply networks were covered briefly in Chapter 1.
2. Bargaining power of customers - The trade space between volume and sales price
generally changes during the life of the aircraft program as the manufacturer recovers
more and more of their investment in the program [59] [39]. The list price typically
increases 3-5% annually to account for inflation and the reduction in program risk by
the manufacturer [9].
3. Threat of new entrants - The development and growth of alternatives have recently
occurred that threaten the stability of the recent duopoly between Airbus and Boeing,
particularly from Asian and South American manufacturers [117] [19].
4. Threat of substitute products - Substitutes for air travel, such as high-speed train
systems and high-efficiency automobiles have increased in the last 20 years, slowly
threatening the commercial air transport market [59].
5. Competitive rivalry within an industry - The 150 passenger commercial transport
aircraft is captured principally by Airbus and Boeing, but other alternatives exist
such as Bombardier and Comac [98] [61]. Appendix F gives a selection of figures
showing the struggle between the two manufacturers over the last twenty years.
The interaction of the Five Forces is given in Figure 80, showing the four satellite forces
feeding into the competitive rivalry at the business challenge core.
Reviewing this literature, it became apparent to the author that each of the Five Force
areas represent possible risk entry points. Recall Figure 19 showing the interrelationship
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Figure 80: Porter’s Five Forces illustrates a complete dissection of business challenges to
economic success [103] [120].
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between the risk dimensions typically discussed in business practices. In Chapter 1, a
short discussion was introduced about the rivalry between Boeing and Airbus, as well as
the impact of the sensitivity to the supply chain and risk-sharing approach and subsequent
schedule risks realized during the Boeing 787. For the focus of this phase of experimentation,
it was determined that the core of the Five Forces, the Competitive Rivalry, was the area
most capable of delivering the relationship between product value to the customer and the
market capacity assumable as a function of aircraft specifications. It should be noted though
that each of these areas is fertile for risk investigation and could provide a rewarding depth
of research. Olson [99], Romli [106], and Thomas [126] have addressed some of these areas
in similar contexts.
Moving forward then with the issue of competition, several approaches were considered in
how to develop a relationship between the market capacity achievable and the performance
and value to the customer:
1. An empirical regression model - Based on previous aircraft sales and their rela-
tive performance. This approach requires an in-depth exploration, a large historical
dataset, and thorough decomposition of the competitive alternatives and scenario
variables.
2. Real Options and Game Theoretics model - This approach is excellent for
quantitative analysis of competitive and decision alternatives as a program or project
moves forward in time, addressing the value of decisions and the lead time a competitor
might face. Several researchers have conducted Real Options approaches to design
and situational selection [16] [15] [102]; however, it is not as effective in addressing the
customer value of the product based on product metrics, nor how to aggregate those
metrics based on customer preferences. Rather, Real Options measures the value of
the availability of the decision itself.
3. Overall Evaluation Criterion - This approach is relatively simple compared to
the other alternatives, and is excellent at quantitatively capturing the (sometimes
qualitative) preferences of the customer. The drawbacks are reliance on a subject
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matter expert to deliver weightings and the lack of a direct competitive function in
the model. However, this formulation could be modified to include competitive effects
directly and the subject matter expert opinion input kept to a minimum.
The historical approach was attractive due to its simplicity and basis on real-world
purchasing decisions, however those decisions may have been confounded with other situ-
ational and internal factors that are not easily resolved or included a posteri. In addition,
the availability of the data may have proven to be challenging and of varying fidelity. For
this reason, Approach 1 was eliminated.
The problem of aggregation of metrics was previously discussed, which was solved by
including cumulative cash flows as an approach for capturing total program risk. While
a Game Theoretics and Real Options approach could be adapted to capture the value of
the option to the customer as a function of the aircraft value, it was likely a poor fit for
solving the market capacity and a costly approach to develop the model. It was preferred to
implement an approach which will aggregate the customer value easily and in an traceable
manner. For this reason, Approach 2 was eliminated.
Consequently, it was therefore determined that using a modified Overall Evaluation
Criterion to include competitive effects directly was the most promising.
Hypothesis
A modified OEC can relate the aggregate measure of design value to consumption quantity
amidst competition.
5.3.1 Overall Evaluation Criterion
In 1995, Mavris and Delaurentis [88] published a formulation for scoring alternatives based
on a non-dimensionalized metrics of interest and so-called importance coefficients. The
method arose from a need to measure weapon system effectiveness, an objective that com-
prised many diverse disciplines, namely affordability, survivability, readiness, capability and
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safety. These disciplines were reduced to quantifiable attributes of the design and grouped
into life-cycle cost (LCC), mission capability index (MCI), engine related attrition (ERI),
survivability and availability. Because the score comprised multiple disciplines, it was called
the Overall Evaluation Criterion (OEC). The original formulation is given in Equation 17.
BL represents the baseline value in each dimension. Also note the reversal of the numerator

















The vector of importance coefficients scaling each individual effectiveness metric is deter-
mined by subject matter expert opinion (SME) or customer voice. To position the resulting
OEC magnitude in relation to the baseline, the sum of the importance coefficients is scaled
to 1.
α+ β + γ + δ + ε = 1 (18)
The overall evaluation score of competing designs can thus be compared apples to apples
in relation to the design effectiveness of the baseline (whose score is 1). The comparative
assessment is comprehensive, definable and traceable [88].
Equation 19 gives the generalized form of the OEC definition, with the taxonomy of













αi = 1 (20)
where:
• F is the individual metric
• n is the number of metrics
• j is -1 for metrics that are smaller-the-better and 1 otherwise
5.3.2 Connecting Aircraft Value to Sales/Production Quantity
It was determined that there was a strong need to connect the number of vehicles produced
(or sold) to a quantifiable value assessment of the individual aircraft design. This was
discovered when conducting the original analysis with BASUCA: outlier designs in the
cumulative cash flow, upon close inspection, were found to have attributes that were not
congruent with the feed-forward variable setting of NV (number of vehicles). These outliers
effectively distort or dilute the design space with nonsensical results (a basic example being
an aircraft design whose performance is measurably worse than existing alternatives and yet
still captures a large percentage of the available market). This is a result of the permission
of NV input to vary in the screening test phase of the methodology.
As this parameter is strongly coupled with the terminal cumulative cash flow (or manu-
facturer ROI), the decision was made to increase the fidelity of the model to accommodate
this effect and reduce the potential of these nonsensical points to affect the design space.
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Table 12: Aircraft Criteria for Customer Buying Practices.
Customer Criteria Units
Delivery Date Years from now
Aircraft Purchase Price Millions of Dollars
Base Passenger Configuration Number (1-class)
Dollars per RPM Dollars
Range Nautical miles
Specific Fuel Consumption Dimensionless
Gross Takeoff Weight Pounds
Direct Operating Cost Dollars per flight
Indirect Operating Cost Dollars per flight
Takeoff Field Length Feet
Landing Field Length Feet
5.3.2.1 Incorporating value-driven estimation into market filtration schema
In order to develop a model for estimating the number of aircraft saleable by a commer-
cial transport manufacturer, customer buying practices were evaluated. This subject was
addressed in detail by references [101] [79] [18].
This resulted in the creation of an adapted OEC-based formulation for estimating the














αi = 1 (22)
where:
• F is the individual criterion with subscripts for Baseline, Design (i), and Competitor
• n is the number of metrics
• j is -1 for metrics that are smaller-the-better and 1 otherwise
• β is the scale factor for competitive effect
5.3.2.2 Assumptions for the OEC+ competitive valuation
The following assumptions must be declared about the competitive-enabled OEC+ model
for determining market share:
• The customer is rational.
• Old customers are just as hard to keep as new customers are to get. If something
performs better or costs less, the customer always favors those attributes. Put another
way, the customer is not brand-loyal.
• All of the planes are produced and delivered on time. Note that this enables study of
how production slippage could affect the incoming order rate.
• An identical aircraft in terms of the metrics will capture exactly 50 percent of the
market segment.
• A categorically better product will capture 100 percent of the market segment.
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• A categorically worse product will capture 0 percent of the market segment.
• There is only one competitor (as in the duopoly between Airbus and Boeing). This
assumption could be argued as invalid because at the time of this dissertation there
exists several other manufacturers in the 150-passenger aircraft market. However,
expansion of the OEC+ model to include non-duopolies is left for discussion in a later
section.
With these assumptions identified, it is now possible to establish the three calibration
points needed to bound the OEC+ competitive market model. In practice, the boundary
constraints were found to be too idealistic, so a slight change was made to the center
and upper boundary points. In reality, a pure duopoly does not exist, so a correction
factor ∆Mshare = 10% was introduced to shift the center point (equivalent product to the
competitor. This factor shifts the center calibration point down from 50% to 40%, and the
upper boundary (Categorically better) down by 2×∆Mshare = 20% to 80%. Thus the three
calibration bounding points become:
1. Lower Bound - This results from Assumptions 1 and 6: a categorically worse product
captures zero percent of the available market.
2. Upper Bound - This results from Assumptions 1 and 5: a categorically better
product captures 80 percent of the available market. This bound might be a little
aggressive as in practice even the best possible product does not always reach this
goal for reasons external to the ability of the OEC+ to capture. For this calibration
though, this bound still suffices.
3. Even Market - In considering the commercial aircraft market as a duopoly, we can
assume that an equally valuable product achieves 50% minus ∆Mshare = 40% of the
available market. Therefore, a competitive OEC+ score of 1 (equally valuable) should
yield exactly 40 percent of the market.
There now remains only 3 sets of inputs for a subject matter expert (SME) to populate.
They are
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1. The αi Weightings for each of the metrics-of-interest.
2. The β weighting for the level of competitive intensity.
3. The shape factors for the market penetration rate versus the OEC+ score.
5.3.3 OEC+ market modeling environment
Experimental Apparatus
A dashboard in EXCEL was developed to elicit customer value functions as well as com-
petitive offering, enabling the quantification of market penetration estimates.
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Figure 81: The dashboard in Excel used to elicit the Subject Matter Expert opinion and calculate the competition-enabled OEC+
scoring.
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1. Lower bound calibration point 2. Upper bound calibration point
Figure 82: The OEC+ dashboard during two states of the calibration process. On the left the lower bound of the market capacity model
is set as categorically worse than the competitive offering, and vice versa for the right figure.
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5.3.3.1 Results from the market modeling
The market model proved to be a success. It identified the range of production quantities
as a function of the performance and value to the end customer, allowing filtration of non-
sensical design points. The filtration step is shown in Figure 83 in the form of a scatterplot
matrix relating the overall evaluation criterion to the number of vehicles produced.
Beginning with the upper left box, the data points reveal a uniform distribution over
both the OEC and the number of vehicles. This reiterates the feed-forward dilemma of
production quantity, as they are independent of customer value, represented by OEC. The
areas shaded in red which represent the candidate aircraft designs predicted to sell in large
quantities, yet having insufficient overall design value. This set of points is the most impor-
tant to filter because they potentially mislead the Program Manager using the methodology
to design points of unrealistic economic success.
The areas shaded in blue suffer reverse problem (although less potentially damaging):
designs which score well in customer value yet are predicted to sell poorly.
Using the market model and the OEC+ approach, the design space is reduced to the
arc shown in the lower two plots. Here, a relationship between the customer value and the
production run quantity is correlated.
Experimental Result
The OEC+ score was used to calibrate design performance in relation to customer value
functions and competitive offering. This enabled filtration of nonsensical results from BA-
SUCA.
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New Research Observation VIa
A posteri filtration using the OEC+ technique reduces the design space significantly, there
may be improvement in efficiency by generating the designs a priori using response surface
equations.
New Research Observation VIb
The apparatus is now ready to explore and test strategic risk mitigation techniques.
Also note the difference between the OEC and OEC+ versions when plotted against the
same data. OEC+ value metric shows a narrower variance versus the number of vehicles
than the OEC. This is likely due to the low impact of competitive differentiation for the
example problem. In the penultimate chapter, a case study is reviewed in detail further
exploring this effect.
5.3.4 Expansion of the Market Model to Non-Duopoly Markets
An additional concern is the evaluation of the OEC+ formulation when the duopoly as-
sumption no longer holds. In practice, duopoly markets tend to be more present in larger
passenger-count where the aircraft programs are more capitally and technologically inten-
sive. As the passenger capacity and capital requirement shrink, the number of manufacturers
competing increases. This is especially evident in the regional transport category market,
where there are over a dozen manufacturers offering competent aircraft.
Therefore, the OEC plus formulation needs to be modified slightly to accommodate
non-duopoly markets. This is done by adjusting calibration bounds of the OEC+ setup.
Here Assumption 3 must be modified, such that the manufacturer captures an equal share
to all of the other competitors, instead of an achieving 50% of the total market. If there are
n competitors, which all have equally valuable and performing products, then the market







Figure 83: Scatterplot matrix of the Monte-Carlo aircraft design set, before and after
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Figure 84: The trend of the telecommunications market share versus the number of com-
petitors in a market, shown for new entrants and incumbents [56].
duopolies, only that the total number of competitors is two and thus captured 1/2 or 50%
of the total market.
This proportional effect of the number of competitors and average market share has
been examined by researchers. Hoernig [56] conducted a study on telecommunications and
cable providers, and found the similar 1/n relationship shown in Figure 84.
The bounds for categorically worse, and categorically better, theoretically remain the
same; however, the curve calibration between mounting points will be much sharper. This
is due to the overall effect that as the number of competitors increase in the market, it
takes a substantially better product to achieve disproportionate percentage of the market
share. The cell phone market is an example of this. There are a large number of cell phone
manufacturers, however a product such as the Apple iPhone enjoys a large market share
due to its high performance appeal.
5.4 Risk Measurement of Uncertain Cumulative Cashflows
In this phase of the CASSANDRA methodology development, an approach was developed
to aggregate the uncertainty of cash flows into a sparse set of metrics that capture the
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Figure 85: Overview of the information and data flow of the experimental apparatus used
to capture the market and number of vehicles sold.
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difficulty in capturing the economic value of the program by singular metrics taken from
the uncertain cumulative cash flow charts. It was found that when considering these metrics
alone it became difficult to fit models and predict program value. Additionally, it was found
that the reduced set of metrics proved to be useful in filtration of candidate designs.
Several approaches were investigated, and are enumerated below:
1. Algebraic Distance to Ideal - This approach requires the program manager to elicit
an ideal uncertain cashflow, and then calculates a distance based on the similarity
between the candidate cashflow and the ideal. Several methods are possible for the
distance estimation, most notably being the Hausdorf Distance. The shorter the
distance, the more similar the cashflow regimes are.
2. Least Squares Distance to ideal - Similar to the Algebraic Distance to ideal in that
it requires an ideal uncertain cashflow input, this approach calculates the cumulative
square error between the candidate cashflow and the ideal. Also similar to the distance
approach, the lower the summed squares of the error, the better the cashflow regime.
3. Geometric relationships - More abstract than the other approaches, this approach
looks at the fields in the uncertain cumulative cashflow space and develops parameters
describing the placement of the cashflows relative to the profit and loss zones.
At the onset of the CASSANDRA methodology development, a similarity approach
using an ideal elicitation Program Manager was explored. This approach required the expert
opinion to be polled and inserted into a worksheet. That data would then be compared
to the expressed uncertainty in the candidate aircraft design. Figure 86 shows the input
worksheet originally considered, showing the elicitation of the expected (mean) and the
upper and lower bounds.
The approach defines two metrics in particular: a risk-benefit ratio and a risk aversion
angle. These metrics are based off of a geometric analysis of the uncertain cumulative cash
flow. The theoretical approach is given in the next section.
Upon reviewing the uncertain cumulative cashflows from both effects screening and the
composites materials study, it was observed that the spread of uncertainty was expressed
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Figure 86: Executive input worksheet for eliciting ideal uncertain cumulative cashflow.
in both of the time and cash domains, and the value of those cashflows to the program
manager could not be explicitly defined by one or two dimensions alone. The positive
return on investment and its uncertainty were coupled with the maximum sunk cost and the
break-even dates and their uncertainties. If each of these three basic metrics are considered
important to the program manager (the end net cash flow, the break-even date, and the
maximum sunk cost), and they are measured by mean, variance, upper and lower bounds (or
100th and 0th quantiles), then there are 12 simultaneous dimensions to consider. However,
it was found that an experienced eye could just look at the uncertain cashflow and gather
a judgment of the associated program quality. This led to the hypothesis that there exists
a geometric, spatial or visual quality metric to the cashflow quality. This hypothesis led
to the original development of a geometric approach that could connect these 12 uncertain
cashflow dimensions into a small set of comprehensible metrics. Formally declared:
157
Hypothesis
Uncertain cumulative cashflows can be aggregated into two core metrics: the Risk aversion
angle and the Risk benefit ratio, which provide better measures of project risk than cost or
schedule risk alone.
5.4.1 Geometric aggregation theory development
The theory given here is the original development of two uncertain cumulative cashflow
metrics, known here forth as the risk benefit ratio and the risk aversion angle. They are
defined as:
• Risk Benefit Ratio, ΓRB - This metric describes the ratio of the cashflow region
that sits in the profit region of the cumulative cashflow chart, and therefore a measure
of the likelihood (not scale) of the resulting cashflow to end up in the profitability
region. It is called the risk benefit ratio as it is similar in mathematical form to a cost
benefit ratio. A large risk benefit ratio does not guarantee that the ending cashflow
expectation will be large, rather that it be positive.
• Risk Aversion Angle, θRA - This metric describes how narrow the cone of un-
certainty is over the manufacturing phase of the cumulative cashflow diagram. Risk
aversion typically describes an individual’s preference for taking risks (see Chapter 2).
The risk aversion angle describes a risk-averse cashflow space when narrow, and a risk-
seeking cashflow when the angle is large. The risk aversion angle tends to scale both
upside and downside losses in the same way that a financial derivative is leveraged in
both potential returns and cost.
A graphical representation of the two metrics is given in Figures 88 to 89.
The risk-benefit ratio can be simplified to just the fundamental triangular area, as shown



































Figure 87: High-fidelity definition of the hypothesized uncertain cumulative cashflow metric
(the Risk benefit ratio Γrisk) which uses a geometric ratio measurement assess to uncertain
program value.
be calculated using the same triangles as the risk aversion angle. It was found in separate
tests that the ratio increased substantially with the simplification, yet the sorted ordering
of designs did not change. The simplification therefore gives a more optimistic nominal
value, yet provides the same value to the designer using the metric for selection and risk
evaluation.
The theoretical derivation of the two metrics begins by evaluating the metrics available
that capture the cashflow space. A table of the cashflow metrics available and required by
the geometric approach to calculate the risk benefit ratio and risk aversion angles are given
in Table 13.
The required key points are then positioned as shown in Figure 90 to form an extended
triangle over the production phase of the uncertain cumulative cashflow. The triangle is
then bisected across the x-axis to from a right triangle in the upper profitability section,
then a quadrilateral in the loss region. The beginning production date is typically year 5 of































Figure 88: Simplified definition of the hypothesized uncertain cumulative cashflow metric
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Figure 89: Graphical definitions of the second uncertain cumulative cashflow metric (Risk
aversion angle θi) using a geometric approach to program value aggregation.
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Table 13: The uncertain cashflow metrics available and required by the geometric approach
to calculate the risk benefit ratio and risk aversion angle.
Variable Available Statistics Method Requirement Handle
Maximum Negative Cost Mean µ
Variance σ
0th Quantile Required E
100th Quantile
Break Even Date Mean µ
Variance σ
0th Quantile Optional F
100th Quantile
Final Net Cash Flow Mean µ
Variance σ
0th Quantile Required B
100th Quantile Required D






















D = (t, C0)
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to production start date
Optional:
A = [max(tprod.start , t),C]
Figure 90: Graphical definitions of the components required to model the risk benefit ratio
and the risk aversion angle.
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Beginning with the risk aversion angle derivation, the first step is to calculate the
interior angles of the triangle. This is done by calculating the vectors ~BF and ~DE. From
these vectors the angles θ2 and θ3 can be calculated respectively using the line from BD as
the basis.
With these angles known, the risk aversion angle θRA can be calculated from the triangle
identity regarding interior angle sums, given in Equation 23:
θRA = θ1 = π − θ2 − θ3 (23)
Note that the origin of the triangle vertex to the lower left is constrained by the beginning
production date and later. This eliminates the possibility that the vectors ~BF and ~DE are
parallel or divergent, leading to an invalid angle calculation. In this case, the break-even
date (Point F) no longer is necessary for the calculation, as it would over-constrain the
drawing of the triangle.




2(cot θ + cotφ)
(24)
Where b is the length of the side between θ and φ. Using the length of the side L2 from
Figure 90, this gives the total area ATotal
ATotal =
L22
2(cot θ2 + cot θ3)
(25)
And subsequently the area of the upper triangle by the same theorem (although it could





The final area can be calculated by remainder from the total area ATotal:
ACOST = ATotal −AROI (27)
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5.4.2 Exploring the metrics and their implications on different uncertain cash-
flows
In this section, the risk-benefit ratio and risk aversion angles is evaluated for their relative
representation of the uncertain cumulative cashflow. Three scenarios are presented here,
with a further comment on the risk efficiency and how it relates to the two metrics.
Experimental Apparatus
The geometric measurements for uncertain cumulative cashflow were calculated in a MAT-
LAB environment from results from the BASUCA apparatus.
Figure 92 gives three scenarios taken from notional uncertain cashflow data. In the
first Example A, ΓRB = 0.4 and θRA = 40. In this case, the proportion of positive return
on investment to negative cumulative investment is roughly balanced and is notionally
representative of a new aircraft development. Looking next at example B, the effect of
reducing the risk aversion angle at constant risk-benefit ratio is shown. Here, the program
experiences much smaller variance in the cashflows during production phases (given by
the low risk aversion angle), yet has the same proportion of AROI to ACOST . The peak
positive and negative net cash flows are both lower, meaning that the opportunity for large
returns as well as the opportunity for extreme failure are both lower. This uncertainty


































































Figure 91: Development of the two uncertain cumulative cashflow metrics (Risk aversion







































































Figure 92: The risk aversion angle and the Risk benefit ratios given for three different
cashflows. Note the risk aversion angle θRA is held constant at 40deg in Parts A and C,
and the risk benefit ratio ΓRB is held constant at 0.4 in Parts A and B.
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5.4.3 Limits of the Risk Aversion Angle and Risk Benefit Ratio
It is perhaps worthwhile to offer the limitations or numerical constraints of the risk aversion
angle and risk benefit ratio. There are two types of limitations on these metrics: the
geometric and the representative. The geometric limitations result from the mathematical
definition of the metrics, and the representative limitations result from the definition of the
metrics on the uncertain cumulative cashflow chart. They are given here:
0 ≤ θRA > π (29)
0 ≤ ΓRB >∞ (30)
ACOST > 0 (31)
The first constraint results from the definition of a triangle, and is that the risk aversion
angle must be greater than or equal to zero and less than π. The second constraint is on
the risk benefit ratio, and results from the cashflow representation and calculation of area.
Here the numerator AROI may be zero (no positive return) but less than infinity, which
relates to the third constraint: that ACOST must be greater than zero for the risk-benefit
ratio to exist as it is the denominator of the ratio.
In practice, the mathematical approaches have resulted in numbers less than zero for
both risk aversion angle and risk-benefit ratio, but these were indicative of failed cases in
the analysis.
5.4.4 Suggested Relationship to Efficiency of Risk Allocation
In Part C of Figure 92, the risk aversion angle is held the same as in Part A, but the
risk-benefit ratio is now ΓRB = 0.1. This illustrates the need for the combination of both
metrics to grasp the cumulative cashflow uncertainty. In this case, the low risk-benefit ratio,






High Risk, High 
Return
Lower Risk, Lower 
Return



























Figure 93: Comparison of the risk aversion angle θRA versus the risk-benefit ratio ΓRB in
relation to a conjecture about risk efficiency.
.
cumulative cashflow response. Here, the opportunity for positive return on investment is
relatively low, and comes at great expense in likelihood for extreme failure.
Next, a further observation is made about the efficiency of the uncertain cumulative
cashflow metrics: the combination is important to risk efficiency. When programs experience
higher Risk-benefit Ratios, and low Risk Aversion angles, they experience a higher risk
efficiency, and the inverse is true: a program with low risk-benefit ratio and high risk
aversion angles is inefficient (and potentially disastrous). This relationship is given in Figure
93.
5.4.5 Risk Aversion Angle and the Width of Uncertainty Analyses
The risk aversion angle describes the conical spread in cumulative cashflow results conclud-
ing from a risk analysis. It should be noted that its nominal score is proportional to the
completeness of both the ranges of uncertain noise variables and the exhaustiveness of the
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noise variable set. A reduction in either the ranges or the noise variable set will generally
result in a smaller risk aversion angle. Another element of consideration in this research
was the combination of two partial and mutually exclusive risk analyses. In this case, the
risk aversion angle resulting from one uncertainty analysis (studying effects of inflation rate
alone for example) may be combined under certain conditions with another uncertainty
analysis (uncertainty in the labor rate alone, for example), provided there is some a priori
knowledge of the interaction between the two. Following the summation of variance from
two correlated variables:
V ar(X + Y ) = V ar(X) + V ar(Y ) + 2Cov(X,Y ) (32)
Using the same formulation, it is hypothesized that the summation of two risk aversion
angles from two separate yet correlated analyses is
Total[θRA] = θRA,1 + θRA,2 + 2Cov(θRA,1, θRA,2) (33)
Capturing the covariance term 2Cov(θRA,1, θRA,2) may prove difficult in practice, yet
if the term can be identified in a separate study, the summation of risk angles may prove
to follow the hypothesis given in Equation 33. Testing of this hypothesis is left for future
research.
5.4.5.1 Risk Aversion angle and Risk Benefit Ratio results
The Risk metrics defined in this dissertation were evaluated over a representative set of
control and noise variables of the baseline aircraft. The control and noise variables and
their ranges are those used as shown in Table 6.
The first review of the results evaluated the correlation between the risk-impact ratio
and the risk aversion angle. These parameters are mildly coupled through the geometry of
their definitions, yet it was unexpected to see the correlation shown in Figure 94.
In this scatterplot comparison, the correlation from the results is shown. The author
identifies two boundaries, the upper and lower boundary. As these are shown for candidate









Figure 94: Comparison of the risk aversion angle θRA versus the risk-benefit ratio ΓRB. Note
the general correlation between the two, and the associated upper and lower boundaries.
The lower boundary identifies designs that exhibit better efficiency in becoming cashflow
positive by the end of the program.
.
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of designs whose risk-benefit ratio was low yet the risk aversion angle was high. This
represents cases where the efficiency of the risk exposure is lower overall: more variance
in the results by year is taken on in exchange for a lower ratio of risk benefit. Similarly,
the lower boundary in green identifies the frontier of more risk-efficient designs. Here, the
cumulative cashflows experienced a higher return on their risk exposure as the risk angle
was lower yet the benefit stemming from that risk was higher. These designs are presumed
to be more favorable to the program manager.
Next, the metrics were evaluated against the degree of composites introduced into the
aircraft program. This is represented by as a single parameter, given as the average of the
percentage of composite structures in the aircraft program. The data is given in Figure 95,
and shows an unexpected result: as the risk-benefit ratio increases, the mass-weighted risk
aversion angle effect decreases with average composites. This indicates that as more and
more composite structures are introduced, the efficiency of the risk increases. This does not
necessarily mean that the overall risk does not increase, but instead that the return on the
risk you are assuming increases.
Experimental Result
The Risk aversion angle and Risk benefit ratio provided better uncertain cumulative cash-
flow metrics than breakeven date, maximum negative cashflow, and total cashflow metrics
alone.
5.4.6 Criticisms and areas of future development
The risk aversion angle and the risk-benefit ratio are metrics that describe the overall risk
perspective of uncertain cashflows. However, in retrospect, it may prove beneficial to use
the areas defined for the risk-benefit ratios as zones, and accumulate the uncertain cashflows
within those zones. This alternative approach eliminates the possibility that the Black Swan
result could heavily affect the area scores. By mass-weighting or expected utility weighting
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Risk Benefit Ratio
Figure 95: Review of the effect of average percentage of composite technologies to the
relationship between risk aversion angle θRA versus the risk-benefit ratio ΓRB. It is shown
that as the risk-benefit ratio increases, the risk aversion angle decreases as more composites




the histograms of candidate cashflows within the AROI and ACOST regions, Black Swan (of
either success or failure) could be accounted for appropriately.
The second criticism is that the risk aversion angle and risk-benefit ratio captures effects
primarily in the production phase, not in the research, development and production set-up
phases. Therefore, factors such as the First Unit costs are directly rather than indirectly
addressed. In the present approach, the First Unit Cost (or alternatively the Maximum
Sunk Cost) are accounted for in the risk-benefit ratios as the ratio is defined by the overlap
across the break-even line.
5.5 Summary
This phase of the Methodology development generated a scoring approach for uncertain
cumulative cashflows, by generating two new metrics: risk-benefit factor and risk aversion
angle that are geometrically defined on the cashflow space.
New Research Observation VIIa
The combination of risk aversion angle and the risk benefit ratio are needed to describe how
efficiently the risk and cost has been allocated in the program.
New Research Observation VIIb
Designs with lower risk aversion angle and higher risk-benefit ratio are more risk efficient
and form a Pareto risk frontier.
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CHAPTER VI
GENERATION OF RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Recalling the objective of this dissertation, the strategic challenge addresses the core deliv-
erable of the methodology: an exploration of possible what-if scenarios and an approach for
how those scenarios might be mitigated. This last step aimed to bring substantial value to
the program manager, as clarification of the difficulty and cost of the candidate mitigation
alternatives gives further insight into the value and robustness associated with the current
design.
6.1 Overview of the Strategic Mitigation Challenge
In approaching the strategy development problem, two distinct methods are considered.
Recall the identification of two design paradigms: normative and explorative, as described in
Figure 97. Recapitulating, the explorative approach looks outward using available controls
to see what states are possible, and the normative looks from the perspective of the target
state and identifies what is required to reach it.
Similarly, the risk mitigation strategy development method follows the same schema
with two approaches: one from the perspective of the target state looking backward, and
the second from the perspective of current state. Instead of considering the mitigation
strategy as a design change, it is considered a program change in state.
It was not clear at the onset of the strategic mitigation development whether the nor-
mative or explorative approaches were preferable. Therefore, the author explored both
approaches and the results are given in detail.
6.1.0.1 Strategic Mitigation by Exploration
The first approach that was reviewed is to evaluate the explorative paradigm. In this ap-
proach, the methodology begins with a program state that is initially considered acceptable
to the program manager. The driving experimental question becomes What range of states
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are possible while remaining within the current locus of control? Of all of the possible ways
to answer this question, the most direct way was to evaluate the program space by Monte
Carlo simulation over the set of input variables. Other approaches include a structured
Design of Experiments (DOE) over the input space. Typically a fractional factorial de-
sign, a central composite design, or a Latin Hypercube design are applied to similar design
methodologies [10] [14] [107] [99] [67]. However this presents two problems: a balanced
and orthogonal design itself may be difficult to construct for the large number of input
variables, and secondly the number of runs may be too few or two many for the desired
experimental evaluation time. Monte Carlo simulation is advantageous in these regards,
because each sequential run generates a random variable for each input from an elicited
distribution (thus averaging out in the whole to be semi-orthogonal and semi-balanced),
and the user may execute as many simulations as desired. The DOE however benefits from
efficiency on an information extracted about the design space on a per-run basis. However,
the earlier phases of the CASSANDRA methodology development have treated the execu-
tion time per experiment, and the experimental cost of Monte Carlo simulation is already
generally acceptable.
The setup of the Monte Carlo simulation is comprised of three separate steps:
1. Identify candidate input variables.
2. Set ranges on those variables that are acceptable.
3. Elicit the distributions and their shape controls around those variables.
The first element was to identify which inputs were candidates for exploration. This
step is initially troubling, as there are quite a large number of possible or available inputs.
FLOPS / ALCCA alone offer 200-300 inputs to the user, and in real programs the available
inputs or controls to a program manager may be innumerable. In addition, it was not known
what specific combinations of inputs may generate high-risk results. Therefore, a sensitivity
analysis was performed to capture the variables that were likely to have the most impact.
The experimental apparati in Chapter 3 were used to execute the sensitivity analysis and
pare down the list from 73 variables to 15-20.
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6.1.1 Strategic Mitigation Analogy of CASSANDRA
Consider the analogy of the pilot of an airplane which is in level cruise. The pilot’s objective
is to maintain the aircraft in level flight. The pilot has several controls available at his
disposition: the up/down and side/side of the flight yoke, the throttle, the trim tabs, the
spoilers and rudder pedals. In cruise, level flight is maintained with relative ease to the
pilot.
Now imagine that an external perturbation is introduced which forces the pilot to react
in order to maintain the objective of level flight: the landing gear accidentally is lowered, and
is mechanically unable to be brought back up. The drag from the landing gear causes the
nose of the aircraft to pitch downwards, and thus lower the altitude. The pilot must mitigate
this perturbation using the controls available. There are several possible combinations of
the controls which could return the aircraft to level flight, however, to the well-trained pilot
some are more efficient than others.
One alternative might be to pull back on the flight yoke to counteract the pitch-down
moment and return the aircraft to level flight. She may also use trim tabs, or throttle
up the under-hung engines. Each of these accomplish the objective independently and are
independently selectable, however there is a preferred method or (path of least resistance). If
the pitch down moment is small enough, the trim tabs may likely be the preferred approach
as they do not require a constant manual input from the pilot. If the moment is large, the
trim tabs alone may not be sufficient; the flight yoke or engine throttle setting, or both,
are required to meet the objective. Additionally, if the nose down moment is extremely
large, then it is possible that no combinations of control inputs meet the pilot’s objective.
Lastly, the absolute altitude of the airplane may be different in the new equilibrium, but
the objective of level flight is met.
Now we relate this example to the focus problem of the thesis: the pilot in this case
is the program manager, whose task is to maintain the program at a constant profit and
risk level. The pilot’s situation where steady, level flight is returned once the state is
perturbed– yet at a different altitude– is analogous to the program manager who returns the
program to an equivalent but not identical risk exposure and profit expectation state. The
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principle objective of the CASSANDRA methodology is the automation and discovery of
these equivalent state alternatives to the program manager. However, some of the strategic
mitigation vectors may be impossible, unreasonable or are subject to uneven difficulty
levels of implementation. Therefore, the CASSANDRA methodology aims to also take
these considerations into account. This approach follows the normative design problem of
What is required to get where I want? and then evaluate how reasonable those requirements
are.
This example highlights four aspects of the scenario mitigation problem faced by a
program manager of a new aircraft development program:
1. There may be multiple, or no combinations of the control inputs to meet the objective.
2. Control inputs are likely to have ranges of effectiveness limiting their use.
3. Among many successful combinations of control settings, there is a ranking or prefer-
ence to the controller.
4. The objective may be met, but other state variables may change as a new equilibrium
is achieved.
This closely resembles the general properties of a linear system of equations, whereby a
linear system may function in three ways:
1. The system has an infinite number of solutions. This usually occurs when there are
fewer equations than unknowns (known as under-determined).
2. The system has a single solution, known as a unique solution. This usually occurs
when there are exactly as many equations as unknowns.
3. The system has no solution. This usually exists when the system has more equations
than unknowns (Known as overdetermined).
The above general behavior of linear systems of equations is also given in Figure 96.
Note that this is the general behavior for linear systems of equations. If the systems
are not linearly independent, then it is possible for the equations to have no intersection
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Figure 96: Diagram illustrating the relationship between number of solutions (intersections)
and number of equations (lines) for general linear system of equation behavior [44].
(visualize parallel lines in the above diagram). This holds true regardless of the number of
equations given as they could theoretically all be parallel.
6.1.1.1 Normative versus Explorative Design Approaches
There are two fundamental development approaches to design involving technology and
scenario considerations. The explorative approach looks forward to evaluate what might
be possible to achieve given two things: 1) a clearly described baseline, and 2) a set of
sufficiently known perturbations to that baseline. These perturbations can be a set of
mature technologies that are already available, such as a newly developed engine design
[67]; or known future conditions such as implementation of a new concurrent design practice.
This is a combinatorial problem, where many possible states looking forward are explored
by different combinations of the available controls. Exhaustive analysis of the combinatorial
problem will locate the possible reach of the baseline outward toward many states, but those
states may not be unique.
The normative approach instead evaluates the set of changes required to reach a desired
level. Here, the end state is known, but the changes required to reach that state are
possibly non-existent, non-unique, impossible or unreasonable. This instead becomes a
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Figure 97: The two fundamental differences in design approaches involving technology and
scenario considerations [132] [85].
changes and attempt to minimize cost, time, risk, or some combination of those and other
factors to identify a minimum or best approach.
6.1.2 Development of the Program Value Model
It was hypothesized and demonstrated that the cashflow presented additional dimensions
of utility to describing the business case of the aircraft program. Those dimensions were
represented in a curve that is augmented by an uncertainty zone with regard to the future
expectation of the cumulative cashflow. It is at this point that the development of the
methodology faced two alternatives: 1) develop an approach for evaluating the utility of
this uncertain cashflow using qualitative metrics, or 2) develop an approach for the program
utility using quantitative metrics. As it was assumed that the strategy development would
result from a quantitative approach to mitigating program risk, it follows that a quantitative
approach towards capturing the program utility be employed.














Perturbed state at constant X1
• Y2= Y1+∆Y,p
Legend
• Y System Response or State
• X Design / Control Vector
Mitigated Y2 state by X2
• X2= X1+∆X,m 
• Y3= Y2 (X2 )

















Lines of constant 
state value to 
controller
Figure 98: Pictorial describing the strategic mitigation of a design whose scenario expec-
tation is perturbed. Note the strategically mitigated state (Point 3 ) is not necessarily
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Figure 99: Pictorial describing the strategic mitigation of a design whose scenario expec-
tation is perturbed, this time with multiple candidate mitigation strategies of equivalent
overall value.
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curve, with the additional dimension of uncertainty. This effectively creates a three-
dimensional surface from which the program manager interprets value. Several approaches
were considered and are compared in this section and given below.
1. Weighted Sum - Similar to the Overall Evaluation Criterion (OEC), this approach
aggregates various measures from the BASUCA outputs, or from the 3D surface itself.
This bears the advantages of reducing the dimensionality of the problem and directly
incorporating a program manager’s preference or weighting to the outputs.
2. Boundary Analysis - This approach makes strong assumptions about the program
manager’s preference to the moments of the uncertain distribution of cumulative cash-
flow data: essentially that the decision tipping point lies in the bounds of the space,
and that the information once inside is essentially ignored. This approach is useful
for disaster and catastrophic risk analysis, but may not be the desired approach for
an explorative risk and strategy mitigation study. It does however lend itself well to
constraint-based valuation.
3. Bottom Line - This approach looks only at the distribution of the cumulative cashflow
at the perceived end of the program (20 year outlook). While this benefits from
simplicity and a reduced set of variables to analyze, it ignores the cost and temporal
aspect of the program economics.
4. Risk-versus-Reward - This approach uses a method similar to the cost-benefit-analysis
approach, whereby the positive economic characteristics of the program are normalized
by the cost and uncertainty simultaneously.
5. Least Squares from Ideal - This approach takes an executive input of the desired cash-
flow, at every point in the program, and performs a least-squares regression between
the desired and actual cashflows. This has the benefit of capturing all of the cost and
time aspects; however, it requires foresight from the executive to be able to correctly
input a realistic cashflow, and to identify the distribution shapes at each point in
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the program. This level of information may be difficult to extract from the execu-
tive, and it may setup a Pareto frontier in the results space that is actually spurious.
This occurs when points that have low value to the executive (such as early on) weigh
equally to points later in the program (which may have more value). The least squares
algorithm, unmodified, treats these points identically.
6. Aggregated score - This approach uses an Overall Evaluation Criterion (OEC) method
of combining individual responses into a weighted sum of the constituent metrics of
interest. Using an OEC method, the responses can be grouped to generate scores for
different value categories, such as performance, schedule, cost risk and cost.
Hypothesis
Inversion of the linearized Jacobian around a target uncertain design allows the generation of
independent strategic mitigation alternatives that are robust to perturbation of the expected
scenario.
6.2 Strategy Generation in Large Data Sets
This section covers the analysis situation where data and simulation capacity to generate
new data is readily available. The situation applies when modeling and simulation codes are
inexpensive to execute or when large databases exist with applicable empirical data with
which to draw conclusions.
When simulation capacity or existing data are readily available, the core analyst chal-
lenge becomes selection and identification of the particular strategic mitigation that will
bring about the desired programmatic risk effect. This section focuses on a particular ap-
proach for the selection process that is expanded to include not only the mean statistic of
the output responses, but those describing the propagation of uncertainty and its charac-
teristics. It is known as Filtered Monte Carlo when simulation capacity is abundant.
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6.2.1 Filtered Monte Carlo approach to risk mitigation
Filtration of response metrics from Monte Carlo simulation provides an approximated inver-
sion of the modeling framework directly. In this approach, the response metrics are filtered
simultaneously across all of the simulations. This reduces the design space substantially to
a set of designs which represent the population meeting the constraints. Ideally, in looking
at the input variables, a trend or correlation can be identified, this gives the user insight
into the variables and their associated ranges which tend to produce the responses meeting
the filtration.
Figure 100 shows the results from the apparatus before and after filtration. In this
filtration step, the maximum sunk cost was limited by year to the values shown in the data
filter. It is clear that the space has been reduced substantially, and the main drivers for
meeting this constraint became identified: annual inflation rate (API) and aircraft price.
6.2.2 Results from Previous Research
This research leverages an existing state of the art design trade method called Manufacturing-
Influenced Design methodology (MInD) that captures manufacturing influences on concep-
tual and preliminary design and applies the proposed risk-influenced design approach. This
approach was opportune because the trade study produced an extensible set of models in
the form of Response Surface Equations (RSEs) that were built from multiple high-fidelity
codes at the manufacturing level.
6.2.3 MInD Analysis Overview
The goal of the MInD was to bring key manufacturing-level aspects into conceptual and
preliminary design before the majority of product cost is committed. It defines system level
parameters and tool sets that permit conceptual and preliminary design trades that include
manufacturing information. The methodology was a preliminary design level decision trade
to compare manual versus automated manufacturing processes on an F-86F Sabre fighter-
interceptor wing. To accomplish this, it approximated industry-supported high fidelity
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Figure 100: Before and after Monte Carlo filtration of designs in the cumulative cashflow
space from the Model Center apparatus used in the methodology development.
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codes (SEER-MFG, FLOPS and MALCCA) with the speed and space-complete, range-
specific attributes of response surface methodology.
Hypothesis
Mean and Variance are simultaneously valuable to the design environment, and to ignore the
variance around a design metric leaves the opportunity for high-risk, low-reward alternatives
to go unnoticed.
6.2.4 MInD Baseline Aircraft and Target Specification
The MInD study used the baseline aircraft to explore how manufacturing details affect
conceptual design level concerns. The wing was selected as the primary design element and
was decomposed into 6 primary components: Spars, Spar Assemblies, Ribs, Rib Assemblies,
Stringers and Skin. The manufacturing setup, fabrication and assembly processes were
modeled in SEER.
6.2.4.1 Response Surface Methodology
The MInD study assembled several detailed codes to capture the desired system behavior
of the F-86F design problem. In particular, SEER-MFG was used for estimating costs and
labor associated manufacturing parts for the primary wing structure. The combine modeling
network took several minutes to complete one design, so the behavior in the ranges of interest
were captured and converted into a reduced polynomial form without substantial statistical
loss of accuracy. The Response Surface Methodology (RSM) is the multi-variate reduced-
form used in this study. The acceleration enabled Monte Carlo simulations with high run
count, and thus thorough explorations of the uncertain permutations. The formulation of
response surface methodology is given below in Equation 34.













bijxixj + ε (34)
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The b coefficients result from linear regression of the empirical outputs (R) with respect
to the inputs (xi and xj). The response surface equation is suitable for smooth outputs
with few non-linearities within the range of interest. It was found that the majority of the
responses in the MInD could be modeled with response surfaces with an acceptable R2 fit.
Experimental Apparatus
Response surface equations derived from the Excel-based MiND study for the F-86F alu-
minum wing re-design. Based in MATLAB alone.
The uncertainty in the outputs was calculated from Monte-Carlo simulation on the
inputs by generating random variables from a previously elicited distribution. This caused
the propagated uncertainty in the response metrics to scale smoothly with the local slopes of
the response surfaces. This is a heavy assumption made by the MInD study, as uncertainty
and particular risk are not physically bound to smoothness constraints.
The following Risk taxonomy was used in the presentation of the MInD Risk analysis
project, and serves as an example mapping of aircraft level metrics to cost, performance,
and schedule risks.
The Table 15 illustrates the high-level performance and economic aircraft metrics for
the baseline F-86F Sabre and the associated targets for the new aircraft wing design. The
risk-influenced design methodology only evaluates aircraft designs that meet or exceed the
target specifications. The process used to evaluate the manufacturing influenced risk is
given in Figure 101.
Experimental Result
Confirmation of improvement of design robustness by simultaneous filtered Monte Carlo of
both mean and variance of design metrics.
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Table 14: Risk Taxonomy developed for F-86F study.
Category Engineering Response Metric Single Risk Descriptor
Performance Operating Empty Weight (OEW, lbs) Std. Dev. OEW
Performance Maximum Climb Rate (CR, m/s) Std. Dev. CR
Performance Minimum Turn Radius (TR, m ) Std. Dev. TR
Performance Wing Loading (WS, lb/ft2) Std. Dev. WS
Performance Thrust Loading (TW lbForce/lb) Std. Dev. TW
Cost Net Present Value (NPV, $FY2010) Est. Std. Dev. NPV
Cost RDT&E Cost (RDTEC, $FY2010) Est. Std. Dev. RDTEC
Cost Average Cost per Unit (CPU, $FY2010) Est. Std. Dev. CPU
Cost Revenue (RV, $ FY2010) Est. Std. Dev. Revenue
Schedule Total Man-hours (Ltime, hours) Est. Std. Dev. Ltime
Schedule Break Even Year (BEY, rel. to 2010) Est. Std. Dev. BEY
Table 15: Baseline and Target Specification for the F-86F Sabre Wing Design
Metric F-86F (Baseline) Goal Target Value Units
Variable Cost 191.89 -5.00% 182 $K per Wing
Tooling Investment 112.00 -5.00% 106 $M
Net Present Value 289.37 5.00% 275 $M
Acquisition Price 538.60 -5.00% 510 $K
Operating Cost 5.20 Minimize — $M/year
Thrust/Weight 0.42 3.00% 0.4326 —
Wing Loading 47.9 -3.00% 46.5 lbf./ft.2̂
Climb Rate 42.4 5.00% 49.8 m/s
Minimum Turn Radius 475 -5.00% 452 m
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Figure 101: The process used to evaluate the manufacturing influenced design risk in the F-86F study [23].
187
Figure 102 gives an illustration of the strategies characterized by slight displacement
from the Pareto frontier to dominated points where risk in other dimensions is mitigated.
Considering Part A: in the risk-influenced design environment, risk dimensions are viewed
simultaneously with traditional design responses (notionally Performance and Cost in this
case). The current design point is Pareto-optimal in the performance and cost domains,
but when viewed in the Risk space, it is dominated by other, lower risk alternatives [23].
Due to this effect, there may exist design points that are acceptably sub-optimal but
offer gains in certainty and insensitivity to adverse states, as shown in Part B of Figure 102.
These alternatives may offer greater value to the decision-maker and the risk-influenced
methodology is designed to facilitate these trades [23].
In this environment, risk dimensions are viewed simultaneously with traditional design
responses (notionally Performance and Cost in this case). At the top of Figure 102 shows
the current design point is Pareto-optimal in the performance and cost domains, but when
viewed in the Risk space, it is dominated by other, lower risk alternatives.
However, there may exist design points that are within the frontier (Pareto-dominated)
but offer acceptable gains in certainty and insensitivity to adverse states (reduced risk),
as shown in the bottom of Figure 102. These alternatives may offer greater value to the
decision-maker and the risk-informed methodology is designed to facilitate these trades.
This final step of CASSANDRA is the knowledge extraction phase of the process, where
key strategic information can be explored. Uncertain cash flows are evaluated and compared,
and interactive filtration of design, scenario, and technology can take place. Here, trade
studies and what-if analyses can be explored: What is the sensitivity of Technology K2 to
the Scenario Assumption L4? Are there design settings that minimize this sensitivity if
desired?
6.2.5 Concluding Observations
It was found that in the absence of information regarding uncertainty and associated sen-
sitivity to inherent process variance, an executive decision maker may settle on a design
carrying disproportionate risk relative to the expected improvement offered.
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Figure 103: Method for design selection under uncertainty by simultaneous filtration of
Pareto-dominated designs by response means and response variances [23].
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Figure 104: Bubble plots illustrating three design alternatives. When viewed absent of
information about variance, a potentially high-risk design point may be selected. In the
left plot, the variance in cost is given by bubble size, and the variance in operating weight
is given by the bubble color (red being high variance). In the right plot, variance in the
break-even year is given by color and the variance in the net present value is given by bubble
diameter [23].
As large system designs increase in complexity and cycle time, careful attention must
be paid toward the balance of risk and reward. The method presented in this study is
an example of how risk analyses may be executed and incorporated into conceptual design
trades spaces in order to improve decision quality. A complex, manufacturing-influenced
aircraft wing design method was used as an example and modified to incorporate risk
views using both Response Surface Equations and Monte Carlo simulation. The resulting
data were reduced to a Pareto-optimal subset where trade studies that balance risk in
performance, cost and schedule could be closely evaluated.
6.2.5.1 Criticisms to the MInD study and moving forward
Response surface equations were able to model the continuous, smooth output spaces with
low fit and representation error and were generally suitable for example aircraft wing design
problem. It was assumed that the associated risk and risk states exhibit the same spatial
smoothness, which may not always be true in real-life environments.
The second criticism of the MInD study is that the results are not risk by a formal
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definition given in Chapter 2. Instead, they are actually propagated uncertainty, and that
uncertainty is represented singularly by variance. Converting them to risk proper requires
mapping the uncertainty to a utility curve (or cost measure). This approach works well
where the utility function is target-oriented, but the majority of the metrics of interest
are actually smaller-the-better. This means that the variance measure is incomplete: the
deviation could possibly be advantageous or detrimental. On cost metrics (or profit metrics),
the utility space is indeed directional, causing the variance measure to be insufficient in
distinguishing which side of the mean the variance tends to lie.
The third criticism is that the metrics of interest were difficult to aggregate. In the
study, all of the metrics were considered equally and simultaneously. In reality, a program
manager has very clear preferences toward which metrics matter. This approach suffers from
the dilution effect, where important metrics of interest are considered equally (and therefore
averaged in the program managers’ view) with several potentially non-important metrics.
The other problem with this is that not all of the metrics were completely independent,
and aggregating them into a focused decision space becomes difficult. An example here is
the relationship between weight and cost. The cost models were built with weight-based
cost estimating relationship (CERs), so aggregating cost and weight equally has the effect
of scaling weight at a greater rate than cost alone.
Moving forward into the next phase, the experimental apparatus was changed to better
enable the aggregation of the metrics of interest into a more holistic approach using the
cumulative cashflow diagram.
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New Research Observation VIIIa
No aggregated measure for design selection that sufficiently captured the economic viability
and business case of alternative designs.
New Research Observation VIIIb
Variance is non-directional, where there exists in reality a utility space or preference for
lower/higher/target values.
From these observations the following hypothesis can be stated:
Hypothesis VIa
The uncertain cumulative cashflow diagram is a candidate measure for holistic business case
evaluation and risk mitigation.
6.3 Strategy Generation in Small Data Sets
Chapter 2 touched briefly on the subject of making prediction and ultimately decisions in
the presence of sparse or missing data. The following section gives a method for addressing
the development of risk mitigation strategies where data is missing, sparse, or expensive.
This approach uses the normative paradigm, where a target is identified a priori and then
sought out by the control system. The approach given here leverages linear algebra and
first-order approximations of the objective space.
6.3.1 Development of the Jacobian matrix
The CASSANDRA methodology uses vector calculus to identify and discriminate between
the possible strategic mitigation alternatives. It employs heavy use of the Jacobian matrices
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and associated vector sets. The notion of this linear algebra approach came from discussion
with fellow researchers, who considered a similar approach to stabilizing flame combustion
in a supersonic ramjet motor [105], and the exergy allocation of thermal systems in a
more-electric aircraft [82]. The Jacobian, named after the German mathematician Carl
Gustav Jacobi (1804-1851), plays an important role in higher dimensional mathematics
[71] [119]. As the dimensions and risk mitigation strategies span across many dimensions
simultaneously, it was found to be a useful approach in identifying the mitigation strategies.
In this thesis, the Jacobian will refer to the partial derivatives of the response or state
(dependent) vectors, with respect to the control or independent vectors. As a reminder,
the state vectors describe the state of the program economic expectation of a new aircraft
development program. This programmatic economic expectation is expressed as the uncer-
tain expectation of the cumulative cashflow profiles associated with the implementation of
an aircraft design.
6.3.1.1 Definition of the Jacobian Matrix
The Jacobian matrix J , or commonly known as just the Jacobian [116], is the matrix of all
of the first order partial derivatives of a vector with respect to another vector. It is used to
obtain the state values of the system in the vicinity of the current state. If functions can
be written using n endogenous variables, and m outputs:
q1 = f1(x1, . . . , xn)
q2 = f2(x1, . . . , xn)
...
qm = fm(x1, . . . , xn)
(35)
Let F (x) be a vector valued function F : Rm → Rn which is at least once differentiable:
These can be re-written to be a single function that maps spaces Rm → Rn as F(x):
F = [f1(x1, . . . , xn), f2(x2, . . . , xn), . . . , fm(x1, . . . , xn)]
x ∈ Rm
(36)













· · · ∂fm
∂xn
 (37)
This matrix is known as the Jacobian or Jacobian Derivative.
6.3.1.2 Numerical Approximation
Finding the Jacobian at point x∗ allows F to be approximated in the neighborhood of x∗.
It also reveals the sensitivities to F with respect to all of the inputs. If this point is taken to
be x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n), then the approximation around this point by ∆x = (∆x1, . . . ,∆xn).
Using first order Taylor expansion of each term in fi, the functions comprising F become:
f1(x
∗ + ∆x)− f1(x∗) ≈
∂f1
∂x1





∗ + ∆x)− f2(x∗) ≈
∂f2
∂x1








∗ + ∆x)− fm(x∗) ≈
∂fm
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Using matrix notation to combine the vectors into a matrix form to describe the linear
approximation at x∗:























The Jacobian derivative of F at x∗ can then be written completely as
















· · · ∂fm
∂xn
 (40)
The CASSANDRA methodology uses this numerical approximation of the linearized
space of the impact of the control variables (design, technology and scenario) to state
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variables describing the value of the uncertain and at-risk cumulative cashflow metrics.
6.3.1.3 Nullspace vector set of a matrix
The Jacobian matrix describes the approximated n-dimension tangent plane to the point it
is calculated around, (x∗). The goal of calculating this matrix is to use the information it
provides to linearly extrapolate effect of changing the input and facilitate the identification
of control strategies (identified as unit vectors) along which produce the most (or in some
cases no) change. This is useful in two ways:
1. Identification of the set of directions which produces the most change - which is useful
for mitigating adverse strategies in the normative design mode (see Figure 97.)
2. Identification of the set of directions which produce no change - useful for exploring
the set of scenario or design/technology changes which have no impact on the resulting
state space value. Exhaustive analysis of this space gives insight to the robustness of
the particular design point in consideration (see Figure 105.)
Consider the matrix A, which is an m by n matrix, and the homogeneous system below:
Ax = 0 (41)
The set of vectors x which satisfy this system form a non-empty subspace of Rn called
the nullspace and are denoted by N(A) .
Once the Jacobian matrix is determined, the null space associated with the matrix may
be calculated. The nullspace is an independent set of vectors in the input (x) dimension
that produce no change on the output. The nullspace of A must satisfy both addition and
scalar multiplication:
Ax1 +Ax2 = 0⇒ A(x1 + x2)⇒ x1 + x2 ∈ N(A)
and
k(Ax) = 0⇒ A(kx) = 0⇒ kx ∈ N(A)
(42)
if k ∈ R.
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Table 16: Variation in the filtration level of linearized Jacobian matrix of the CASSANDRA
methodology.








6.3.2 Nullspace of the Jacobian
In practice, the CASSANDRA methodology relaxes the constraint slightly to identify sub-
spaces of Rn which are approximately nullspaces, or
Ax ≈ 0
or
|Ai,j | ≤ ε
(43)
Where i and j are the individual elements of A, and ε is a small positive prescribed
threshold. This is done to filter and reduce large nullspaces to manageable and impactful
workspaces following the Pareto 80/20 rule. The numerical nature of the linear approxima-
tion to the Jacobian give the opportunity for spurious micro perturbations, so ε is selected
at a level commensurate for isolating only the most relevant dimensions of the input spaces.
6.3.2.1 Uniqueness and the constraint on the number of input and output variables
As the Jacobian approximation method solves a linear system of equations, there exist
bounds on the number of linearly independent inputs and outputs to the Jacobian lin-
earized system around x∗. The linear system requires that the number of unknowns–or
in this case the m inputs or dimensions of x– be equal to or greater than the number of
output dimensions (n). If the input dimensions are given as the control variables in the





Figure 105: Locus of independent points describing the nullspace of the Jacobian matrix of
a notional design problem. Each of these points in the input space produce no change in
the output space [30].
198
variables, and certain scenario variables. Refer to Table 7 for a complete taxonomy of the
variable types, examples, usage and their justification in the methodology.
Therefore, following the linearization system of equations principle, the following obser-
vation is made regarding the dimensionality of the inputs and outputs to the methodology:
Research Observation IX
If there are m independent inputs, and n dependent output of the model which describe
the product value, and the set Z of vectors describing program-level strategic mitigation
alternatives, then if:
m ≤ n (44)
then the set of vectors Z is non-empty.
6.3.2.2 Nullspace of the Jacobian matrix as a strategic development tool
Recalling the objectives of the program manager, one of the tasks of strategy development
is to identify the directions of managerial action which produce little or no change to
the program value expectation. The sensitivity of the current program state value to the
variables within and outside of control is of value to this goal. To this end, the Jacobian
offers valuable information. The trace of the Jacobian offers the direction of the greatest
change (or gradient), and the nullspace of the Jacobian offers a set of input directions
producing no change. Changing nomenclature slightly from the previous definitions of the
Jacobian and nullspace, let the state space Y be given as
y = F (x) (45)
The strategic mitigation approach compresses the state space into a representation of
state value. Let Value space be given then as:
199
G(F (x)) = G(y) (46)
If the current program state value is G(Y (x)) at the point X, and the Jacobian at that
point is J(G(y)), and the s, i script refers to s strategies defined in i inputs, then:
Null(J(G(y)) = X̂∆x,s,i (47)
where X∆x,s,i is the set of differential vectors, usually called the vector basis of Null(A)
such that any linear combination of strategies in X:
Y (X +X∆x,s,i) ≈ G(Y (X)) (48)
which yields the same value function G(Y ). When the nullspace is calculated on the
Jacobian matrix, it identifies the principle, linearly independent directions in which the
input vector X may change and cause no change in the output vector Y (similar to walking
along a line on a topographical map, the altitude is held constant).
The unique value in this approach is that it produces a set of directions (versus an
approach which identifies a single direction) causing no change in state value. If this set is
large, and the magnitudes of the change are in directions previously interpreted as sensitive,
then the set itself becomes a measure of robustness. That is, the program state value is
insensitive to change (see the section on Robustness in Chapter 3 for more information).
This approach is by its definition explorative: the nullspace of the Jacobian evaluates
change outwardly. The nullspace of the Jacobian is but one set of program information
that can be captured from this linearized approach. In the next section, an approach
for normative of strategy mitigation development is identified using similar toolsets from
algebra.
6.3.2.3 Normative approach to strategy development using the Jacobian
In this section, an approach is developed for the generation of strategic mitigation plans to
return a perturbed state to a state of equivalent value. As described in the analogy of the
pilot maintaining level flight, the theory given here estimates the direction and magnitude
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needed to reach that equivalent state. The resulting plan is a mitigation vector in X that
is given in the variables within control.
Several things are required in this normative approach. Recall that if there are n di-
mensions describing the output states, then this approach requires
1. The original or desired state, given by its value as G(Y1,n) for independent input
vector X1.
2. The current or perturbed state, given by its value G(Y2,n) for independent input vector
after out-of-control perturbation X2 = X1+∆Xp,noise .
3. The Jacobian at the perturbed state, J(G(Y2,n)).
4. The ability to invert the Jacobian.
The first three requirements have been addressed in earlier sections, but the inverse of
the Jacobian matrix has not been discussed. In practice, the CASSANDRA methodology
rarely operates in cases where m = n, or the number of control variables is equal to the
number of dependent response variables (or state variables). Calculating the inverse of
non-square matrices is possible by approximation and use of the Moore-Penrose method
[8] [54]. This pseudoinverse method computes solutions by minimizing the least squared
error of a system of linear equations. Though this approach is computationally costly when
compared to the inversion of a square invertible matrix, MATLAB was able to calculate the
psuedo-inverse matrices of the Jacobian with relatively zero delay.
Beginning with the two state vectors, Y1,n and Y2,n
∆Gp,n = G(Y2,n)−G(Y1,n) (49)
Where ∆Gp,n describes the change in the j between the original and perturbed states.
Letting Z be the Jacobian at Y2,n, or
Z = J [G(Y2,n)] (50)
Taking the inverse of Z the multiply it by ∆Yp, it achieves
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Z−1 ∗∆Gp,n = B∆X̂m,control (51)
where B is the scaled vector norm and ∆X̂m,control is the unit mitigation vector required
to return the state to one of equivalent value. This vector is in differential form, so to arrive
at the total input vector the program manager should give
X2,m = X1,m +B∆X̂m,control (52)
Combining terms yields
[J [G(Y2,n)]]
−1 ∗ [G(Y2,n)−G(Y1,n)] = B∆X̂m,control (53)
This equation yields the formulation for finding the linearized solution to the perturbed
state problem. The mitigation vector B ∗∆Xm,control is of unit length and is scaled by B
and is forthwith referred to as the principle strategic mitigation vector. As in other
gradient-based methods for numerical optimization, this approach yields a single strategic
vector. This leads to the following observations:
1. The mitigation vector may contain elements which are beyond the physical capability
or range of the controls. An example of this from the previous analogy is the mitigation
input for trim tabs, which has a control range of +/− 5deg. The linearized range may
indicate that the controller (or program manager) set the trim tabs to +10 deg, in
which case this is not possible.
2. The method produces a single vector (denoted here as the principle strategic vector),
but that vector may be projected onto vectors from within the nullspace at Y2 to
create independent strategic alternatives that surround the principle strategic vector
to create a strategic vector set.
6.3.2.4 Expansion of the principle strategic mitigation vector into a vector set
As mentioned in the last section, this method produces single principle strategic mitigation
vector. The CASSANDRA methodology aims to deliver many strategic alternatives to
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the program manager, so it is therefore of interest to explore expanding the specter into
a vector set. Several approaches were considered, some borrowing from multidimensional
optimization techniques, including probabilistic techniques for evaluating adjacent strategic
mitigation factors. For the sake of simplicity methodology delivers an approach that does
not require extensive programming nor identification of all of the covariance terms needed
in a probabilistic approach. Instead, this approach makes use of the nullspace available at
both the original and the perturbed program states.
As the principle strategic vector and the nullspace of the Jacobian are orthogonal in all
dimensions, it is possible to create a set linearly independent vectors that are a weighted
projection of the principle vector to each of the vectors in the nullspace.
Recalling Equation 47 of the nullspace at X1, we define similarly the nullspace at the
perturbed state at Xp
Null(J(G(Yp) = X̂p,i (54)
where X̂p,i is the set of i vectors describing the nullspace of the Jacobian. Each vector
is also of unit length, and may be projected onto the principle strategic mitigation vector
∆X̂m,control. Let θi is the angle between ∆X̂m,control and each vector within X̂p,i, then the
interior hypercone angle ∆θi creates the set of vector projections, given as:
Xm,hypercone,i = Bsin(∆θi)X̂p,i (55)
Xm,hypercone,i is the set of i surrounding strategic mitigation vectors, each containing m
elements in the control dimensions.
The principle strategic mitigation vector and the nullspace-projected hypercone are






Figure 106: Hypercone in 2 dimensions created by projection of the principle strategic miti-
gation vector onto the nullspace vector set. This approach generates surrounding mitigation
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Figure 107: Pictorial describing the strategic mitigation of a design using the nullspace and
a hypercone angle θ of the jacobian to identify candidate risk mitigation strategies.
.
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Table 17: Control variables and their limits in the example strategic mitigation approach.
Control Variable Value Lower Bound Upper Bound Control Range
AR 9 6 13 7
SW 1250 500 2000 1500
DESRNG 2000 1000 3500 2500
SHT 400 100 600 500
ARHT 6 1 12 11
SVT 270 100 600 500
ARVT 1.1 0.3 2 1.70
SWEEP 22 0 45 45
PWINGTI 0 0 1 1.00
PWINGCO 0.13 0 1 1.00
PWEMPTI 0.6 0 1 1.00
PWEMPCO 0.13 0 1 1.00
PWBODYTI 1 0 1 1.00
PWBODYCO 0 0 1 1.00
PWNACTI 0 0 1 1.00
PWNACCO 0 0 1 1.00
6.3.2.5 Example results from the strategic mitigation approach
Experimental Apparatus
Codes were written in MATLAB that approximate the inverted Jacobian matrix for
nullspace and gradient space identification.
Experimental Result
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Strategic Mitigation, in Percent Change
Figure 108: Percent change in the allowable control space that tries to achieve the normative
strategic mitigation target.
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Scenario Perturbation
Mitigation Effect
Figure 109: Percent change in the results space that tries to achieve normative strategic
mitigation target.
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New Research Observation Xa
There exists a mitigation preference to the controller among the input dimensions as well
as physical limitations.
New Research Observation Xb
Some mitigation strategies are effective, some are not effective. The non-effective strategies
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Figure 110: Overview of the information and data flow of the experimental apparatus used
to test the CASSANDRA methodology.
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CHAPTER VII
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND METHODOLOGY
7.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to identify and structure the dissertation contribution, design
problem, and to formalize the measures of success. The previous chapters focused on the
motivation, literature review of the current paradigms of risk analyses and their applications
in aircraft design processes. The aircraft design exercise has the following key attributes:
a highly multi-dimensional problem with non-linear interactions, mixing varying types and
fidelity of data, not all of which is quantitative nor certain.
This chapter presents the following key aspects of the dissertation and methodology:
1. Identification of the design problem.
2. Declaration of the decision perspective and methodology user.
3. Technologies available and their impact.
4. User preference towards risk, the analysis outputs, and strategy channels.
5. The baseline aircraft design problem.
6. The three case study scenarios.
The systems engineering and aircraft design fields present a stunning variety of problems
bearing risk and risk alternatives. Several candidate design problems were considered; it
is generally believed that the approach, if successful, is adaptable to a large majority of
these problems. The particular selection of the design problem for this thesis is therefore
based on access to public data and high fidelity codes. The Aerospace Systems Design
Laboratory offers a variety of tool sets for research. The most relevant tool sets for broad
economic evaluation of aircraft designs that integrate manufacturing (and thus a variety
of interesting trade study opportunities) are FLOPS, ALCCA and SEER. These are codes
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that have been developed over decades and incorporate a wide variety of empirical cost data
from many sectors of the aerospace industry. The author has experience in risk analyses
using these tool sets (see Appendix C for a description of the Manufacturing-INfluenced
Design study), therefore they were preferred to ground-up cost codes for this dissertation.
This study was carried out for a F-86F Sabre fighter jet. While this aircraft study is both
fruitful and readily accessible, the business management perspective of cash flow analysis
and risk aversion is more applicable to a commercial aircraft problem as the profit and loss
attitudes towards risk are magnified for these problems.
7.2 Identification of the Design Problem and Baseline identification
The CASSANDRA methodology is demonstrated on the executive-level decision-making
problem of a large-scale commercial transport aircraft manufacturer.
7.3 Identification of the CASSANDRA Methodology user
The executive level manager is in charge of a product development program, and is responsi-
ble for the market estimation, design, and manufacture of an all-new technologically-infused
aircraft. Her core objectives are the following:
• Produce maximum profit
• Assume minimum risk
• Achieve minimum break-even time
• Compete favorably with a single competitor by delivering value to the customer
Her problem is therefore multi-objective as the time, profit and risk are assumed to be
independent dimensions. This thesis will refer to this person and her responsibilities as
the Designer, or Program Manager interchangeably. The range of variables in her control
include design variables, technology inclusion/exclusion variables, and some limited control
of manufacturing. Outside of her control are external (market) variables, aleatory noise
variables, complexity factors and certain labor and materials costs. A complete breakdown
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of the control locus is given in the methodology and experimental platform sections of this
dissertation.
7.3.1 Beginning with the end in mind
The core deliverable, as outlined in the Thesis Objective, is the generation of a strategic
risk mitigation plan. Put formally, this is an identification of an adjustment in the
program strategy to insulate the business case from external perturbation or
influence (or scenario). It is appropriate at this time to re-iterate and focus definitions
for the terms in the Thesis Objective.
• Identification: Declaration, discovery generation or calculation and of a strategy.
• Strategy: A vector of settings (or changes to) of the variables within control that
constitute a plan to achieve the specific goal.
• Business Case: The risk-reward or economic viability and understanding of the
associated financial (not safety) risks of a business decision.
• External: Forces or influences that originate outside of the control of the Program
Manager.
• Scenario Perturbation or Influence: Deviation from the planned development,
manufacturing, or market expectations.
7.3.2 Definition and Etymology of Scenario
As the term scenario appears in the title of this dissertation, it is perhaps appropriate to
formally declare its meaning and its implication to the design problem presented to the
program manager. A scenario is an account or synopsis of a possible course of action or
events [133]. This dissertation focuses on the scenario as descriptors or more formally, as
the set of state variables that describe a possible course of events. Those events are given
as the internal and external state variables. Internal state scenario variables include the
role as an aircraft manufacturer or airframe integrator, the core technologies or intellectual
property owned, or the availability and quality of the human resources. External state
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Aspect Ratio (Wing) AR Control Design
Area (Wing) SW Control Design
Design Range DESRNG Control Design
Area (Horizontal Tail) SHT Control Design
Aspect Ratio (Horizontal Tail) ARHT Control Design
Area (Vertical Tail) SVT Control Design
Aspect Ratio (Horizontal Tail) ARVT Control Design
Weight (Engine) WENG Control Design
Sweep (Wing) SWEEP Control Design
Percentage of Titanium (Wing) PWINGTI Control Technology
Percentage of Composites (Wing) PWINGCO Control Technology
Percentage of Titanium (Empennage) PWEMPTI Control Technology
Percentage of Composites (Empennage) PWEMPCO Control Technology
Percentage of Titanium (Body) PWBODYTI Control Technology
Percentage of Composites (Body) PWBODYCO Control Technology
Percentage of Titanium (Nacelle) PWNACTI Control Technology
Percentage of Composites (Nacelle) PWNACCO Control Technology
Number of Vehicles Produced or Sold NV Control and
Noise1
Scenario
Annual Percentage Inflation API Noise Scenario
Complexity Factor (Engine) CFENG Noise Scenario
Learning Curve (Block 1) LEARN1 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve (Block 2) LEARN2 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Assembly (Block 1) LEARNAS1 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Assembly (Block 2) LEARNAS2 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Avionics (Block 1) LEARNA1 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Avionics (Block 2) LEARNA2 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Engine (Block 1) LEARNP1 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Engine (Block 2) LEANRP2 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Fixed-Equipment (Block
1)
LEARNFE1 Noise Scenario
Learning Curve, Fixed-Equipment (Block
2)
LEARNFE2 Noise Scenario
Manufacturer’s Rate of Return RTRTN Noise Scenario
Engineering Labor Rate RE Noise Scenario
Tooling Labor Rate RT Noise Scenario
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variables may include things like the inflation rate, competitive factors and availability and
position in the market. Both of these types of factors influence the economic viability of
the airplane program, however they may impact its economics in different ways. There is a
hierarchy to the scenario state variables worth mentioning. Various researchers, engineers
and managers may refer to scenario variables while describing the same thing or within the
same hierarchy, so for clarity, a sample hierarchy of the scenario state variables is given in
Table 18. In this table, the taxonomy of variables allows the user to understand exactly to
which point of the hierarchy they may be referring.
A complete description of the scenario space is challenging to develop due to the sheer
dimensionality; however, identifying various bounds or nodes makes describing the space
more accessible. The methodology identifies several key scenarios and their associated state
variables, and a space can be developed around those scenarios using those as nodes. The
states themselves may be discretely described (where elements of the scenario are binary),
but they can be mapped to continuous spaces through combinations. Any linear combina-
tion of the scenario variables, provided they are not mutually exclusive, can form a new
candidate scenario. Monte Carlo simulations can be executed for the combination of states
in between the key scenarios which build a progressively more filled spatial representation
and ultimately lead to greater understanding [126] [34].
7.3.3 Definition of Strategy and Implications on the Design Problem
The term strategy is derived from the Greek word stratgos, and was first used in its current
form in writing in 1810. Merriam Webster defines strategy as an adaptation or complex of
adaptations (as of behavior, metabolism, or structure) that serves or appears to serve an im-
portant function in achieving evolutionary success [134]. With respect to the CASSANDRA
methodology, a strategy is a plan of programmatic adjustment to controls to mitigate an
unforeseen degradation (or perturbation) of the programmatic value by external (and gen-
erally uncontrollable) forces. In this regard the strategy, or strategic mitigation, is described
mathematically as a vector in X that accomplishes one of two goals:
1. Perturbation mitigation - Returns the programmatic state to a state of value
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equivalent to the original and desired, or
2. Conditional state value optimization - Maximizes the state value given a pertur-
bation.
The first strategic mitigation approach is similar to a control problem where an output
is fed back to a controller who adjusts the input as a function of the feedback and seeks
to maintain the current value. This strategic mitigation approach tends to favor stability.
This approach has the advantage of knowledge at the current state, and therefore a direct
awareness of the change from the original to the perturbed state. This enables the norma-
tive approach to be employed in discovery of mitigation strategies. However, this imposes
more on the program manager (or controller), in that the original state be one of already
acceptable value. In an explorative design paradigm, this may be more challenging.
The second strategic mitigation approach makes no assumption about the value of the
original state. It focuses instead on how the new (perturbed) state may seek a maxi-
mized programmatic value. This approach lends itself better toward the explorative design
paradigm yet suffers the difficulties of optimization. These difficulties include the potential
for settling on local instead of global minima, expensive function call requirements, and
continuous and discrete factor influences.
7.3.4 Dissertation Limitations on Risk and Modeling Fidelity
In order to scope the work of this work, several assumptions were made on the type, nature,
and magnitude of the environments and the risks modeled therein.
1. Uncertainty Elicitations are valid and complete - The selection of distributions on
the scenario variables, technology costs, technology cycle times, technology impact
factors, and design space exploration are given to be accurate and sufficiently broad.
This single assumption limits the realistic application of the results presented in the
notional problem, however with access to internal data a program manager could
potentially apply the method to improve decision making.
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2. Modeling and Simulation sufficiently capture the potential risk - The physics and
process based simulations are of acceptable validity to measure risk. Secondly, the high
speed surrogate models fit the range sampled with an acceptable degree of precision.
Response surface equations are generally able to model continuous, smooth spaces
with low fit and representation error, and are generally suitable for modern aircraft
design problems. It was assumed that the associated risk and risk states exhibit the
same spatial smoothness, which may not always be true in real-life environments.
7.4 Baseline Aircraft Selection
The generation of technology was selected to be of the early 1990’s, when large-scale use of
composite materials for primary structure became prevalent [11] [51] [75] [80]. The baseline
aircraft class was selected to be a single aisle, tube-and-wing aircraft carrying approximately
150 passengers and a range of approximately 2500-3000 nautical miles. This was selected as
both major commercial vehicle manufacturers (Boeing BCA and EADS Airbus) investigated
replacing their existing products in that time frame. This design problem has been called
the Next Generation Narrow Body and is of current interest to both Airbus and Boeing,
which may aim to replace their aging A320 and 737 aircraft. Table 19 gives a short overview
of the basic specification of the 150-passenger, single aisle Next-Generation narrow body
aircraft.
Several studies, including the Next-Generation single aisle effort, have shown that an
approximated 15-20% reduction in Direct Operating Cost may be possible for this class of
aircraft. This is by incorporating new lighter-weight (and thus fuel-saving) technologies,
specifically in the replacement of aluminum primary structure with carbon-epoxy structures
described in Chapter 1. The reduction in direct operating costs come in part from lighter
weight structures, however the total cost of ownership may be affected by the increase in
acquisition cost. Therefore, there exists a trade between the variable cost savings of the
lighter weight structure to the end user, and the program costs by the manufacturer or
airframe integrator.
1In billions of USD, corrected to Fiscal Year 2010. Amounts are approximates, as development aid and
subsidies shroud actual development cost.
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Table 19: Baseline geometric, performance and economic aircraft specification for the CAS-
SANDRA methodology demonstration. Resembles the Next-Generation Narrow Body air-
craft that major manufacturers explored in the early 21st century.
Description Handle Value Unit
Passenger (2-class) PAX 150 -
Maximum Range RANGE 2040 Nautical Miles
Gross Takeoff Weight GW 150000 lbs
Fuel weight FUEL 34000 lbs
Aspect Ratio AR 9.4 -
Wing Area SW 1360 feet2
Wing Taper Ratio TR 0.201 -
Wing Sweep angle SWEEP 25 deg
Wing Thickness-to-Chord TCA 0.133 -
Wing Loading W/S 114 lbs/ft2
Horizontal Aspect Ratio ARHT 5.6 -
Horizontal Tail Area SWHT 360 feet2
Horizontal Tail Taper Ratio TRHT 0.28 -
Horizontal Tail Sweep angle SWPHT 33 deg
Vertical Aspect Ratio ARVT 1.2 -
Vertical Tail Area SWVT 290 feet2
Vertical Tail Taper Ratio TRVT 0.28 -
Vertical Tail Sweep angle SWPVT 39 deg
Thrust-to-Weight T/W 0.265 -
Approach Speed VAPP 125.3 knots
Takeoff Field Length FAROFF 7515 feet
Landing Field Length FARLDG 5800 feet
Total Thrust THRUST 20700 lbs
Cruise Speed VCMN 0.787 Mach
Cruise Altitude CH 41000 feet
Acquisition Price ACPRICE 100 Million Dollars
Revenue Passenger-Mile $/RPM 0.14 Dollars
Direct $/Flight Hour $/FH-DOC 4600 Dollars
Indirect $/Flight Hour $/FH-IOC 3400 Dollars
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One of the key literature review sources was a report by NASA and Boeing for the
Advanced Subsonic Technology (AST) program, which was dedicated to exploring the via-
bility of more affordable composite structures technologies. The report authors verified an
economically viable, full-scale technology application on an all composite wing box for an
MD-90 passenger aircraft. The MD-90 is similar in size and in role to the Next-Generation
single aisle commercial transport, making the AST report particularly well-suited as a way
to calibrate and develop the CASSANDRA methodology.
For these reasons, the 150-passenger aircraft infused with new composite wing technol-
ogy is appropriate a baseline aircraft for this dissertation research.
7.5 Methodology Overview
This chapter covers the proposed approach to achieving a process with which to address the
Research Questions. This new method, called CASSANDRA, is named after the mytholog-
ical Trojan woman of such incredible beauty that an enamored Apollo gave her the power
of prophecy and the ability to see the future, shown in Figure 111. However, when his love
was not reciprocated, he cursed her so that no one would believe her prophecies. It is hoped
that the method is successful in measuring risks, while avoiding the latter curse of disbelief.
CASSANDRA stands for Computational Aircraft Sub-System ANalysis of Design Risk
Alternatives.
The goal of CASSANDRA is to quantitatively measure the risk of uncertain aircraft
systems and generate sets of risk mitigation strategies. The approach leverages elements of
the existing state of the art of probabilistic design methodology with a geometric scoring of
uncertain cumulative cashflows.
The CASSANDRA method is given in four separate sections: A) Problem Formulation,
B) Realization, C) Analysis, and D) Strategic Risk Mitigation. The constituent steps for
each section are listed below, and are also arranged graphically in Figure 112.
(A) Problem Formulation
(1) Define the Problem and Executive Voice
(2) Elicit Executive Cash Flow Utility Profile
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Figure 111: Artists’ renditions of the mythological beauty Cassandra, who was gifted with
prophecy but cursed with everyone’s disbelief.
(3) Establish OEC weightings
(4) Identify the Expected and At-Risk Scenarios
(B) Realization
(1) Define the Concept Space
(2) Identify the Control and Noise Variables
(3) Setup Fast multi-disciplinary System Model
(4) Execute Design of Experiments and Monte Carlo Simulations
(5) Filter factor effects by Analysis of Variance
(C) Analysis
(1) Calculate Market Capacity Based on Product Value
(2) Filter Candidate Designs
(3) Calculate Uncertain Cumulative Cashflow Metrics: Risk Aversion Angle and Risk
Benefit Ratio
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(4) Analyze the Uncertain Cumulative Cashflow Distributions
(5) Calculate Program State Value
(D) Strategic Risk Mitigation
(1) Identify and Compare Perturbed Program State Value
(2) Identify Principle Risk Mitigation Strategy Vector
(3) Identify Alternative Risk Mitigation Strategies
(4) Implement Mitigation Strategy and Verify
The overall approach to CASSANDRA is indeed a blend of many existing methods.
There is fundamental resemblance to the risk management methods covered in Chapter 4,
where context is given, risks are identified and analyzed, and proactive decisions are made
to address the risks. The process is adapted to probabilistic aircraft design processes where
the emphasis on technology infusion is given [87, 67]. Indeed, CASSANDRA leverages
these proven approaches with a new, additional layer of complexity: the Prospect The-
ory approach to risk interpretation measurement made possible through the use of Target
Cascading the objectives and targets to the sub-system level.
An overview of CASSANDRA illustrating the process and the areas of thesis contribu-
tion is given in Figure 112.
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Figure 112: Overall CASSANDRA methodology for treatment of aircraft program risk.
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7.5.1 Problem Formulation
7.5.2 Defining the Program Metrics and Executive Voice
As with many processes addressing risk assessment and aircraft technology evaluation, the
first step of CASSANDRA is to formally describe the problem, scope, perception of value,
and the system objectives. In this step, the context of the system and fundamental risk areas
of interest are established. The goal of this step is to develop target system objectives and a
tractable relationship between the product voice of the customer and aircraft manufacturer
elicitation of the value function. There are many methods for mapping the voice of the
customer to explicit system objectives (for example, an 8% reduction in the $/Revenue-
Passenger-Mile), notably a Qualitative Functional Deployment (QFD). Aircraft marketing
research helps establish the voice of the customer who establishes the design objectives.
In addition, the system-level value functions are established by parameter-izing the cash
flow curves and mapping them directly to a utility curve. This process involves mapping
objectives to the cash flow parameters, for example break-even year (as an objective) is
mapped to the intersection of the cashflow line with zero net cash flow. An example of the
risk mapping to system objectives is given in Appendix C.
7.5.3 Realization
This set of steps in the methodology assembles and organizes the input variables, the eco-
nomic cashflow responses, and builds the simulation framework. A diagram illustrating this
arrangement is given in Figure 113.
In these steps, the various spaces are identified and bounded for the CASSANDRA
methodology. There are three distinct spaces considered: the design space (x space), the
scenario space (or λ space) and the technology space (or k space. The definition of the
baseline vehicle and the ranges associated with each of the spaces is defined.
The Scenario and Technology spaces require an understanding of the risk intended to
be evaluated. This step involves high level assessment of the exchanges of risk to be made.
Therefore, the elicitation of the Scenario and Technology spaces should come after an eval-
uation of the technologies and scenarios pertinent to the baseline problem. Technologies
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here refers to materials, processes, or measurable improvements to the baseline design. The
scenario and scenario assumptions are all the descriptions of the system and environmental
state that are typically defaulted or assumed in a deterministic or non-risk probabilistic
analysis.
7.5.3.1 Separation between Control and Noise Variables
Figure 113 illustrates a combined view of design inputs, scenario assumptions, technology
forecasting, and results analysis. The design inputs are treated as separate candidate de-
signs, and conducting a design of experiments (DOE) on likely ranges is considered a design
space exploration process. This portion is deterministic.
The scenario assumptions, illustrated at the top of the diagram, are the representation
of the variance in underlying (non-design variable) assumptions that could occur in future
states. The vector describing the shifting assumption in this space is called the λ space.
Possible examples of λ space assumptions could be the price of oil, machining labor rates,
manufacturer learning curves, production rates, etc. The technology forecasting section
(illustrated on the bottom) represents the new probabilistic effects on design responses,
stemming from the addition of new technologies. Their space is known as the k space [87].
An example of this organization of the variables is given in Table 20.
7.5.3.2 Conduct Uncertainty Elicitation and Propagation
This step carries out the uncertainty analysis through the multi-disciplinary system: the
scenario assumptions (manufacturing labor tate, production quantity, etc) and technology
forecasts (materials specification type, manufacturing process, Young’s Modulus, etc) are
executed probabilistically for each design, similar to a nested Monte Carlo approach. This
allows the complete system model interaction between design variables, scenario assump-
tions, and technology forecasts to populate the candidate design response space. For each
of the preliminary designs, candidate ”future risky scenarios” or ”instances” are generated
to represent the potential drift from natural processes of the design specification. These
instances were generated by creating local distributions centered on each sub-system level
parameter in the DOE. This is done for each design point instead of on the whole so that
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the conditional robustness of each design point can be evaluated in post-processing. This
conditional probability calculation arrangement is what separates the risk assessment pro-
cess from a conventional sensitivity analysis: the deviations experienced by each design
point are based around the values defining the design itself, and not on the whole design
population. The values describing relative distributions applied to each design are selected
to represent discrete, likely scenarios defined by subject-matter-experts (SME) during the
risk declaration and distribution elicitation workshop. The result of the workshop will be,
in addition to the set of requisite Monte Carlo distributions, a formal description of the
assumptions and likely states substantiating the uncertainty range of the subsystem level.
This step is a key element of the risk analysis as it brings to light the discrete sources of
uncertainty.
Domain Type Example Symbol
Design Variables Geometry Aspect Ratio XG
Design Variables Configuration Number of Engines XC
Design Variables Architecture Fly by Wire XA
Scenario Assumptions Economic Price of Oil λε
Scenario Assumptions Labor Assembly Labor Rate/hour λγ
Scenario Assumptions Manufacturing Learning Curve λρ
Scenario Assumptions Materials Aluminum-Lithium Cost/lb λm
Scenario Assumptions Market Orders Received λµ
Technology Factors Materials Carbon-Epoxy Composite km
Technology Factors Manufacturing Process Automated Tape Layup kρ
Technology Factors Aerodynamic Circulation Control kα
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Figure 113: The overall CASSANDRA method illustrates an approach to balancing at-risk technology alternatives.
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7.5.3.3 Build the Fast Multi-disciplinary System Model
In this step, the assembly of the codes describing the multi-disciplinary system is done in
the same fashion as existing probabilistic design processes. Modeling and simulation of large
system design problems have expanded to incorporate investigations in the propagation of
uncertainty at the system level. As overall complexity rises, the simulations must increase
in fidelity to maintain accuracy. Monte Carlo technique requires thousands upon thousands
of samples to resolve the probability and variance information needed, posing serious con-
straints on using the high fidelity truth codes. Fortunately, methodological developments
in system-wide design have enabled high-fidelity codes to be captured and converted into
a reduced-form surrogates that can be accelerated without substantial statistical loss of
accuracy. The use of high-speed surrogate models (developed specifically over the range of
interest) are a common solution for achieving the probability density function resolution
needed for resolving uncertainty and risk.
7.5.3.4 System Model Fidelity
For CASSANDRA, the model of the system used is required to be of sufficient fidelity. A
natural question a user might ask is: What is the level of sufficiency (fidelity) needed? The
system model itself is considered an input to the CASSANDRA process; no model fit error
or model representation error is assumed at this time. Stults provides a separate method
used for propagating and developing required fidelity for uncertainty propagation of complex
systems [121]. Response surface equations are generally able to model continuous, smooth
spaces with low fit and representation error [87] and are generally suitable for modern
aircraft wing design problems. It was assumed that the associated risk and risk states
exhibit the same spatial smoothness, which may not always be true in real-life environments.
7.5.3.5 Effects Screening by Analysis of Variance
A two-level Design of Experiments (DOE) is used to develop a wide, space-spanning list
of candidate design factors. The purpose of this step is to reduce this number of factors
to a smaller set that is more active for the design problem and scenario set of interest.
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By statistical analysis of Variance (ANOVA), factors may be separated by their Contrast,
t-Statistic and p-value. Each design contains a vector of design parameters X space (Wing
Span, Aspect Ratio, Sweep, Airfoil, Rib spacing, etc) as well as k and λ vectors of their
respective settings (defaulted at this stage). Each design will then produce an associated
vector or responses, denoted as R.
7.5.4 Analysis
This portion of the methodology contains the bulk of the thesis contributions prior to the
development of risk mitigation strategies. Here the CASSANDRA methodology focuses on
the analysis of the output from Part B. In these steps the output data is transformed, filtered
and measured by the proposed metrics, ultimately reaching a valuation of the programmatic
state to the executive or program manager. It comprises five steps (C1-C5), given here in
summary:
1. Calculate Market Capacity Based on Product Value - Addresses the feed-forward vari-
able of market capacity and production quantity found in FLOPS by defining a win-
dow of likely sales volume as a function of the product specifications, the existing
customer’s baseline, and the level of performance offered by a competitor. This capa-
bility is measured by an enhancement of the Overall Evaluation Criterion formulation,
called OEC+.
2. Filter Candidate Designs - Results from Monte-Carlo simulation are filtered a posteri
by the number of vehicles sold using the prediction window given by the OEC+
formulation.
3. Calculate Uncertain Cumulative Cashflow Metrics: Risk Aversion Angle and Risk
Benefit Ratio - Here additional metrics are offered which capture the driving factors
of program value and risk on the uncertain cumulative cashflow space. These metrics
and their development were covered in Chapter 5, and give insight into the balance
of risk and reward to the program manager.
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4. Analyze the Uncertain Cumulative Cashflow Distributions - In this step, the CAS-
SANDRA methodology user reviews the results from the results processing steps and
draws initial design and technology conclusions based on the distribution and fron-
tiers of the uncertain cumulative cashflow metrics. An example conclusion would be
Design Range drives the risk aversion angle larger and the risk-benefit ratio remains
unchanged.
5. Calculate Program State Value - The responses within the uncertain cumulative cash-
flow space and their metrics are fused with the executive voice and weightings from
Phase A of the methodology to compile the results into a state value. This value
function will be held as the baseline or target in the risk mitigation steps from within
Phase D.
7.5.5 Strategic Risk Mitigation
In this section of the methodology, the user identifies an Expected program state. This
state is held as the reference, or baseline, and is selected such that it be considered to be
the target or program risk neutral state. This state is based on a single setting of the
control variables (both design and technology as well as the defaulted scenario variables
within control), and an expected elicitation of the distributions of the noise variables that
are out of user control.
The CASSANDRA methodology is comparative and gives a normative approach to
strategic mitigation. Therefore, when analyzing the risks to the assumption set in the noise
variables, the scenario is perturbed. This perturbation occurs in the a priori elicitation of
the noise variable. Put another way, the perturbation is defined by a shift in the expected
distribution of the noise variables. Recall the example in the Development chapter where
the pilot is tasked with maintaining level fight. The pilot is then faced with a change in
the variables outside his control: the landing gear will not retract, causing a shift in the
expectation of the noise variables, and he must work within the control space to maintain
the objective. In practice these elicitation are in assumptions about material costs, market
forces such as competitive entry or customer requirement shift, availability of capital, etc.
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Mapping the scenario description and associated elicitation of uncertainty has been
addressed by many researchers studying scenario-based risk assessment, specifically Millet
[94] who used an Analytical Hierarchical Process approach, Savci who used a knowledge-base
[109], and Holbrook [57].
The process for mapping the scenario description and associated perturbation to the
control and noise variables is given below:
1. Identify baseline control variable set and ranges.
2. Identify the baseline noise variables.
3. Elicit the baseline noise variable distributions settings.
4. Elicit any change in control variables or their ranges due to the scenario perturbation.
5. Elicit the change in baseline noise variables distribution settings.
6. Append any additional noise variables, and their ranges not previously captured in
the noise variable set description.
Using the known difference between the Expected and the Perturbed states in the un-
certain cumulative cashflow space, the CASSANDRA method then leverages the linearized
approach for solving for the Jacobian at the perturbed state location. This then gener-
ates the partial derivative sensitivities of each of the controls to the state value metrics.
From this, the principle Risk Mitigation strategy vector can be identified, which points the
user in the direction and magnitude of the control space mitigation strategy. This is a
linearized approach and prone to error yet, so alternative strategies are also identified using
the Nullspace of the Jacobian and a hyper-cone angle around the principle mitigation vec-
tor. Finally, each of these strategies is tested under the perturbed noise variable elicitation
and the mitigation selection is made.
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7.6 Demonstration and Results of the Methodology
This chapter applies the CASSANDRA methodology to a case study, demonstrating the
ability of the methodology to create risk measurement for the aircraft programs and de-
velop strategic risk mitigation strategies. These strategies aim to minimize or remove the
effect of a perturbation in noise variables by offering a set of changes within the control
space. The resulting impact of the perturbation and subsequent risk mitigation strategy is
demonstrated and compared to an alternative approach.
7.7 Case study: A Shift in Manufacturing Cost Estimation
In this case an event has forced the program manager to react to a sudden lack of advanced
material resources abroad and move engineering and tooling processes to the United States.
This causes a reduction in efficiency and an increase in the manufacturing labor and tooling
costs. The case study begins with a current aircraft design and program state that is near
launch ready. The economic risks have already been identified. The associated value of that
program state is given by the value state vector G(y) in Table 21. The case studies will
review the effectiveness of the strategy generation by using the independent sets of metrics:
statistics from the uncertain cumulative cashflows and the set of geometric parameters (risk
aversion angle and risk-benefit ratio).
7.7.1 Setup
Table 22 give the mapping of the scenario to the noise variables. This mapping shows the
original state assumption as well as the perturbation change caused by the external shift
in forces. The disaster is modeled by causing a shift in the distributions of two types of
variables in the noise space: the efficiency factors and the manufacturing labor rates. The
efficiency factors of the composite technology variables were permuted by 9% due to the
supply chain effects, and the labor and tooling costs were increased by 4% due to a shift in
some of the manufacturing to the United States.
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Table 21: Metrics in the program manager’s value function. This function translates the
program state variables from the uncertain cumulative cashflow chart into a weighted con-
sideration to the program manager.
Term Statistic Aircraft Price No. Weighting
Maximum Sunk Cost Mean, µ 3 Medium
Variance, σ 3 Low
100th Quantile 1 Low
0th Quantile 5 High
Break-even Month Mean, µ 3 0
100th Quantile 5 High
0th Quantile 1 High
Total Net Cash Flow Mean, µ 3 Medium
Variance, σ 3 Low
100th Quantile 1 Low
0th Quantile 5 High
Risk Aversion Angle θRA - High
Risk -Benefit Ratio ΓRB - High
Table 22: Mapping of scenario variables to the noise space, and the relative change caused
by the external perturbation described in the Case Study.
Perturbed Original
Factor Distribution Mean (UB) Var (LB) Change Mean (UB) Var (LB)
CFWINGCO Normal 0.47 0.10 - 0.47 0.10
CFEMPCO Normal 0.47 0.10 - 0.47 0.10
CFBODYCO Normal 0.35 0.05 - 0.35 0.05
CFLGCO Normal 1.00 0.10 - 1.00 0.10
EFWINGCO Normal 1.35 0.10 9% 1.23 0.10
EFEMPCO Normal 1.35 0.10 9% 1.23 0.10
EFBODYCO Normal 1.44 0.10 9% 1.31 0.10
EFLGCO Normal 1.10 0.10 9% 1.00 0.10
EFNACCO Normal 1.10 0.10 9% 1.00 0.10
API Normal 0.07 0.02 - 0.07 0.02
LEARN1 Uniform 90 70 - 90 70
LEARN2 Uniform 90 70 - 90 70
RGA Uniform 1.45 0.82 - 1.45 0.82
RMANSUP Uniform 76 41 4% 73 41
RQA Uniform 80 43 4% 77 43
RTENGMHR Uniform 120 65 4% 115 65
RDEVPMHR Uniform 71 38 4% 68 38
HIMAT Normal 1.00 0.08 - 1.00 0.08
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Figure 114: Original uncertain cumulative cashflow from Case study, showing the uncer-
tainty space and the triangle used for generating the risk aversion angle and risk-benefit
ratio.
7.7.2 Analysis
The baseline cumulative cashflow was executed under the original set of noise variable dis-
tributions. The resulting cashflow was then calculated using the BASUCA apparatus, and
the risk aversion angle and risk-benefit ratios were calculated following the CASSANDRA
method. The initial uncertain cashflow and risk triangle is shown in Figure 114. The risk
aversion angle was 37.2 degrees and the risk benefit ratio was 0.47.
The noise variables were then perturbed per the mapping of the external scenario shift
(keeping the design and technology variables constant), and the resulting effect on the
uncertain cumulative cashflow diagram is given on Figure 115. Here, the main change
was a reduction in the risk-benefit ratio, as the portion of area in the positive return
on investment region of the chart is reduced and the break-even date is extended. This
caused a negligible change in the risk aversion angle as the maximum negative sunk cost




Figure 115: Perturbed uncertain cumulative cashflow from Case study, showing the uncer-
tainty space and the triangle used for generating the risk aversion angle and risk-benefit
ratio.
Following the guidelines given in Chapter 5 regarding the efficiency of risk, the perturbed
state experienced a reduction in risk efficiency (by an overall increase in risk at constant
risk aversion angle). This is due to the increased cost structures introduced by the scenario
perturbation: efficiency factors for the technology costs and increased labor and tooling
costs.
The Jacobian was estimated and inverted per the CASSANDRA process, producing the
cell plot in Figure 117. Here the linearized sensitivities of the inputs to the outputs is easily
visualized.
The principle strategic mitigation vector was calculated by the approximated inverted
Jacobian approach shown given in the CASSANDRA methodology. The result was a mit-
igation vector and an associated mitigation vector set calculated from the vicinity of the
perturbation state. The vector is given in Figure 118 as a relative change from the original




Mitigated (under Perturbed State)
Figure 116: Mitigated uncertain cumulative cashflow from Case study, showing the original
state, the perturbed state (due to the scenario mapping to the noise variables) and the
mitigation (under the perturbed state.)


































Strategic Mitigation, in Percent of Control Range
Figure 118: Principle strategic mitigation vector (shown as a percent change of control
variable range) that tries to return the program to equivalent program state value in the
Case Study.
given in Table 17 so they may be plotted on the same scale. Here, it is shown that the miti-
gation required change in the design and technology variables. Among the design variables,
the strongest change was in the reduction of horizontal tail area.
7.8 Methodology Summary
There are many possible approaches to risk mitigation of complex systems. Chapter 4
reviewed some of the issues regarding the ambiguous nature of their effectiveness yet preva-
lence in past and present managerial parlance. The CASSANDRA methodology is but one,
but its focus is on the measurable and actionable implementation of a risk measurement
and mitigation method. From these measurable strategy implementations, further insight
about the economics and the technological, design, and scenario sensitivities to risk become
clear.
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Figure 119: Percent change in the allowable control space that tries to achieve the normative




Risk management is a challenging, probabilistic task that deals with multiple sources of
uncertainty that in turn affect many areas and disciplines simultaneously. The task of
guiding a successful new aircraft design is not immune to these risks, as real-world managers
on these projects must balance infusing unproven technologies and manufacturing processes
with programmatic constraints on cost, schedule, and performance risks.
Dealing with the risks requires a combination of judgmental and technical analyses,
involving many disciplines and perspectives towards risk. This thesis adopted the definition
of risk as a manifestation of uncertainty on program objectives and their consequences, and
went a step further to specifically express those manifestations onto the cumulative cashflow
space using modeling and simulation.
Modeling and simulation have become the standard practice for addressing these issues:
detailed simulations and explorations of candidate future states of these systems help re-
duce a complex design problem into a intuitive, manageable form where decision factors
are prioritized. There have been several important advancements in system design methods
that have leveraged modeling and simulation to carry out structured analyses. Yet, the field
is still growing quickly, especially in domain of probabilistic methods that treat uncertainty
quantification and mitigation. These analyses attempt to reduce overall uncertainty in cost,
performance and schedule by delivering holistic analyses with the ability to examine the
key engineering and programmatic trades: Should I risk making the product in-house or
outsource the manufacturing? What is the best technology portfolio and how do I optimize
and adapt it to my risk tolerance constraints? While there are still fundamental criticisms
about using modeling and simulation approaches (pertaining to fidelity, model form, appli-
cability of assumptions and scalability, etc), the emerging challenge becomes How do you
best configure uncertainty analyses and the information they produce to address real world
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problems?.
These high level questions motivated the dissertation research, and its objective is re-
called below:
Research Objective
In order to contribute to the present techniques for integrating risk management practices
into the design process, the objective of this research is to deliver three things:
1. A methodology that a program manager can use to measure and allocate the risk
arising from technology and manufacturing uncertainty onto the business case of a
new aircraft development project.
2. Development of metrics in the uncertain cumulative cashflow space which better ex-
press the extent and usefulness of the risk being assumed.
3. A process for identifying robust risk mitigation strategies in the presence of either
large or small available data sets.
The CASSANDRA methodology structured several modeling and analysis techniques
into one functional process for the exploration and management of technology and manu-
facturing risk in aircraft design. It sought to answer the question What are the financial
and schedule implications on the business case about including uncertain technology onto a
concept aircraft, and what can be done about it? To answer these questions, this investiga-
tion combined Monte-Carlo simulation, expert-based elicitation and a structure of models
to generate probabilistic results in the value space and a strategic mitigation approach for
the methodology user. This user is ideally a program manager (or executive) of a manufac-
turer/integrator working on a concept future aircraft. In this role, it was assumed that the
program manager has the ability to control design elements as well as the new technology
distribution on that aircraft. She is also responsible for the elicitation of the uncertainty in
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those dimensions within control as well as the external scenarios (that are out of program
control).
Unlike other methods treating uncertainty within the aircraft design process, this method
placed emphasis on the uncertainty in the cumulative cashflow space as the integrator of
economic viability. From this perspective, it then focused on exploration of the design
and technology space to tailor the business case and its associated risk in the cash flow
dimension.
The methodology was applied on a future single-aisle 150-passenger aircraft design, and
evaluated the cost and schedule implications of a composite materials technology called
Stitched Resin Film Infusion. As such, the problem was scoped away from searching for
highly improbable or unforeseeable failure modes (such as Black Swans and safety con-
siderations) and focused on a programmatic impact of design, technology and scenario
uncertainty.
8.1 Review of Research Questions, and Hypotheses
The research contributions resulting from the development methodology are at two levels.
The first level addresses the overarching hypothesis about the CASSANDRA method itself:
Methodology Hypothesis
The CASSANDRA methodology improved design awareness by forecasting the cost and
time risks caused by uncertainty in the technology and manufacturing decisions during the
conceptual design phase.
The overall methodology was compared to existing approaches and was shown to identify
more economically robust design decisions under a set of at-risk program scenarios. Using
the methodology, the fiscal robustness of candidate designs could be identified and projected
onto the uncertain cumulative cashflow space, causing the frontier of best designs to shift
relative to the existing approaches.
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Research Question
The CASSANDRA methodology improved design awareness by forecasting the cost and
time risks caused by uncertainty in the technology and manufacturing decisions during the
conceptual design phase.
The methodology hypothesis led to the creation of the BASUCA apparatus. This ap-
paratus allowed experiments with control and noise arrays to be executed rapidly over a
modeling framework for design sizing, synthesis, and cost estimation. The stitching of these
codes allowed the exploration of not only driving factors for the risk in the design responses
(captured by extensive screening tests), but the execution requirement for sufficiently as-
sessing risk-burdened technology. Recall the research structure:
Research Question I
How many executions of the noise array are enough to propagate the uncertainty to the
cumulative cashflow space and draw the same design selection?
Hypothesis I
Approximately 1000 simulation runs in the noise array for each control run to is sufficient
to propagate the uncertainty and deliver an actionable estimate of the cumulative cashflow
risk.
Result
It was found that between 50-125 simulation runs in the noise array for each control suffi-
ciently propagated the uncertainty and enabled the Jacobian approach to risk mitigation.
Additionally, a set of metrics in the uncertain cumulative cashflow space were developed
240
to assist the methodology user in the identification, evaluation, and selection of design and
technology. These metrics are compared to alternate approaches and are shown to better
identify risk efficient design and technology selections. At the modeling level, an approach
is given to estimate the production quantity based on an enhanced Overall Evaluation
Criterion method that captures the competitive advantage of the aircraft design. This
model was needed as the assumption of production quantity is highly influential to the
business case risk.
Research Question II
How should total program risk impact of technology and manufacturing uncertainties be
measured so as to make cost and schedule allocations?
Hypothesis II
The probabilistic use of the uncertain cumulative cash flow space enables the aggregation
of many business case metrics, and allows for a small set of geometric risk measures that
prioritize design alternatives based on program risk attitude.
Result
It was found that the risk aversion angle θRA and the risk-benefit ratio ΓRB capture de-
coupled dimensions of the program risk perspective and allow for efficient selection and
allocation of at-risk design alternatives.
Finally, the research explored the capacity to generate risk mitigation strategies in to
two analysis configurations: when available data and simulation capacity is abundant, and
when they are sparse or incomplete. The first configuration leverages structured filtration
of Monte Carlo simulation results. The allocation of design and technology risk is then
identified on the Pareto Frontier. The second configuration identifies the direction of robust
risk mitigation based on the available data and limited simulation ability. It leverages a
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linearized approximation of the cashflow metrics and identifies the direction of allocation
using the Jacobian matrix and its inversion.
Research Question III
How should risk mitigation strategies be generated and assessed to best allocate design and
technology risk within program and business profitability constraints?
Hypothesis IIIa
Assuming availability of data and simulation capability, the design and technology control
variables should be selected by evaluating the Pareto frontier of the uncertain cumulative
cashflow program metrics.
Hypothesis IIIb
If data or simulation capability is sparse or unavailable, design and technology control
variables should be selected by identifying a target uncertain cumulative cashflow state
and generating the normative risk mitigation strategy by inversion of the Jacobian matrix
approximation.
Result
It was found that under both assumptions of data simulation capacity, the CASSANDRA
methodology user was able to identify more economically risk-robust design and technol-
ogy strategies than existing methods that do not leverage uncertain cumulative cashflow
information.
8.2 Final Remarks
This research grew out of the observation that risks entered the design space via many
avenues concurrently. The investigation of their integrated mitigation during the design
process is necessary for the program manager to improve her chances of program success in
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an uncertain world. The present research demonstrated the benefit of integrated modeling
and simulation and new metrics for the valuation and exploration of the business case.
The major focus of this research was on the implications of those risks onto the cu-
mulative cashflow realm. It was argued that this is an appropriate holistic measure of the
business case dynamics, and that it was able to capture the risk implications better than
discounted cashflow or net-present value techniques.
While the aircraft design challenge and example problem provided the specific prob-
lem dimensions leading to the development of the methodology, there are other similar
systems-of-systems on which CASSANDRA could reasonably be applied. One application
of particular interest is in the infrastructure for telecommunications and data centers. This
system exhibits large scale investment projects with lengthy cycle and payback periods, and
are also burdened with the perpetual obligation to adopting new technology.
8.2.1 Assumptions and Future Work
There were several major assumptions underlying the research and methods which should
also be explored in future work. Firstly, the uncertainty elicitations are valid and complete.
The selection of distributions on the scenario variables, technology costs, technology cycle
times, technology impact factors, and design space exploration are given to be accurate
and sufficiently broad. This single assumption limits the realistic application of the results
presented in the notional problem, however with access to internal data a program manager
could potentially apply the method to improve decision making.
Secondly, modeling and simulation sufficiently captures the potential risk. The physics
and process based simulations are of acceptable validity to measure risk. Secondly, the
high speed surrogate models fit the range sampled with an acceptable degree of precision.
Response surface equations are generally able to model continuous, smooth spaces with low
fit and representation error and are generally suitable for modern aircraft design problems.
It was assumed that the associated risk and risk states exhibit the same spatial smoothness
which may not always be true in real-life environments.
Other areas for future work include:
243
1. Development of the risk aversion angle for multiple correlated studies. This topic was
covered in Chapter 7 and involves investigating the independence of both width of the
noise ranges and the noise variable breadth with the risk aversion angle. Identifying
how the resulting risk aversion angle may be combined would provide a valuable
contribution as studies from separate researchers may be integrated to better improve
the combined risk aversion angle measurement.
2. Correction for the risk-benefit ratio denominator. The denominator ACOST extends
leftward towards the risk aversion angle vertex, and thus increases the area of the
cashflow space without representation of this space by actual cashflows. This results
in sightly lower overall risk-benefit ratios. An envisioned improvement would be to
correct this effect by trimming the lower left triangle of this area to the lowest cumu-
lative cashflow line (Q0th for ACPrice1.)
3. Exploring the OEC+ further for the case of non-duopoly competitive markets. This
assumption of a duopoly becomes more invalid as new manufacturers enter the com-
petitive space. Game theory may also be applied to positive effect in this area. The
regional transport vehicle (RPV) category is a particularly diverse market where the
OEC+ formulation would need to be adjusted substantially.
4. Unit Cost-Time curve. Instead of the cumulative cashflow space, the author believes
that this plot (shown in Figure 70) may also be fruitful for risk and uncertainty




There exists a group of studies dedicated to resolving risk and uncertainty by analysis of
the boundaries of a system. Major research contributions to boundary-based risk analysis
methods are covered in detail by Morgan [95] and Fishburn [38]. In some of these studies,
the risk dimensions are assumed to be monotonic and the analytical range is solved deter-
ministically, offering rapid assessment of the propagation of uncertainty and a feel of system
limits. This applies well for systems exhibiting low internal coupling and linear behavior
[95], but in larger and more complex systems the linearity assumption weakens and the
Central Limit theorem drives Gaussian-like behavior, particularly in the extrema in which
the tails extend to infinity.
The bounds of the cumulative cashflow problem are indeed of value to the executive,
but Gaussian process will demonstrate a widening of bounds as a function of Monte Carlo
simulations. Effect is studied in great detail, particularly in 6-Sigma approaches, which
specifically define the number of failures per million. It is then worthwhile to examine this
effect, and answer the following Research Question:
Research Question VI
How many simulations need to be executed, and how does that affect the bounds of a
Gaussian system?
Rrequired = Xdesigns ∗Kportfolios ∗ λscenarios (56)
The effect of number of samples on the the extreme bounds of a discrete sample set is
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illustrated in Figure 120. In this demonstration, the number of standard normal random
variables in the sample set was steadily increased from 1 to 100,000 iterations. The normal
distribution is unbounded in both directions, but the rate at which the extrema tend toward
infinity is of interest in understanding the number of runs needed to resolve the bounds of
the aircraft design problem.
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Figure 120: Demonstration of the effect of number of samples versus the mean, standard deviation, and bounds for a pseudo-random
standard normal variable N (0,1).
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From this small experiment, one can easily see that for every order of magnitude increase
in the number of samples, the bounds of the normal distribution expand an additional 1-σ.
The implications of this in the exploration of a design space at risk are significant: increasing
the order of magnitude of the number of samples takes you an approximate 1-1σ further
outward in the risk space. This of course assumes a perfect Gaussian distributed risk space
which will be evaluated in detail in later sections. It is of interest at this time to examine
how the number of samples in the set relates to the number of factors able to be resolved.
For a full factorial experiment, the minimum number of cases required to completely resolve
is given by Equation 57.
RRequired = 2
n (57)
where n is the number of two-level factors. Transforming the x-axis of Figure 120 by
Equation 57 gives the relationship between the number of fully resolvable factors in an
experiment and the growth of the extremas, shown in Figure 121. Here it shows that 1
million samples approaches 20 fully resolvable 2-level factors, with an associated aggregate
extrema at approximately 6 σ from the mean.
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Figure 121: Demonstration of the effect of fully resolvable factors versus the growth and stability of the mean, standard deviation, and
bounds for a pseudo-random standard normal variable N (0,1).
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APPENDIX B
FUTURE AND PRESENT VALUE
As the inflation rate assumption affects the future value of money, it is worth deriving how
sets of future payments and expenses can be corrected to a present equivalent value (and
vice versa). The following equation calculates a present equivalent amount with annual



















The Future Equivalent (FE) value can be calculated similarly using the same approach:
FE(i) = F0(
F/P,i,n) + F1(

















The last approach commonly used to correct future and annual cashflows is the Annual
Equivalent (AE) amount. The AE at a given interest rate is:
AE(i) = PE(i)(A/P,i,n) (66)


















SUPPLEMENTARY AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND UNCERTAINTY
ASSESSMENT PROCESSES
Figure 122: Method flowchart for the TIES process (Technology Identification, Evaluation
and Selection) [67].
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Figure 123: Overview of key design processes for new aircraft development [84].
Figure 124: State of the art airframe development cycle duration, circa 1990 [118].
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APPENDIX D
FLOPS AND ALCCA OVERVIEW
D.1 FLOPS
The Flight Optimization System (FLOPS) is a multidisciplinary system of computer pro-
grams for conceptual and preliminary design and evaluation of advanced aircraft concepts.
It consists of nine primary modules: 1) weights, 2) aerodynamics, 3) engine cycle analysis,
4) propulsion data scaling and interpolation, 5) mission performance, 6) takeoff and landing,
7) noise footprint, 8) cost analysis, and 9) program control [89].
FLOPS was originally written by Linwood Arnie McCullers at NASA. Version 8.11 is
used for the research in this dissertation.
D.2 ALCCA
The stand-alone version of ALCCA was written and modified by Dimitri Mavris and Thomas
Galloway. It is the prediction of:
• AircraftManufacturingCosts(NASACR-152278)










































Figure 125: The manufacturing and airline namelists and analysis chain of ALCCA.
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Figure 126: Cashflow calculations process of ALCCA [42].
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Figure 127: Manufacturer’s ROI calculations process of ALCCA [42].
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APPENDIX E
AIRBUS AND BOEING COMPETITION
E.1 Duopoly dynamics of large commercial transport aircraft manufac-
turers
Figure 128 illustrates the steady battle between Boeing and Airbus, showing both total
orders by year and total deliveries by year [12]. Airbus has grown steadily over the period
from 1989 to 2011 to capture roughly 50 percent of the new aircraft market.



















Figure 129: Chart of Airbus and Boeing commercial transport aircraft, organized by passenger count and maximum range
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